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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 3, 2014 23:18:57 GMT 8
Here's on interesting perspective on the loss of the B-17s at Clark Field on 12/8/41 by Col. Bud Fletcher, who flew B-17s in the Pacific in early 1942:
Not withstanding all the indecisive screw-ups [ at MacArthurs hdqts in Manila early Dec 8 1941] , it was probably a divine providence that allowed the 19th BG to lose all those B-17s on the ground at Clark Field, I'll stand on that: because I'm convinced that all 19th Gp aircraft would have been lost on any attempted raid on Formosa, and the crews too to the last man -- no prisoners. We never recovered a single bail-out from the waters between Java and the P.I. The Japs killed them all on the way down. And for that matter, with very few exceptions, the same was true for the next couple of years in the the, Coral Sea, the Bismarck Sea, etc. off New Guinea. So I say, forget any recriminations about who was at fault and why for not launching the 19th Bomb Gp's B-17s against Formosa. Manchester's book confirms my belief that the Japs would have been sitting on ready, licking their chops; and the damage we might have inflicted under those circumstances would have been minimal if not negligible. As it was, we lost only half our B-17s (the ones at Clark), and nearly all our crews lived to fight on.
And yes, I guess you could say that MacArthur had the authority, but he wasn't all that certain that he did, and I'll bet the s--- would have hit the fan with an entirely different interpretation of that authority by the command authority in Washington if all those B-17s had been launched against Formosa prior to the Japanese strike and none had returned. On the other hand, nobody can explain away why the balance of the 19th BG B-17s were not at least removed to Del Monte.
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Post by darthdract on Jun 4, 2014 0:49:55 GMT 8
Very interesting point you make there Joe.
I am also under the impression that if they had decided to attack Formosa with B-17s they would have send them with out fighter escort? and like you said the Japanese will be on the alert.
Do the Japanese have radar in Formosa I think not.
I know the USA has a radar in Iba airfield.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 4, 2014 0:59:31 GMT 8
I don't think the P-40s had the range to accompany the bombers from Clark Field to Formosa and back. Also, I believe the B-17s at Clark had neither self-sealing fuel tanks nor tail guns.
That was a serious gap in pre-war planning. Because the military believed that a B-17 could either outrun attacking fighters or defend itself from fighter attack, no attempt was made to develop long-range fighters. That became a serious problem when the Eighth Air Force set up shop in England and started bombing the Continent.
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Post by Registrar on Jun 4, 2014 14:18:40 GMT 8
Concerning your statement "On the other hand, nobody can explain away why the balance of the 19th BG B-17s were not at least removed to Del Monte.," that as been at least partially explained. The more worldly pilots and crews had delayed their deployment to Del Monte so as to attend Gen. Brereton's birthday party at the Manila Hotel on Saturday night, 6 December. (The Manila Hotel had a reputation as being one of the best nightclubs "this side of Minsky's.") Although having all been ordered to Del Monte, the senior crews had taken it upon themselves to stagger the departures on a pretext. Having given the order some days earlier (I cannot recall how many days, offhand), MacArthur naturally assumed that his orders had been complied with and that the aircraft were safely at Del Monte, and out of known Japanese range. I have described MacArthur as one of the most "lied to" generals of WWII, and this is but one more example.
What also followed from this was that the crews, inebriated, had raced back from the party to Clark, and had used an Air Corps hangover cure cure - sitting in their aircraft and breathing pure oxygen. This rendered the aircraft less able to take off until all the aircraft could be replenished, a process which was delayed as there was only one oxygen cart available.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 4, 2014 20:34:05 GMT 8
Does the pure-oxygen trick work? I may have to file that one away for future use!
Isn't it ironic that while that party may have cost 17 B-17s, it may have saved the lives of those pilots and crew members?
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Post by fortman on Jun 4, 2014 22:35:00 GMT 8
Joeconnor53 has certainly made a good point. The B-17C and -D aircraft had woefully inadequate defensive armament; no guns in turrets as on later versions. The P-40C, -D and -E fighters would definitely not have made it back to Luzon,even if they survived Japanese fighters. During the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe Messerschmitt 109s were hamstrung by their limited fuel capacity and could not remain in British skies for long, and they only had to fly over the Channel. Flying to Formosa would have been suicide for the P-40s.
fortman
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Post by Registrar on Jun 5, 2014 5:19:00 GMT 8
Does the pure-oxygen trick work? I'm not a doctor but some authorities say it doesn't, and that any hangover reduction is wishful thinking or a placebo effect. Others suggest anecdotal evidence that people who have used pure oxygen after a night of heavy drinking have reported that they were able to decrease headaches, fatigue, and nausea. It might not reduce blood alcohol content in the slightest but it may well reduce the headache and nausea associated with the hangover. You may be no less drunk, but you surely feel better about it. The episode is just a wry little footnote to history. Everything points to the conclusion that had a mission been flown, the early models of B-17 would not have fared well at all, and that few of the men would have survived. The B-17 was a sophisticated weapon, and the circumstances in which it was expected to perform were primitive at best. Even in the ETO the heavy bomber concept needed time to develop and to expect that something effective would have come of the first use of the weapon in the SWPA is staggeringly unrealistic. It is quite conceivable that had the mission been flown, that there was a high chance none would have returned. When you do read into it further, you might also note the different standards which seem to apply to the loss of the B-17's at Clark and the withdrawal of the Navy's submarines from Philippine waters. At this point, the United States had much to learn about the capabilities and competence of its armed forces, and the overconfidence of its leadership. American ground forces in the Philipppines, bolstered by the Philippine Scouts, always gave a good accounting of themselves throughout the campaign, whereas the USN did not begin to fare well until it was forced to clean house after being soundly beaten at Savo and Tassafaronga in Guadalcanal. I am often reminded of the quote attributed to Churchill (though it is nowhere identified in his writings or recorded speeches,) "The Americans can be relied upon do the right thing… after they've exhausted all the alternatives."
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Post by varsity07840 on Jun 12, 2014 8:41:41 GMT 8
Concerning your statement "On the other hand, nobody can explain away why the balance of the 19th BG B-17s were not at least removed to Del Monte.," that as been at least partially explained. The more worldly pilots and crews had delayed their deployment to Del Monte so as to attend Gen. Brereton's birthday party at the Manila Hotel on Saturday night, 6 December. (The Manila Hotel had a reputation as being one of the best nightclubs "this side of Minsky's.") Although having all been ordered to Del Monte, the senior crews had taken it upon themselves to stagger the departures on a pretext. Having given the order some days earlier (I cannot recall how many days, offhand), MacArthur naturally assumed that his orders had been complied with and that the aircraft were safely at Del Monte, and out of known Japanese range. I have described MacArthur as one of the most "lied to" generals of WWII, and this is but one more example. What also followed from this was that the crews, inebriated, had raced back from the party to Clark, and had used an Air Corps hangover cure cure - sitting in their aircraft and breathing pure oxygen. This rendered the aircraft less able to take off until all the aircraft could be replenished, a process which was delayed as there was only one oxygen cart available. That bogus story about drunk 19th BG pilots and crews at the "party" has been around for decades and was recently stretched even further by the author of "MacArthur, The Most Dangerous Man In America", who claims that the reason Sutherland turned Brereton away without seeing MacArthur early on the morning of Dec. 8th was because Brereton had a hangover. Where is the evidence of any of that or the claim that senior pilots made the decision not to go to Del Monte? This was the pre war Air Corp. There's not a chance that that could happen. And, my understanding is that the only pilots at the party that night were from the 27th BG, which didn't have any aircraft. Half of the 19th remained at Clark because the 7th BG was expected within days at Del Monte from the US and there was not room there for both groups, which was another example of the poor planning that went into the build up in the Philippines; no infrastructure and defense to support incoming aircraft. That condition in itself assured that attrition would quickly eat up the 19th. What might have been achieved early on Dec. 8th if a mission to Formosa had gone ahead is a matter of conjecture. But, slight as it was, there was a chance that the 19th could have hit the airfields there virtually unopposed while the JNAF was grounded and delayed in their take off to strike Clark due to fog. Sakai confirmed that they sat on the ground waiting for that vey thing to happen. And MacArthur's claim that he opposed a strike against Formosa because it was suicidal given the enemy's superior is a crock. If he believed that, why did he inform Washington late on Dec. 8th after Clark was wiped out that he had ordered a maximum effort against Formosa on the 9th when half his bombers were already destroyed?
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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 12, 2014 23:40:53 GMT 8
The MacArthur statement was, I believe, a post-war CYA statement. He said that without fighter escort, the B-17s would have had little chance of success in a mission to Formosa. In light of the Eighth Air Force's later experience in Europe, MacArthur's statement was probably accurate. However, from the perspective of 12/8/41, the military (presumably including MacArthur) believed that the B-17 could defend itself and did not need fighter escort. In other words, MacArthur used later experience to justify prior action (or, in this case, inaction).
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Post by okla on Jun 13, 2014 2:39:47 GMT 8
Hey Joe...Gotta agree with your assessment i.e. as to Mac's CYA statement. In 1941 they weren't labeling the early model B-17 as a "Flying Fortress" for no reason, but those early Models paled in comparison with the machine in use by the 8th AF in their trips to Deutchland in 1943-45. Those B-17s were loaded for bear with Tail Gun/Ball/Chin turrets plus the original waist guns,etc of the earlier aircraft, and the ETO Fortresses still took heavy losses when matched up with ME-109s and FW-190s. It would seem that the very nimble Zero would have had much success against Brereton's more lightly armed flyers. Still, our guys might have gotten in a few fortunate "licks", but the way most of our early efforts panned out, it ain't likely, in my humble. Just sayin'. Cheers
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