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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 11, 2015 0:16:32 GMT 8
Interesting stuff.
In Washington in 1942, Quezon reportedly told Eisenhower that MacArthur was the one who believed that Japan might bypass the Philippines. (Eisenhower and Quezon knew each other because Eisenhower had served in the islands in the 1930s). However, my inherent skepticism tells me to take all post-1941 statements by the participants with a grain of salt (and that includes Brereton, MacArthur and MacArthur's staff) for obvious reasons. For what it's worth, in 1954, MacArthur said he did not have the slightest doubt but that the Japanese would attack the Philippines.
There was no way for any investigation to be conducted during the war for obvious reasons. After the war, it would have been difficult to conduct a reliable investigation. Quezon was dead and so were some of the lower-level participants. MacArthur was Supreme Commander in Japan and it would have been politically embarrassing to conduct an investigation that might throw some mud on him. The public already had its public hanging with Kimmel and Short so there was no outcry for answers. Given the chaos in the Philippines in late 1941 and early 1942, you have to wonder if all relevant records were available after the war.
In every book I've read on the subject, from Morton's "Fall of the Philippines" through Bill Barstch's "December 8, 1941," the author throws up his hands and says that we will probably never have a definitive answer as to why MacArthur acted as he did regarding Brereton that morning.
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Post by okla on Jun 11, 2015 2:52:03 GMT 8
Hey Guys....One last "lick" on the carcass of this "dead hoss". It is impossible for me to feature the Japanese bypassing the Philippines under any circumstance. Methinks they would have gobbled up the PI even if the only American military presence were the US Embassy/Consulate Guard Marines (if any would have been present). Tojo would, no way, no how, left this ripe, undefended plum hanging on its bush. It is incomprehensible to think otherwise. Again, only my humble. Cheers.
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Post by fireball on Jun 11, 2015 5:11:15 GMT 8
Unlike most (everyone else) on this forum I don't really know much about the history of the war as any research I do is focused on locating or identifying things of interest be they aircraft, tunnels or bunkers so BEARING THIS IN MIND...
There is no excuse for the loss of the aircraft at Clark and I would call it sheer incompetence. Of course acknowledging that incompetence or allocating blame during that stage of fighting for survival would have been , for want of a better phrase, just plain stupid. No doubt there were many factors at play but one of the things that I have noticed with the military is that they love to exercise or play war games and while this may hone technical skills and identify logistical and support bottlenecks it also has a tendency to create tunnel vision amongst officers (NCOs are normally far more realistic) - what I mean by this is that they become fixed on the type and nature of an attack or battle (ie the one they always have in the exercise) and fail to account for different scenarios. But worst, even if the actual attack does mirror the exercise scenario there is an initial lag or disbelief as 'the exercise is over so it can't be happening' so the first action on hearing (say) of enemy action might be to check if there is an exercise / assume it's our own forces. Once the reality of war has hit home this mindset will be gone.
With Formosa, with so few aircraft they needed to be used in the most effective way and to me that would mean using them within the PI to attack an invading force. What might have been destroyed at Formosa could easily be replaced but what an invading force at the moment of landing or in establishing a beachhead looses can make the difference between success and defeat. So, given this and the likely losses in a Formosa attack I would say not risking aircraft on Formosa was the right decision. As for Quezon and the rights / role of the Philippine nation I don't think that they would have counted for anything if the American command decided on such an attack and equally if the General on the ground wanted such an attack peacetime protocols from Washington (only attack if already invaded PI) would have had zero influence.
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Post by batteryboy on Jun 12, 2015 7:20:04 GMT 8
While tensions were already starting to mount about the "possible" (which soon became a reality on Dec. 8) Japanese offensive, Mac said in a meeting with HC Sayre and Adm Hart that he be believes that the Japanese will not launch an attack before April 42. How he got to that conclusion still posses questions.
He meets with Admiral Tom Phillips, the commander of British Eastern Fleet, (who will sadly perish in five days with the HMS Prince of Wales) during the latter's visit to Manila. Mac mentioned that his B-17s were one of his main assets for the Philippines defense but Adm Phillips points out that in order for the B-17s to be effective would also depend on how well fighter units can operate together with the bombers force. Mac in all his wisdom, tells Phillips: "The inability of an enemy to launch his air attack on these islands is our greatest security" and he adds: "which leaves me with a great sense of great security."
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Post by Registrar on Jun 12, 2015 19:35:02 GMT 8
While tensions were already starting to mount about the "possible" (which soon became a reality on Dec. 8) Japanese offensive, Mac said in a meeting with HC Sayre and Adm Hart that he be believes that the Japanese will not launch an attack before April 42. How he got to that conclusion still posses questions. President Franklin D Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill after Divine Service on board HMS PRINCE OF WALES. Immediately behind them are Admiral E J King, USN and Admiral Stark, USN. This photograph was taken during a series of meetings between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on board HMS PRINCE OF WALES and USS AUGUSTA in the North Atlantic off the coast of Newfoundland, 9 - 12 August 1941. I interpret from my readings that MacArthur had been told by Washington, directly but secretly, that April 1942 would be when the US would be in a position to enter the war against the Axis, and by that time he would be in possession of forces sufficient to secure the protection of the Philippines. That was the "safe until" date he had been given. However, with England (now) in an even more precarious and urgent situation than had been anticipated, its gold reserves depleted, it had become necessary for the US to get involved somewhat earlier. Roosevelt and Churchill spoke privately on August 9 and 10. If you follow what occurred after Roosevelt returned to Washington, (interpretations tested by consequences) relative to maneuvering the Japanese into firing the first shot, I think you will have your answer. MacArthur was not told, he was only a mere theater commander, and not privy to the greater world strategy which had been decided. Thus he continued to believe what he had been told, namely that he had until April 1942, at which time things would happen. This is another part of my view that MacArthur was being mushroomed. He was not told that decisions had already been made. In August the President had warned Japan against further moves against Thailand. Stimson considered the warning had been sufficiently clear that it justified an attack without further warning. However Roosevelt was canny, cautious never to appear in public more than one step beyond the readiness of the American public. He was, of course, of a mind to deal with Germany, having assessed them as the most urgent priority. Documents made public by the Congressional Committee on Pearl Harbor reveal that Gen. Marshall and Admiral Stark, in giving form to war plans in cooperation with British military and naval officers and making military recommendations to Pres. Roosevelt, took the position that the United States must fight if Japan moved her armed forces beyond certain lines in the direction of British and Dutch possessions in the Far East. On 28 November Secretary Stimson and President Roosevelt discussed measures which might be taken against Japan. The Pacific was to be a Navy War. If anything was to be done, the President suggested "to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight". I repeat, MacArthur was not in the loop. He still believed what he'd been told. Maybe it had been true when he'd been told it, but as of December 1941, it had become a lie.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 12, 2015 20:30:58 GMT 8
Roosevelt definitely had a Europe-first outlook. FDR was definitely trying to get us into the war against Germany. For example, he had U.S. Navy destroyers escorting the Lend-Lease convoys in the north Atlantic, leading to U-boat attacks on the U.S.S. Greer, the U.S.S. Kearny and the U.S.S. Reuben James in the latter half of 1941. Those attacks, however, did not rally the public (or Congress) sufficiently to enter the war. The oil embargo against Japan and other acts suggest he was also trying to pick a fight in the Pacific.
However, even a direct attack by Japan, such as Pearl Harbor, did not guarantee public support for entering the war in Europe. We only got into that war when Hitler honored his alliance with Japan and declared war on us after we had declared war on Japan. Hitler was not exactly an honorable man and it was no sure thing that he would honor his alliance with Japan. If he hadn't, we would have been involved in a war in the Pacific but yet would have been neutral (at least officially) in Europe.
I wonder just how much the build-up of forces in the Philippines caused Japan to accelerate her timetable for war. Post-war interviews with high-ranking Japanese military officials show that they believed that a large force of bombers and fighters in the Philippines would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to conquer the Philippines. A large American air and naval force in the islands would have hampered any Japanese attempts to move south to get the resources, such as oil, that she needed. It sounds as if we might have had the necessary forces in the Philippines by April 1942.
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Post by xray on Jun 13, 2015 6:33:47 GMT 8
"Yes we (speaking as a Filipino) were still under America but in a transitional government and all military affairs whether defense or offense was still the call of Uncle Sam. Its true Quezon wanted to avoid war and in fact as even asking that that independence be given immediately when the war broke out thinking it would stop the Japanese. Whether it was Quezon or someone else as President, there will be a fight in the Philippines and sorry to say Quezon was powerless to stop it."
Of course everyone knew then and knows now who exactly was calling the shots, and that was US high command, of which MacArthur was the prime instrument in the Philippines. It is safe to say however that Quezon had influence, indulgence and the ear of US high command, and his wishes would not have been brushed aside lightly, especially before the Philippines were even attacked. If there was any chance at all of avoiding a violent Japanese move in the Philippines, a large US air strike on Japanese territory from PI would have voided that, so it makes perfect sense that he would strenuously argue for all he was worth against it. On the other hand, if Mac was persuaded at all, it probably wasn't against his better judgement. He must have been leaning that way already, he was not the man to have his already legendary authority undercut by anyone.
I think it is pretty obvious that if there was not a single American based in the Philippines the Japanese still would have invaded, of course the casualties and destruction would have been magnitudes lower. Leads to a lot of "what-ifs", no sense getting into that here.
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Post by batteryboy on Jun 13, 2015 13:17:07 GMT 8
MacArthur during a meeting with Admiral Hart and HC Sayre mentioned that he did not expect the Japanese to attack before April of 1942. Now he got that conclusion still posses questions.
On December 5, Admiral Tom Phillips of the British Eastern Fleet made a visit to Manila to talk about the joint defense plans with the US Asiatic Fleet and USAFFE. Here MacArthur tells Phillips that although he lacks the adequate anti-aircraft defenses, he has the B-17s as his main weapon for defense. Admiral Phillips points to MacArthur that the effectiveness of the B-17s would also depend on how it can coordinate with fighter units. Then MacArthur say: "The inability of an Enemy to launch his air attack on these islands is our greatest security".
December 8 becomes his reality check...
p.s. - Admiral Phillips would perish with the Prince of Wales on Dec. 10. His two ships, the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse would be sunk by Japanese Navy aircraft.
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Post by okla on Jun 13, 2015 21:05:19 GMT 8
Hey Battery...Regarding the destruction of the Prince of Wales and Repulse by Japanese Naval A/C....weren't those A/C Twin Engine Bombers with Torpedos mounted in the bomb bays??? Attempts to knock out surface vessels from medium/high altitude during the Pacific War seemed to be futile in most cases, if memory serves. Our B-17s at Midway failed miserably, although initial claims made by our guys were "off the chart". Subsequent analysis showed that it was USN Dive Bombing that did the major portion of knocking out the Japanese carriers,etc. What was left of MacArthur's heavy bomber force was forced into flying missions with three or four planes involved, bombing from medium/h9igh altitude, accomplishing only minor annoyance to the invaders. I suppose high altitude tactics, in some instances (stationery targets in cramped quarters ala Rabaul Harbor, etc) did sink some transports, etc, during the later conflict, but in general it was the dive bomber/torpedo folks who victimized the Japanese surface fleet. Methinks, also, that the USAAC would have been better served had they been furnished with B-25 type bombardment A/C which would have been much better suited for repelling invasion forces (these light bombers played havoc with Japanese shipping in and around the Solomons/New Guinea area) rather than the heavy, 4 engine bombers, but they probably would have been destroyed on the ground as were the much vaunted "Flying Forts". I just can't conceive, even if Genl Mac had all 35 of those B-17s at his disposal, that they would have made that much difference in the final outcome. Those early models had no tail gunner, no belly Ball turret, only one 30 cal. machine in the nose, 2 waiste guns and the top turret for repelling Zero fighters. It would appear that attrition during the opening days or weeks of the war would have thinned out our heavy bomber numbers to the point of having to withdraw them or what was left to the South as was done anyhow. Again, just my humble. Cheers.
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Post by batteryboy on Jun 13, 2015 22:04:02 GMT 8
Hi Okla,
Yes Task Force Z was attacked by the same type of aircraft that bombed Clark and Iba on December 8 1941. The Mitsubishi G3M Nell and G4M1 Betty were armed with aerial torpedoes and hit the Prince of Wales and Repulse and sank them on the 10th of December.
You are correct to point out that the B-17s had a dismal performance in Midway. It was the same here in the P.I. as bombing at high altitude against surface vessels was inaccurate. The US did not have enough B-25s by that time although a number of them flew with the Royce Mission in early 42 against Japanese targets.
The B-17 C and D models had a lower gun tub but had limited fire unlike the Bendix lower turret found in the E models and the Sperry Ball turret found in the later F and G models.
We did not have any torpedo planes to repel the Japanese invasion. Even our submarine force was ineffective in stopping the Japanese convoy. One of the reasons that the faulty torpedoes that the subs and even the PT boats used. Unlike the Japanese they had the Type 91 18-inch aerial torpedo and the best torpedo during WWII: the Type 93 24-inch "Long Lance" torpedo used by their subs, cruisers and destroyers.
In Midway, it was dive bombing that scratched out the four flat tops of the IJN. Here in the P.I., we had ten (10) A-27 Attack Aircraft. These are armed and modified T-6 Texans that were intended for Siam (Thailand) but were diverted to the P.I. They were suppose to be able to perform dive bombing missions but they were used as "hack" aircraft instead. We were suppose to receive 52 A-24 Banshees (Army version of the SBD) but the Pensacola convoy that was suppose to bring them here were diverted to Australia instead.
Cheers, Batts
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