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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 10, 2016 7:51:24 GMT 8
Once Bataan fell, Corregidor was doomed to fall pretty quickly. It wast just too easy for the Japanese to pound that living hell out of Corregidor with artillery and bombing attacks. That takes us back to the old question of what, if anything, could have been done to save Bataan? The answer may be not very much. That, in turn, takes us back to the question of what should have been done before the war to enable the troops in the Philippines to deter or prevent a Japanese invasion.
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Post by cbuehler on Aug 10, 2016 23:21:54 GMT 8
Actually, the more I think about it, the more questions come up. We really dont have all that much information regarding the landings on May 5. We have descriptions that the Japanese suffered heavy losses in the initial landings, with descriptions of barges being hit at close range and sinking (what happened to those barges that sunk and how many were lost? Did the create additional obstacles for subsequent landings?) They drifted further east than planned, where the shore is very rocky. How was that dealt with? We have descriptions of heavy losses while attempting to scale the low cliffs along the area, but the defenses there did not seem to hold for long. And just where did the Japanese land those tanks? I dont know of any particular location below the Kindley Field area that offers an imaginable place for such an operation, although where ever it was, it must have occured well after the area was secured as it would have been impossible while under fire. Was the landing of the tanks totally unobserved? As far as I know, no one seems to have put in a real focused examination of the area of the landings to try and find anything that may remain of defenses there. Nor are there any remains to be seen of sunken barges etc. ( wish someone could do a sonar or diving exploration to see if there is anything still out there under the water ). This area of Corregidor was not heavily affected by the 1945 battle and subsequent post war changes (other than perhaps Kindley Field), so perhaps it could do with a proper investigation. Perhaps some secrets could be revealed and some more ideas as to why the invasion went so quickly.
CB
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Post by okla on Aug 11, 2016 2:54:06 GMT 8
Hey Guys (and possibly Gal...Patty???)...Regarding the possible landing locations of the three Japanese Tanks during the 1942 Invasion of Corregidor...Bear with me and my, rapidly, failing, 84 year old recollection, but didn't Fots, during one of his excellent Fantastic Foto Tours, in the murky past, present us with a couple of images of Corregidor's Tail and a possible Tank landing location??? If memory serves, this spot on the beach appeared to be a "wash" or eroded gulley, that may have been man made, but widened, etc by tropical rains, in the following years, that widened the original "track". Also, if memory serves, a few of us discussed the very real possibility that this "feature" in the shoreline, may, very well, have been where those difference making tanks entered the fight. I don't have sense enough to relocate Fots' pics, but, surely, one of our resident Gurus could manage to come up with those photos. A second look might change our original conjecturing. Just a thought. Cheers.
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Post by batteryboy on Aug 12, 2016 14:02:53 GMT 8
Ok, now that I have some "half shut eye" and reading all the nice postings here, let me just add some thoughts: - On the water issue, there was never really a water shortage on the island. It was when the pumping stations got damaged that water in some parts were hindered but there was no real water shortage. Japanese fire added to the suppression of distribution of water either by transpo or by hand. - Obsolete Weapons, I don't think so because the men on Corregidor fought with the same weapons that was also available in the US. It was only in late 42 when newer armaments started to flow into the front lines. The Japanese also fought with late model armaments (from the beginning and even up to the end of the war. - the actual rations of food and medicine in Corregidor surprisingly were very adequate at the time of surrender. They could have held on much longer actually. - As for beach defense, if some of you have seen the Japanese propaganda documentaries about the capture of Corregidor, wherein it shows the beach and ridge line defenses of the Marines, well surprisingly a good portion of them were intact. As for the 75mms on top of Malinta, yes two were damaged but the one on the shed was still intact and could fire to both north and south. There were 155ms still firing at Stockade and the remaining roving batteries were throwing eggs at the landing barges in Cabcaben. Yes several 75mm were knocked out during the bombardment but there was still a relative number of them intact. I have a copy of the Japanese report on the captured equipment on Corregidor and the other island forts and if I am not mistaken, most of the 75mms were either destroyed by their crews prior to surrender. - On the artillery observation, the Japanese used both balloons and aircraft and even an unconfirmed use of the Kayaba, the Japanese auto gyro aircraft (or heli) that was used to spot USAFFEE positions in both Bataan and Corregidor. Now the CA gunners relied on grid coordinates and base end stations and observation post to rely on the effectiveness of their fire. The advantage of the Japanese was that they had Bataan and their artillery was mobile and with the high ground, they could easily spot targets. - As for the landing of the tanks on the island and not having anti tank guns to deal with them, I don't buy that reason. In reality the presence of the tank was more psychological than tactical. The Japanese late Type 97 even got bogged down and had to rely on captured M3 tanks to pull them out. You don't need AT guns to disable the Chi Ha or even the M3. A close range shot from a 75mm (even using HE rounds) is enough to disable them. - Lt. Lawrence position in the tail that caused a lot of casualties to the invaders is a fine example of a disciplined and well concealed unit. Imagine if there were two more units like him in the invasion site? The Japanese may not have landed on the 6th. ...more later.
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Post by wwalker on Aug 12, 2016 20:03:37 GMT 8
Hello Batteryboy,
Very interesting points that you make. So you're essentially saying that Wainwright should not have surrendered on May 6?
I'm in agreement with your points initially, such as there still being water on the island. But how do you distribute the water while under siege of artillery guns, Japanese infantry, and bombers, to people you have no communication with, let alone know their whereabouts? Furthermore, we don't know officially how many people were on the island. Of course there are estimates from between 11,000-14,000. I've never seen finite documentation of what food was left. There was lots of hearsay, because many were under the impression that some aspects of the garrison were hoarding food (which continued in prison camp), but most of these accounts are hard to prove. If you have this information I'd love to see it. From all accounts I've read (diaries), most of the soldiers, particularly those outside of Malinta Tunnel were very low on food and water. Cracked wheat was even becoming hard to find.
Nonetheless, you make some good points.
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Post by batteryboy on Aug 12, 2016 21:45:26 GMT 8
Wainwright had his reason why he surrendered on the 6th. I cant blame him for he was after the welfare of his men and he had his own assessment of the situation. He knew that help would not arrive and he was practically surrounded. If he did decide to fight on he would have lasted another week (or maybe two). He may have had some respite because Japanese supplies and ammo were about to reach as low point. For 27 days after the fall of Bataan, Japanese artillery pumped in 22,469 rounds of artillery shells to Corregidor and the other fortified island. Prior to that they expended around 41,321 rounds during the Bataan campaign so that is a total of 63,790 rounds. Note that they have to truck them all the way from Lingayen to Bataan which was not an easy task.
Hoarding of food was common. The Army and the Navy had their own food stores and men from each service accused each other of having the better rations. Another factor was then then the Fort Mills cold storage plant was damaged, most of the fresh foods had to be consumed immediately. For those who have explored the island you can see several storage depots, subsistence buildings and tunnels that were spread around the island. Other accounts mention that before the surrender (and even in Bataan), other than destroying their equipment the other priority was to consume the remaining food stocks and again, they were still in adequate quantities. Even after the surrender, the late Al McGrew, 60th CA, Corregidor survivor told us that the Japanese even allowed them to walk back and forth from the 92nd Garage (where they were detained) to Malinta to get food crates. (at one point he choose a case of Hershey chocolates over canned tomatoes).
more later...
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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 13, 2016 7:35:58 GMT 8
The impact of the tanks comes from Wainwright's own memoirs. He was especially concerned because Malinta Tunnel held the nurses and the wounded. Granted, Wainwright's assessment on the chances of repelling an invasion, which he radioed to Washington immediately before the landings, does not show a hopeful or optimistic state of mind.
The food situation is less certain. According to Morton, an inventory in April showed only enough food to supply half rations until the end of June. Wainwright's staff suggested that the rations be boosted to full rations so the beach defense troops would be at maximum physical strength. Wainwright refused to do so because that would mean the food supply would run out by the middle of May. This all means that on 5/6, there was a reserve supply for about seven weeks. Of course, with hoarding etc., no one could calculate the precise amount of food on hand.
Communications may have been the key. How accurate and timely a picture did Wainwright have of what was going on on the ground? (Don't forget that many think that poor communications on Wake caused Devereaux to surrender prematurely).
Let me ask you all this: assuming that the May 5-6 landings were defeated and assuming the Japanese did not launch any further landings, how long do you think Corregidor could have held out?
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Post by EXO on Aug 13, 2016 8:07:57 GMT 8
I've long been considered a stirrer, and I must admit, I've long been proud of it.
I am agreeing with much of what Batteryboy is saying, though the core of my concern had been with the possibility Wainwright saw himself as trapped in a position where he knew he had to send men to their deaths under circumstances in which he was unable to support them adequately to fight to win. This is an issue which vexes me, I must admit, namely the concept which has arisen in the last century that it is sometimes necessary to send brave men to their deaths, to fight a war for a lesser purpose than winning. Fighting to win is an ancient warrior concept which MacArthur strongly believed, and ultimately it became the dismissal of him, his fatal flaw in the King Lear sense. Korea, post MacArthur, became the high point of fighting NOT to win, but for something vastly less - and how has that turned out, eh, with a rogue militarist state in possession of nuclear weapons? MacArthur was no warhawk. Anyone who has studied his farewell address to West Point would recognize this. He had counselled Kennedy against going into Vietnam, because he saw it as a limited purpose fight not a fight to win. There have been too many wars fought in the last century where, as unpleasant as the thought was at the time, it has proven to be wrong not to have fought to win. (Would there be fewer wars had we decided to only fight to win? Probably, because we'd be more fearful of them.) I am not suggesting that Corregidor became the point at which the profession of warrior split into two camps, the fight to win camp and the fight for limited political purposes camp, but it is a circumstance where the approaches begin to contrast.
My old friend and author Daniel D. Howell, does hint at this in his "THE BATTLE FOR CORREGIDOR : DECEMBER 1941 - 6 MAY 1942 : THE 4TH MARINE REGIMENT HUNG OUT TO DRY" though I do recall him struggling with the probability that he was about to publish a book that would be the destruction of his future, to suggest that the plan for the defense of Corregidor was the plan to surrender Corregidor. (These are my words, not Danny's.) The hint is in the title, of course - that's what he used to convey his conclusion that his beloved 4th Marines had been betrayed, sacrificed, hung out to dry, sent to defend (and die) resisting an invasion when the plans for surrender had already been decided upon. It was a heretical charge against a well-beloved soldier's Soldier, and unlikely to make him any new friends (and to lose him old ones), but he described it essentially in the sense of it being the elephant in the room every time he interviewed senior officers who had been involved. They did their duty, they followed their orders, but it was their orders which became the betrayal of them.
I don't want to turn this into a book review, but it is a shame that Howell's book has become a rare and collectible item, now worth far more than it was when it was printed new. More people should be reading it. I have issues with its style, it could have done with better publishing support and sub-editing, but ultimately I admire its direction, and Howell's chutzpah. The reason it isn't better known, I believe, is that it cuts too close to the truth.
What might have occurred had there been reserves dug in deep on tailside? What might have happened had the Japanese been defeated? Could Wainwright have then negotiated a better surrender? Could he have been in a better place to not be forced into a situation where he was compelled to surrender every fighting man in the Philippines? Would America have been?
I don't mean for these questions to be decided here, just for the consideration that they were options possibly considered, and need to be considered still. I am trying to dispel that fog of hindsight bias, bain of moderately competent historians, the tendency to form opinions on the basis of an outcome, and then pronounce it "inevitable." Batteryboy most ably establishes that many of the factors which might have been considered telling in arriving at the so-called "inevitable" surrender of Corregidor, weren't necessarily as true as we might like to think. I think that Corregidor is a primer which establishes that there are some very more complex truths to be recognized than the simple lies.
I will now return you to your scheduled program.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 13, 2016 8:37:21 GMT 8
Food for thought, EXO. Just a couple of things:
1. On his deathbed, MacArthur warned LBJ against committing ground troops in Vietnam. It was as if this old soldier, slowing fading away, rallied to try to perform one last service for his country.
2. Per Eisenhower, the War Dept. wrote off the Philippines on 12/14/41. Check out Roosevelt's fireside chat from late February 1942 where he admits the garrison had been written off.
3. Ironically, Quezon's neutralization plan from 2/42 might have been the one way out for the Philippine garrison. Quezon figured things out pretty quickly.
4. The Japanese never had to assault Corregidor. They could have simply left it alone, allowing the garrison to starve. They didn't need Manila Bay. Once the Japanese had neutralized American air power in the islands, the Philippines no longer posed any threat to Japan's southern expansion. The threat that the Philippines had posed in 12/41 was that American air and sea power in the islands might threaten Japan's lines of communication for her southward expansion. When Clark Field was taken out on 12/8/41, the air power was neutralized. When Cavite was taken out on 12/10/41, the sea power was neutralized.
Agreed in 1. LBJ was foolish and headstrong to think he was had a better knowledge on this issue than MacArthur. He should have resisted the drift into a war that clearly could not be fought on a "fight only to win" basis. 2: The fireside chat of 23 Feb? That followed by a day FDR's direct order to MacArthur to leave Corregidor. MacArthur leaves no record of his thoughts during the following weeks. A penny for his thoughts. As for 3, Manuel Quezon III is a member and I might like him to field this one. FDR did give MacArthur the power to arrange for the capitulation of the "Filipino elements of the defending forces", but made it clear to Quezon that would be "defended by our own men to the death." I am not inclined to go so far with you on 4, as it was possible to bring munitions down from Subic Bay, but the entirety of the Philippines couldn't be governed without opening the sea trade into (and out of) Manila Bay. The Japanese had surely been misdirected as to how long Corregidor's food would last. - EXO
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Post by cbuehler on Aug 13, 2016 8:39:38 GMT 8
Well, I was waiting for EXO to get at the gist of this. What is being said here is that the defense of the Corregidor was not all that it could have been. Let me reference the Japanese on Tarawa or Iwo Jima as other example of island defense that was also hopeless. We can always fall back on the Japanese disregard for human life, or we can try to look at it differently. They knew that it was hopeless and underwent similar bombardment in preparation for the invasion. We do not know of the extent of their supplies, but it could not have been any better than that on Corregidor at the time, likely even worse. There is a fundamental difference here that perhaps we cannot, or are reluctant, to recognize. The Japanese were in trouble in the early stages of the invasion on Corregidor, but was it their determination and will to win, or was it the US command's lack of such that determined the outcome? Or was it pre-ordained that the surrender was to be accomplished without a fight to the end?
CB
PS, I often wonder if the US forces on the island at the time had any inkling of what their treatment would be at the hands of the Japanese subsequent to surrender, that they may have chosen to fight it out to the end.
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