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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 7, 2015 22:01:32 GMT 8
I finally got around to reading Bill Bartsch's "December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor" and I would highly recommend it. If you're interested in the Philippine campaign, it's a must read. Bill explains exactly what happened to the FEAF on that first day of the war. It's very readable and by the time you're done, you’ll feel like you personally know the guys involved. It's an extremely impressive book. Because Bill started his research in the '70s for "Doomed at the Start," he interviewed and had access to the diaries of many of the people involved, almost all of whom are no longer with us.
Here are some interesting things from Bill's book:
1. He cannot answer the question of why MacArthur refused to see Brereton on the morning of 12/8/41 and why he refused to authorize B-17 air strikes on Formosa. However, he gives several theories with a lot of factual support. What is interesting is that Bill found a statement by MacArthur in 1946 denying that Brereton had ever recommended to him a strike on Formosa and claiming that he was unaware of any such recommendation ever having been made. That’s remarkable because it’s demonstrably untrue. It’s a fair inference that MacArthur took this approach because he had no palatable explanation for his refusal to authorize the attack. (My own personal opinion is that he bowed to Quezon and Quezon’s far-fetched idea that Japan might bypass the Philippines).
2. He does identify the person responsible for all the B-17s and P-40s getting caught on the ground. I won’t spoil the surprise.
3. A lot of us have thought that a B-17 raid on Formosa that morning would have been a suicide mission because without fighter escort, the B-17s would have been easy pickings for the Japanese Zeros. Not so fast. The Japanese took the calculated risk to allocate all their Zeros for the attack on the Philippines. The planes guarding the bases in Formosa were older fighters that were nowhere near as formidable as the Zero. The Japanese anti-aircraft batteries were not particularly impressive either. Thus, an attack might have had a chance to succeed, especially if the B-17s arrived when the attack force was still grounded by heavy fog that morning.
4. The Philippines were far more of a threat to the Japanese than I had previously thought. It was assumed that when America entered the war, Russia would also enter. The B-17s had the range to attack Japan itself from the Philippines, with the planes landing at Vladivostok , rearming and refueling, and doing it again. Eventually, the plan was to base B-24s in the islands. The B-24 had the range to attack any city in Japan from Luzon and return to Luzon. Thus, we can see why the Japanese saw American air power in the Philippines as such a threat. The threat was greater than simply to Japan’s line of communication to the south.
5. One of the problems for air power in the Philippines was the lack of infrastructure. While B-17s and P-40s had been sent to the islands and more were on the way, the infrastructure was sorely lacking: the number of air bases, runways long enough for four-engine bombers, runways more modern than simply dirt, repair facilities, dispersal areas, a modern air-warning system etc.
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Post by batteryboy on Jun 8, 2015 6:31:20 GMT 8
Dec. 8 a great book. I immediately got a copy when it was released years ago. A must read. Also recommend to get his earlier book: "Doomed at the Start"-- it focuses on the American Pursuit pilots in the Philippines in 41-42.
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Post by Registrar on Jun 8, 2015 12:36:38 GMT 8
The prior night had been Brereton's birthday party, and it had gone on until the very early hours. There is a theory that Brereton was too tired and emotional (code words) that morning to be sharp, and that it took some time and effort to ascertain his and his unit's operational capability. It must also be recalled that the B-17s at Clark had been ordered south three times, and shouldn't have been there at all, a fact hidden from higher authority.
Brereton would be relieved in due course, and he went on to a very average career elsewhere. The West Point Preservation Society would look after him, at least until his memoirs were published. As if that weren't enough, a bombing mission that morning without Washington's direct approval would have breached Washington's direct orders. Only after the Japanese had bombed Luzon, and Quezon withdrawn his objection to using the aircraft offensively could the mission have been given the go ahead.
Too many people ignore the fact that when the sun rose on 8 December, the Philippines were not sovereign American property where the US military could do whatever it pleased. (Similar inconveniences arise in Australia, Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Syria.) Quezon was sufficiently adamant about his control that the US would later take steps to move him to a place where they could control his outside contacts.
Micromanagement of military authority isn't something that is a recent problem - particularly from a country where there is an independent chain of command. The supreme civilian authority in the Philippines that morning was High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, and the US military were still subservient to the High Commissioner, and he in turn could not act independently of Pres. Quezon. It was an extremely awkward command structure, and placed there by Washington, not by the people at the sharp end. The cessation of civilian control in the Philippines didn't come easily. What made sense in D.C. didn't always work on the other side of the dateline.
The examination of the manner in which political structures (and strictures) might conflict with the American way of war is an extremely sensitive topic, and remains sensitive even today. (Consider the impact that role of the CIA had in the assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm, and what followed upon it.) A closer examination of the issues in the Philippines would make no friends either, on either side of the Pacific.
One cannot simply approach that week considering military air power alone. There were bigger fish to fry.
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Post by okla on Jun 8, 2015 20:43:54 GMT 8
Hey Registrar....Very well put. It was, indeed, a complicated arrangement. Command Structure, although strictly of a Military nature, would rear its ugly head again when Corregidor and the Units in the Mindanao/Visayan Commands were surrendered. "Skinny" Wainwright was left hanging out on a limb ala whether he had the authority to deal with General Homma regarding the Troops in the Southern region. The old "hindsight/20-20" thing proved to be higtly accurate for the umpteenth time. Cheers.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 8, 2015 22:15:45 GMT 8
Interesting stuff, Registrar.
1. The legal status of the Philippines is definitely important. The Philippines were not a sovereign nation. They were still an American possession. However, under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, they were scheduled for independence in 1946 and were being transitioned towards independence. That made them a little more sovereign than other American possessions (e.g., Hawaii) but not fully sovereign. The leverage that Quezon had was manpower. There were only about 31,000 U.S. troops in the islands and many of them were not combat troops. MacArthur's ground defense would, of necessity, depend on the Philippine Army and the Philippine Scouts. Thus, it was imperative to keep Quezon on board.
2. The order to transfer the B-17s to DelMonte is another interesting issue. That alleged order has popped in various accounts. It appears to have come from the 1946 statement by MacArthur that I referred to in my original post. It may not be true. Bill Bartsch could find no such order. There was an order from Brereton, not MacArthur or Sutherland, ordering half of the bombers to DelMonte, and that order was complied with. The only USAFFE order Bartsch found was one that ordered the 19th Bomb Group's ground echelon to DelMonte on or after 12/8/41. He could find no order from MacArthur or Sutherland ordering all 35 bombers to DelMonte.
3. One major issue with Brereton is whether he had sufficient target data to launch a successful strike on Formosa. I don't see him as any kind of superstar, for sure, and it seems as if he was a little too concerned with protecting his own reputation.
4. I'm curious why you say that a bomber strike on Formosa required express permission from Washington. At 3:22 a.m. (Manila time), the War Department ordered MacArthur to execute his mission under Rainbow Five. Rainbow Five included a provision to "conduct air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases." That certainly sounds like he was authorized to strike the Japanese bases in Formosa.
5. Let's not forget that the issue of the bomber strike on Formosa is separate and distinct from the issue of the P-40s and B-17s getting caught on the ground. If those planes had not been destroyed on the ground, MacArthur would have had far more air options than he wound up with. It appears that neither MacArthur nor Brereton was directly responsible for those planes getting caught on the ground. Even without the Formosa mission, if the planes had not been caught on the ground, MacArthur would still have had a fairly formidable air force.
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Post by batteryboy on Jun 9, 2015 17:31:27 GMT 8
Even if Brereton knew which targets to hit in Formosa, his bomber force would have been decimated as they wont have proper fighter protection.
The Japanese planned their attack very well and used their strengths to complete the missions. The mere fact that targets in Luzon were divided via the 16th Parallel (anything above would be hit by Army Air Force and below would be the Navy Air Force) is indication that the planners have thought it all out based on the strengths and limitations of their aircraft. Even prior to the attack Japanese were flying extensive recon flights to the Philippines. There were incidents prior to the 8th that would have alert the USAAC but the greatest question is "why didn't they do anything about it." and the planes were caught on the ground. The mere fact that the Japanese planes flew over Luzon straight to Clark, they would have been spotted as soon as they entered the northern air spaces. Again another mystery.. which leads to more question and more mysteries.
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Post by okla on Jun 10, 2015 0:38:04 GMT 8
Hey All....I, of course, think that all the above points are valid, but I can't help but think, and have held this view for these many moons, that the prevailing peacetime mindset was the over riding factor in all the missteps that took place during this crucial time period. Of course, there was an ongoing Military buildup taking place in the PI, especially since early Summer 1941, but it took the bombing of Clark Field to shake this "malais", for lack of a better word. The blowing up of the Arizona and capsizing of the Oklahoma seemingly had not penetrated the inner thinking of our "honchos" in Manila, thus those decisions, or lack thereof, were greatly influenced by that mindset. Of course, this is just my own humble, but some writer (I can't remember who, due to my rapid advance into early Senility), wrote that the powers that be at USAFFE were in a "blue funk" when hearing of the attack on Pearl Harbor. After all, "the Japanese probably wouldn't or couldn't attack before April 1942". Cheers.
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Post by xray on Jun 10, 2015 12:25:03 GMT 8
Thanks for the heads up, will seek out that book.
Still tough to believe even after all these years that we could have been caught so flat footed as Clark. I agree with Joes conclusion that Quezon was likely the prime factor in nixing a strike at Japanese forces in a forlorn hope that Philippines might somehow be spared if they were not provoked. Of course, he knew as well as anyone that the Philippines in and of itself were not any threat to Japan, but rather US forces based there ,,, But forlorn hope has been known to override common sense, and I think that is the case here.
But as pointed out, the lack of any aerial offense is a separate issue vs getting caught with our pants down and having the bulk of our far east airpower destroyed in 1 fell swoop, precisely at the time we should have been expecting it the most. Due credit must be given to the Japanese themselves for having aggressive plans, the will to ruthlessly implement them, and motivated soldiers to carry them out, but it should never have happened. Hard to avoid the impression that no one was ever really called to task for the debacle because Washington feared stirring up a hornets nest that would ultimately blow back on no one else but MacArthur. Any lack of confidence in command issues/reprimands obviously would not have boded well for what was already then known was shaping up to be a desperate, losing struggle. Basically, what happened happened and cannot be undone, no sense compounding the bad situation by searching for heads to roll - The Japs themselves would soon enough provide for that. And I think that was the correct stance at that moment in time.
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Post by Registrar on Jun 10, 2015 18:32:47 GMT 8
I recall a fellow explaining once, it may have been Herman Wouk, that "America cannot deal with two disasters on the same day."
What Wouk did say was of Pearl Harbor was that "there were loud cries of "infamy" and "treachery" as though these terms of private morality had any relevance to historical events. A poor nation wishing to supplant a rich one must use the best means it can find; moreover Thucydides said long ago that men by a natural law always rule where they are strongest. in history what is moral is what works. The will of God, Hegel taught, reveals itself onlyin historical outcomes."
He adds "...Yamashita's operation surprised the Americans precisely because it was such a foolish thing to do, such an outrageous gamble, such a bad strategy, such muddled politics, and such unsound psychology. Even if it succeeded, it was just about the worst move the Japanese could try. Therefore the Americans made the mistake of shutting it from their minds."
I am reminded a little about what China is doing in the South China Sea these days.
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Post by batteryboy on Jun 10, 2015 23:13:52 GMT 8
My two centavos:
I don't think Quezon was the factor for the non strike to Formosa. Yes we (speaking as a Filipino) were still under America but in a transitional government and all military affairs whether defense or offense was still the call of Uncle Sam. Its true Quezon wanted to avoid war and in fact as even asking that that independence be given immediately when the war broke out thinking it would stop the Japanese. Whether it was Quezon or someone else as President, there will be a fight in the Philippines and sorry to say Quezon was powerless to stop it.
The Philippine Scouts although were composed of Filipinos (led by US officers) were under the US Army not the Philippine Army or Commonwealth Govt.
Herman Wouk points to "Yamashita" -- although we know this is wrong but we can't blame him. Faulty US intelligence thought it was Yamashita invading the Philippines which rumored during the opening days of hostilities. However it Masaharu Homma who was leading the 14th Army in the Philippine invasion Yamashita was taking care of the Malayan Theater at that time.
Going back to the USAAC in the PI:
The sending of additional aircraft to the Philippines was meant to boost the defense of the Philippines. By the Dec. 8, we had 35 B-17Cs and Ds in the Philippines with a number B-18 Bolos plus a small number Martin B-10s as hacks. Hardly a real offensive force for attacking Japanese airbases in Formosa.
USAAC crews were still inexperienced for war. Despite their bravery, they were just about to learn how to fight. Japanese aviators were experienced having flown in actual combat during their China campaign.
Clark and Del Monte were said to be the only airfield complex that can handle the B-17s. Not true. Iba can accommodate a few B-17s, and so can Nichols and Nielsons' airfields. Nichols always had a problem with its drainage system but in dry weather, it can accommodate any type of aircraft. Another airfield was built in Tanauan, Batangas could accommodate B-17s and even Cabcaben airfield in Bataan was designed to accommodate the 4 engined bomber. When war broke out, Tanauan was abandoned, Cabcaben was used but only for the remaining pursuit planes. However all the airfields that I mentioned (other than the Del Monte Complex) was still within range of Japanese Navy air force twin engine bombers from Formosa. The logical choice was to send them all the way to Del Monte to avoid destruction. But still a considerable number of B-17s got caught in the ground at Clark.
In fairness, Clark is really the logical choice to deploy B-17s and even for the planned LB-30s (B-24s) which did not arrive. It has the facility for maintenance, re-armament and repair, it had a large runway (they can even take off criss-cross-- and believe it or not it did happen) due to the large flat area. B-17s can fly from Clark to Formosa and back. One thing that they should have really thought over and over is that: "When the enemy is in range, so are we".
The debacle of Clark (depending on what aspect you look at it) is an interesting subject. We can study the facts, speculate, play the "blaming game". We may not be able to agree on the one real reason why "we got caught with our pants down" on that fateful noon on the 8th December 1941.
Bill Bartsch's two excellent books have answered a lot of questions about air war in the Philippines in the early days of hostilities. It also gave birth to more interesting questions. So the cycle continues.
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