AMERICAN BETRAYAL - Part 4

[Registrar]

This is the fourth in a series in five parts based on the new book American Betrayal: The Secret Assault on Our Nation’s Character (St. Martin’s Press) by Diana West.

DID COMMUNIST INFLUENCE LEAD TO D-DAY INVASION OVER ITALY STRATEGY?



The two most ardent boosters of the Normandy invasion were Stalin and Harry Hopkins.

At this point in this series, the combination should prompt at least a second look at the strategy. The heroism, sacrifice, and achievement of all the Allied forces in Normandy stand undimmed, but the question becomes to whose end was the invasion launched – ours or Stalin’s?

Before laying out some clues to the answer, it’s worth noting that the conventional understanding of the Normandy invasion – the “long-awaited invasion” of the European continent to open the “long-awaited second front” – perpetuates some of Stalin’s most pernicious disinformation. British and American forces had already invaded Europe (Sicily, Italy) long before the Normandy invasion. Churchill famously urged that the advance on Germany continue from already-won bases in Italy and elsewhere in south-central Europe.

New York Times front page the day before the D-Day Invasion

Stalin’s demand for the big U.S.-British push in northern France, however, prevailed. According to the tally of one peeved letter to the editor in the New York Times, this would put the Allies on track to open their ninth front.

Of course, in order to gather sufficient forces for the June 1944 D-Day invasion, men and equipment, particularly landing craft, had to be withdrawn from the European continent – in Italy – to reinvade the European continent – in France.

In his memoir, Calculated Risk, Gen. Mark Clark, commander of U.S. forces in Italy, explains how gutting his forces in Italy in the months before D-Day stalled Allied progress against German forces. (Italy had already surrendered.) Meanwhile, the disappearance of Allied men and materiel from the battlefield completely mystified the Germans.

For weeks, Clark writes, Allied counterintelligence “was catching enemy agents who had orders to find out 'where in hell' were various Allied divisions that were being sent to France.” They couldn’t believe the Allies weren’t dealing them the death blow they had expected.

Allied invasion of Sicily

Italy, after all, as a senior U.S. commander explained to assembled military brass at the Cairo conference in late 1943, “was the correct place in which to deploy our main forces and the objective should be the Valley of the Po. In no other area could we so well threaten the whole German structure including France, the Balkans and the Reich itself."

"Here also our air would be closer to vital objectives in Germany,” he explained. The commander went on recommend “operations in the Aegean”: "From here the Balkans could be kept aflame, Ploesti would be threatened and the Dardanelles might be opened.”

That commander’s name was Dwight D. Eisenhower. Soon, he would be named Supreme Commander of the Normandy invasion. His enthusiasm for the Churchillian Italian/Balkan campaign is preserved in the State Department records of the Cairo Conference.

Interestingly, it doesn’t appear in Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower’s 1948 war memoir, where he portrays himself as an undeviating supporter of the Normandy invasion. The State Department corrective wouldn’t be published until 1961 – the year Ike left the White House. In this way, myths take hold.

To be sure, there were legitimate strategic arguments against the southern European strategy, and the subject is debated to this day. But the political ramifications of a British and American presence in central Europe – holding back the Red Army – are irrefutable.
On August 11, 1943, John C. Wiley, a Soviet expert in the OSS, wrote to FDR recommending the opening of a front in the Balkan area “where it could best influence the course of the war, diplomatic relations with the Kremlin and the peace to come... An invasion of France and the Lowlands would give us no political authority in central and eastern Europe. Only a successful Anglo-American invasion of southeastern Europe can give us a real voice in the eventual peace settlement.”

No one in Communist-“occupied” Washington was listening.

Read Part 5

[Registrar]

West's examples are starting to get a little thin here.  The US had been keen to invade Europe across the channel, and had even resented the diversion of Operation Torch (the British-American invasion of French North Africa) in November 1942, considering that it constituted a diversion of the build-up of troops in England, and delayed the return to Europe. The differing Anglo-American strategies became even more starkly contrasted with Churchill's preoccupation with his preference for taking Europe from the Mediterranean, through the "soft underbelly". To consider that the US preferred Operation Overlord, in comparison with Churchill's proposals, because it might allow the Soviets to occupy more of eastern Europe, is fanciful, even though that's about the way it played out. There seems to be a confusion here between cause and effect. That there were many shady deals between FDR, Churchill and Stalin is beyond doubt, and if one wants to research the nether regions of wicked politics, I would strongly recommend World War II Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and the West by Laurence Rees.  Yes, in preference to West's American Betrayal. I had never felt so disgusted by the betrayal of the Poland by Churchill, and the duplicitous manipulation by FDR in concealing the deals he'd done with Stalin from the American people until after he had been re-elected in 1944, than when they were clearly explained by Rees.  Roosevelt bragged that he could handle "Uncle Joe", and never did he make a more grievous error, and history should not be glossed over that one might overlook his error. Stalin played him like a violin, for all that he was worth, and the outcome was that for millions of people WWII did not really end until the fall of Communism in 1989. FDR felt he was doing the world a good deed by ridding it of Hitler,  but never lived to see how the war swapped one tyrant for another, elevating Stalin into an infamy that Hitler could hardly match. . 

[okla]

It's a general discussion, Okla, and you're really quite WITHIN your element.

I am afraid that the Italian campaign really was more the result of opportunism, and not having anything better to do at the time, than careful planning. It suffered thereby.

Churchill was doing his level best to keep all the troops and landing craft in the Mediterranean, and always had a side-show or two ready to try and add to the agenda. To Britain's interests, of course, one can't fault him for that, if one is English, of course. I'm not, so I fault him.

[okla]

Hey Registrar....No big deal, but I was wondering as to what happened to my remarks ("rants")in regard to General Mark Clark's mistaken, in my humble, opinion that with adequate material,etc his 5th American Army and the Brit 8th could have broken out of the near stalemate that had been the case in the Italian Campaign for far too long, and swarmed into the Balkans and Austria,etc. My post has, evidently, disappeared into the Ozone. As I said, it is nothing of any real consequence, but it has me puzzled. Maybe I deleted it by some means,, but it appears that I answered my own post when, in reality, it is your kind response to the original . Grimlins, perhaps, lol. Cheers.

[Registrar]

Okla,
A rant it wasn't. And in this sub-board about WWII generally, it was not off-topic. I had added my comment to your post, and can't explain why your comment has gone. All I can say is "Sorry about that, Chief!"

Actually, let me take this opportunity to ask you to repeat your comments and develop them further, as they were quite valid.

[okla]

Hey Registrar....I don't think I can reconstruct my previous views as first presented. Something to do with early stages of dementia, senility, etc, but I will make the effort anyhow. My thoughts were that Mark Clark was a not being realistic about his forces being able to burst thru Field Marshall Kesselring's Nazi defenders and break out into the Balkans and thru the Brenner Pass into Austria/Germany. Kesselring, assuming that he was still Hitler's Commander, and if not, his subordenants had learned their lessons well, was a master at defending the Italian boot. All thru the latter part of 1943 and into 1945, when the Allies did, finally, move into the Po Valley, he had used the mountainous Italian terrain to his advantage. The American and British Armies had paid dearly for each mountain that they took in their sluggish move northward. Having all the material, resources, etc in the Allied arsenal still wouldn't have made a level "playing field" for General Clark's forces. The landings in the South of France made much more sense. Better terrain allowed the Champaign Campaign", up the Rhone Valley, to be a total success, drawing off German forces from the fighting in Northwest France, plus allowing the Allies to scoot all the way to the Rhine headwaters area where, of course, German resistance stiffened as they were now fighting to defend their Fatherland in earnest. The push up the Italian boot did force the Germans to keep troops in the region and the threat of some type Brit campaign in the Greek theater also kept the Germans uneasy. I suppose the Brit entry into Greece, near the European War's end, was primarily to move into that vacuum before the Bolsheviks came down from the North. I gotta think that George Marshall was on the right track and had his "eye on the ball" in promoting the cross channel operation as far back as 1942. Churchill was correct, again, in my humble, to insist that the Allies take a "shakedown cruise" in the Med and North Africa prior to attempting anything in Western Europe in 1942. Methinks, Gallipoli still lurked, heavily,in Winston's mind. After reading up on that ill fated effort, one can sympathize with his reluctance on heading to Normandy,etc before we were really ready. One wonders if his heart was really in the venture, even as late as June 1944? Ain't hindsight wonderful??? Now that I have displayed my ignorance, everyone can feel free to cut my humble opinions, regarding all this, to pieces. Cheers. Postscript...I, at times, like to discuss the ETO, but my primary interests have always been in the Pacific and again, primarily that frustrating first 5 months of fighting in the PI. Nothing piques my Military History interest as does Bataan/Corregidor. I guess I am still looking for that gigantic Naval Task Force, led by the "Big E" to come steaming around the Cavite headlands and victory would be snatched from the jaws of defeat. Sadly, it was not to be, but I can keep looking. Patience is a virtue, so they say. Anyhow Midway was only a few weeks distant.