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Post by xray on Nov 8, 2016 10:16:57 GMT 8
Dubious American accounts, if only some righteous sons of the Emperor could come along and clear things up !
There may be some Philippine accounts of Bataan/Corregidor, couldn't say if they are dubious or not because I have never heard of them, and I doubt anyone else has outside of the islands. I would hazard a guess that, as per the topic, there were not many Filipinos of any variety around to give an account of the landings and subsequent battle. I'd say for starters that Marcos himself wrote the book on dubious, fraudulent accounts of the Philippine campaign.
As far as Whitcomb [who passed away just this year, almost 100 years old], I am surprised to see "complete garbage", what do you base this on Buff, just your suspicions that a USAAF officer would not command a small Army battery ? I will say that would be highly unusual, I doubt there was a shortage of qualified artillerymen on the Rock. On the other hand, we know for certain there were USAAF personnel on Bataan engaging in viscous search and destroy ops and hand to hand fighting, someone with no context might think that was complete garbage as well.
Is there doubt he served 2 tours in Philippines, was on Corregidor and escaped ? Don't think so, I think anyone under those circumstances and ending up in China would have quite an adventure, though of course one if free to disbelieve all or part ,,, But for a man that served his country [and the Philippines] and was caught up in historic, barbaric events, it is tough to listen to such base disparagement on only a whim.
I stand ready to be corrected. What else do you got, why is it "complete garbage", I'd really like to know ?
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Post by chadhill on Nov 8, 2016 12:16:30 GMT 8
The following article is from the November 1982 issue of Quan. It is a translated summary from the Japanese press of 14th Army tank operations on Corregidor, by veteran Tadakuni Ichinose. I found the account fascinating and full of details I did not know about the battle. P.S.-Sorry about the small print. I tried unsuccessfully to copy and paste it to wordpad. Am unable to manually re-type it now. With reading glasses ("cheaters") I can read it ok...
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Post by cbuehler on Nov 9, 2016 1:27:30 GMT 8
Thanks to Chadhill for providing this account! There are only the smallest snippets that we have from the ordinary Japanese soldiers experience during the fall of the Philippines and this one I have never seen. I see that the boulders and rocks that are mentioned and appear in the few Japanese photos of the action still remain on the beaches, at least they did not scrap those! I always thought that getting the tanks on and up must have been quite a feat. The invasion was not easy for the Japanese and it seems that LTC. Lawrence may have been correct in his estimation that they could possibly have turned it back, at least for awhile. This is what is needed to fill out the picture of history, which in my opinion should not evaluated or judged by only one side, which is problematic when tackling the subject of Bataan/Corregidor in 1942 due to what it resulted in. I will state that have no bias either for or against the Japanese, Filipinos or Americans regarding this subject. There are quite a few Filipino accounts of Bataan in particular, but they are mostly local publications available only in the Philippines. While I would stop short in calling Whitcomb's book garbage, I regard it and a number of other accounts as dubious in many details. PS, I just realized that there may possibly still be the remains of a Japanese tank 50 meters offshore...we need to get Karl suited up again. CB
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Post by xray on Nov 9, 2016 9:29:56 GMT 8
What Americans did in PI is written in blood and tears, one should be on solid ground casting disparaging comments about bonafide vets and really should be shamed to do so.
There have been many people from all countries and wars who have exaggerated and lied about the parts they played, including some who didn't serve at all. IMO, anyone [particularly US] who is confirmed to have been through that hell and survived should be given just credit. If they put their experiences on paper then sure they should be subject to scrutiny for the sake of historical accuracy if nothing else - And I am still waiting for this avalanche of evidence to prove Whitcomb [and "many other"US vets as alleged] self aggrandizing liars.
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Post by fortman on Nov 9, 2016 12:40:59 GMT 8
xray,
You are right - my comments are uncalled for and I retract them.
Fortman
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Post by armyjunk on Nov 10, 2016 3:33:03 GMT 8
That a guy can remember any details 20 years later amazes me, little on names and places from a time many would like to forget. The fact that sailors also manned the beach defense seems to say they used any folks they could get. Any officer should be able to take charge of a trained gun crew, the crew does the work. IMHO
His book was published in 1967
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Post by chadhill on Nov 10, 2016 11:57:35 GMT 8
This photo is said to be of the captured M3 Stuart commanded by Captain Hideo Ho that landed on Corregidor May 6, 1942 with the two Type 97 tanks (see Quan article above, "Japanese Armor on Corregidor"). The Type 97s were unable to climb a ridge off the beach and had to be towed by the M3 up the grade. Type 97 tank on Corregidor May 1942 ("Philippine Expeditionay Force", Gasei, Manila 1943) The next two photos are also Type 97s on Corregidor Invasion landing map from "Philippine Expeditionary Force", Gasei, published in Manila during 1943. This photo was lifted from a Japanese newsreel taken shortly after the battle. Due to the sequence of filming, I think we are looking up towards the area of the two water tanks near Battery Denver, from the northeast. I think I can make out the two water tanks along the top of the hill.
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Post by EXO on Jan 21, 2017 13:50:32 GMT 8
Bob Hudson tracked down the article about Japanese Tanks on Corregidor, and I have reproduced it here: JAPANESE ARMOR ON CORREGIDOR Originally published in THE QUAN, Vol 37 No. 3 (November 1982) - Courtesy of the American Defenders of Bataan & Corregidor Recently in the Japanese press, a former veteran of the Corregidor campaign, Tadakuni Ichinose, provided an account of tank operations by the 14th Army during the assault of Corregidor in 1942. Osamu Tageya has provided here a summarized translation of the account which is interesting in that it was the operational debut of the Shinhoto Chi-ha tank. Steve Zaloga provided the accompanying photos. The Stuart mentioned in the article refers to an M3 captured by the Japanese from one of the two American tank battalions serving in the earlier Philippines battles. Sensha Rentai is the Japanese term for a tank regiment. Chutai is the Japanese term for company. "The 7th Sensha Rental was ordered to Limay, midway down the Bataan peninsula on 11 April 1942 shortly after the termination of the Bataan campaign. The regiment was supposed to be located at Limay to prepare for the forthcoming assault of Corregidor, but malaria and dengue fever was rifle among the troops and practically everybody came down with one or the other.
In the meantime, the 14th Army and the 4th Division were planning to assault the island and were picking the units to take part. Within the 7th Sensha Rentai a provisional chutai of about 10 tanks was formed for use in the assault. The division planned to land tanks in both the first and second landing waves. The idea of landing tanks in the first wave was somewhat unreasonable, particularly given the cliffs at the beach edge and the terrain in that sector, but the decision had been made for two reasons. First, it was felt necessary for raising troop morale. Secondly, it was suspected that large numbers of concrete bunkers and pillboxes would be faced. It was felt that a 47mm high velocity gun would be more than effective against targets that the low velocity 57 mm gun used on the regiment's main tank type, the Type 89 Otsu. For this reason, a provisional chutai was in the process of formation using as its core the Matsuoka Unit which had arrived in late March equipped with Type 97 Kai medium tanks (modified Type 97 tanks with 47mm guns, later called Shinhoto Chi·Ha). The Chutai commander was the CO of the 2nd Chutai, Capt. Hideo Ho. The medium tank shotai (platoon) was commanded by Lt. Shigeo Tsuchida 13 Type 97 Kai) and the light tank shotai was commanded by Lt. Akio Waizumi (4 Type 95).
The history of the Matsuoka Unit from which the new Type 97·Kai were drawn was as follows. The unit was formed in March 1942 from troops of each chutai of the 2nd Senma Rentai and students from the Chiba Tank School and were put under the command of Major Matsuoka. The Type 97 Kai were received from the Akabane Arsenal in early March and were put through a test run at the Omiya station. The troops departed from Ujina Harbor on March 17 and the tanks were transported by rail. The unit was officially transferred to the 7th Sensha Rentai on 18 March, and departed from Japan on 20 March, arriving in the Philippines nine days later. The unit linked up with the 7th Sensha Rentai at Samar on 1 April 1942. The Type 97 Kai medium tank was a preproduction model hastily armed with the new 47mm gun at the Mitsubishi plant. This had been done at the request of the 7th Sensha Rentai commander, Col. Sonoda, after it had become apparent following the initial landings on Luzon in December 1941 that the regular equipment (Type 95 light tanks, Type 89 and Type 97 medium tanks) were proving ineffective against the American M3 light tank, thus causing a lowering of morale among the regiment's tank crews. Col. Sonada, who had seen duty with the machinery section of the Army Ministry as part of the Tank Research Committee, was familiar with reports on the experimental trials of the new 47mm gun. He requested a special dispatch of the weapons prior to official Army acceptance with a special chutai for use in the Philippines.
On 6 April following the death of Col. Sonada in combat, Maj. Matsuoka took over acting command of the regiment, but he soon fell ill and was forced to enter the hospital, leading to Masuda taking command of the regiment.
The Corregidor assault was scheduled for 5 May 1942. The main assault was to be undertaken by the left wing of the 4th Division (mainly the 61st Infantry Regiment). This left wing was formed from two Daitais of troops up front with supporting tank, engineer and mountain artillery elements. The landing was divided into three waves, the first wave consisting of two-thirds of the combat troops plus HQ command liason, and the second wave consisting of the remainder of the troops. Half the tanks (5) were to land with the first wave, and the remaining 5 with the second. Plans called for the first wave to land at 11:00 PM, and the second at 2:30 AM. Landing craft were boarded at 19:00, pushing off an hour later in two columns. As they neared the island about one hour and a half later, the boats fanned out for the landing. At this point, the boats of the left Daitai were caught in American searchlights, but the boats of the right Daitai in which the tank chutai was riding avoided the lights. The time was about 23:00 which was on schedule and 88 Japanese artillery on Bataan opened up to soften up American positions, surviving American batteries directed their fire against the left Daitai boats.
The beach where the right Daitai boats arrived was very rocky and not very suitable for tanks, but the tanks were landed successfully. In this was the Shotai commander's tank (Tsuchida's Type 97 Kai), with Chutai commander Ho's captured M3 Stuart tank to his left, and Takahisa's Type 97 Kai to the right. The infantry quickly moved off the beach and was engaged at close quarters. This left only the three tanks and the engineers at the bottom of the cliffs. The beach area was strewn with large rocks and boulders, and it took the tanks one hour to negotiate 50 meters to a position from which they could climb the steep cliffs. The steep grade proved too much for the Type 97 Kais, but the M3 made it up and proceeded to tow the two Type 97 Kai's to the top. The tanks reached the high ground about 8:30 AM. The light tank Shotai which was the left Daitai boats never made it to shore. The boat carrying the Shotai commander's tank was sunk by American fire about 50 meters from shore, and the crew swam ashore but were wounded. They were evacuated back to Bataan on the afternoon of 6 May. On the plateau, the fighting was fierce. American troops counterattacked in an attempt to crush the landing before the tanks could enter the fray. The author (Tadakuni Ichinose) was shocked by the number of dead Japanese troops on the ground. A few infantrymen crouching in trenches pointed to the right where there was a pillbox holding back the Japanese advance. Tsuchida's tank destroyed it with a single shot. Capt. Ho consulted with the infantry regimental commander on American dispositions, and continued to support the right Daitai advance.
The two Type 97 Koi 's under Tsuchida's command proceeded slowly along the road toward Malinta Hill (the main American facilities). During the advance, the tanks fired on the "Sakura" position (this was the Japanese term for an American defense point, probably Water Tank Hill), and American opposition gradually melted away. Probably intimidated by the Japanese tanks, there were no signs of opposition from American troops. The tanks stopped on the road to the Sakura position just in front of Malinta Hill. This was the line decided as the forward perimeter, of the initial advance. Shelling soon stopped and an American staff officer approached requesting directions to the Japanese regimental HQ. He was escorted to the rear. A communication then reached the front line, "The enemy has requested a truce". This lasted for 30 minutes but talks were unsuccessful and the Japanese artillery began shelling Malinta Hill again. The tanks resumed the advance along the road, heading for Malinta Hill and continuing right up to the main tunnel entrance at San Joseph, due to the lack of opposition. Corregidor's high hill and the barracks came into view. The stars & stripes had already been taken down and the surrender flag raised in its place. Time was about 1400 hours, 6 May 1942. To summarize: the important thing about this battle was that the tanks landed with the infantry and supported them from the very first opportunity. The actual fighting involving the tanks was very light, but the effect on the troops' morale was tremendous. It is also noteworthy in that the tanks landed under adverse conditions on a very rocky beach. A month after the fall of Corregidor, on 5 June, the unit commander Maj. Matsuoka died of sickness in the hospital.The permalink is at: philippine-defenders.lib.wv.us/QuanNews/quan1900s/quan1980s/november_1982_quan.pdf
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