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Post by joeconnor53 on Dec 7, 2014 22:46:30 GMT 8
I just came across The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific and it makes for some interesting reading. This report was prepared by Gen. MacArthur’s staff after the war but MacArthur refused to authorize its release because he felt it needed further editing. The Army released this report in 1966, after MacArthur’s death. The person authorizing its release was Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson, who served on Bataan as a junior officer and was captured when Bataan surrendered. www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/index.htm#contentsWhat I found interesting is the Japanese perspective on invading the Philippines. On 12/8/41, MacArthur had fewer than 150 combat-ready planes. The Japanese committed 751 aircraft to the Philippine operation. In post-war interviews, ranking Japanese officers said that but for this numerical advantage in aircraft, they could not have subdued the Philippines: 1. Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, formerly of the Navy General Staff, said that if MacArthur had had 500 planes, the Japanese could not even have attempted an invasion. 2. Col. Monjiro Akiyama, Organization and Order of Battle Department, Imperial General Headquarters, said that a “well-equipped” air force in the Philippines would have had a “great effect” on the Japanese decision to begin a war with the United States. 3. Lt. Col. Tokutaro Sato, Fourteenth Army Staff Operations, believed that if MacArthur had had 400 planes, the Japanese might have decided to forego a war with the United States. I’ve read that MacArthur told Washington that he expected no attack on the Philippines until 4/42 and the build-up proceeded on that schedule. Does anyone know how many planes MacArthur was scheduled to have by 4/42?
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Post by victor on Dec 10, 2014 3:01:30 GMT 8
Gen. Harold K. Johnson was the S3 (operations officer) of the 57th Infantry PS. He pretty much took over and ran the show at Mabatang when their real regimental CO, Col. Clarke, suffered from nervous breakdown as soon as the shooting started. There's a book about him.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Dec 11, 2014 22:31:31 GMT 8
I’ve read the portions of The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific that deal with the early part of the war. There were no earth-shaking revelations but I found a few things of interest:
1. The report states that when the Japanese launched their air attacks in early December, “Enemy bombers were guided in by sympathizers or espionage agents located near military objectives.” Some memoirs of Bataan survivors mention such fifth-column activities but those accounts were all second or third hand. I have never seen any that were documented. At that stage, our airfields were not camouflaged and Clark Field, Cavite etc. weren’t exactly difficult to find. Has anyone seen any documentation of such fifth-column activities?
2. The report perpetuates the overestimates of Japanese losses during the first week of the war:
a. “The enemy carried out 14 major air raids on military objectives in the Philippines, but paid dearly in the loss of transports, planes and troops and at least two battleships badly damaged as a result of action by our air and ground forces.”
b. “An enemy landing was attempted in the Lingayen area, but was repulsed by a Philippine Army division.” This repulsed landing was imaginary. News reporters (Clark Lee?) traveled to the scene and saw that there had been no battle.
3. The report claims that the Japanese drove civilian refugees into Bataan to exacerbate the food shortage: “The shrewd enemy applied pressure and accelerated the influx of these refugees. This influx became an important factor in the logistics of defense.” While there was certainly a large number of civilian refugees on Bataan, I never heard any claim that they were driven there as part of Japanese strategy.
4. The report claim that the Japanese outnumbered Allied troops by more than 2 to 1: “The combined American and Filipino troops, partially trained, inexperienced, and ill-equipped as they were, numbered less than half the Japanese forces, many of whom were battle-tried veterans from China.” (emphasis added). Was this ratio true? It’s not clear if the report refers to just Japanese forces on Bataan or all Japanese forces in the Philippines.
5. The report presents MacArthur’s last-ditch plan for Bataan as a realistic possibility: “His plans already formulated for the future conduct of operations on Bataan, were aimed at a fight to the end; they included…a counterattack to capture the enemy base at Subic Bay. There was still the possibility that the defense could be protracted until the United States had time to recover from the first blows of the war and begin to send in supplies and reinforcements.”
At the end in early April, Gen. Wainwright ordered such an attack, but Gen. Edward King refused to launch it. He and his subordinates believed that this attack had no chance of success and would result only in needless slaughter. King surrendered shortly thereafter. From everything I’ve read, King was correct. This attack would have been suicidal and had no chance to succeed. It certainly could not have prolonged the defense for the several years it would take for American forces to return to the Philippines.
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Post by Deleted on Dec 17, 2014 10:45:15 GMT 8
I'll have to find my copy but I believe Richard M. Connaughton's MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines discusses the defense build-up plans (including schedules), and a rather thorough discussion on the controversy involving the proposal to bomb Taiwan that didn't happen.
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Post by batteryboy on Dec 17, 2014 18:09:37 GMT 8
Off hand replies to some of the points mentioned from my shattered brain: On Pt. 1 - Brief mention (IIRC) in Morton's Fall of the Philippines that fifth columnist aided in the bombing of Nielson's by tying a reflector or a mirror so that reflection can be seen -- I really doubt this as you don't need a mirror to spot some of the still Natural Metal Finish of a number of US aircraft (like the B-17Cs and B-10s and 18s) and you can see them at least within 40 --or even 60 mi away in a good day. 2a) - Japanese losses were still comparatively light in the early days of the war. 2b) - False - Gunners of the 21st Division (PA) fired on a phantom enemy invasion which was caused by Japanese scouting vessels.
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