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Post by EXO on Aug 9, 2016 14:12:05 GMT 8
I recently had cause to look into the issue of errors made in the defense of Corregidor. Essentially, it was an issue of "what could have been done differently?"
I've always wondered why, for instance, there was little fire available from the other Forts on the morning of the invasion, and if so, why hadn’t the fall of fire from these other forts been registered? Surely a grid could have been prepared? Consider also, for instance, how few Germans were killed in the weeks of bombardment prior to the disastrous first day of the Somme, and how the Germans were able to put up a lead wall of intersecting MG fire within minutes of the all clear signal. German trenches had been dug down to thirty feet, where the bombardments had little effect other than psychological.
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Post by batteryboy on Aug 9, 2016 22:01:08 GMT 8
This is an interesting question and also did ponder on this Although the outcome would have been the surrender, some are pondering why the island succumbed in less than 24 hours after the Japanese landings (which by the way did not go well in the early stages) given that a regiment of Marines together with a mixed bag of Philippine Scouts, Phil Army, Coast Artillery, USN and other men from various service units. On paper, the men defending the beach defense of the island is formidable with a number of land defense stations, field artillery emplacements and various MG emplacements covering possible landing approaches. The field artillery was composed of a number of M1917 75mm (or Brit 75mm), plus the Marines had a number of M1916 37mm guns (not to be confused with the M3 37mm AT Gun) located all around the island. Some of the 75mms were even deployed at the top of Malinta Hill. Plus the defenders also improvised other measures like dropping or rolling shells and explosives that were meant to impede any landing. Before I continue, I need some shut eye. Anybody who want to add to this please do so. Will post some observation tomorrow.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 9, 2016 23:44:12 GMT 8
Interesting question.
1. Wasn't a large part of the problem that the forts and coast artillery emplacements were sighted to protect against a naval attack on Manila Bay, not an amphibious assault from Bataan? How much artillery did the defenders have other than the coast artillery? How much of the coast artillery could hit the invasion beaches? Could they hit the beaches accurately enough to avoid friendly casualties?
2. As for the bombardment, the Japanese had been pounding Corregidor relentlessly since the fall of Bataan. That is an ungodly long bombardment: nearly a month (and they had periodically bombarded Corregidor before Bataan fell). I think the World War I vets said it was worse than anything the Germans had thrown at them. Malinta Tunnel was the only safe place on the island, but for obvious reasons, it could not be used to shelter the beach-defense troops.
3. As for the surrender within 24 hours, Wainwright later wrote that the dispositive factor was Japanese tanks advancing on Malinta Tunnel. He had no anti-tank weapons and he was horrified at the thought of what even one tank could do if it nosed into the tunnel.
4. Lurking in the background was the knowledge that the fresh water supply would run out soon. The Japanese continually knocked out the power plant, which was essential to the fresh-water supply. The food supply wouldn't last past June, and Wainwright knew that no help would be arriving from the United States.
5. Before the attack, Wainwright radioed Washington that he felt the defenders had less than an even chance of repelling a landing. MacArthur felt that Wainwright was being too optimistic.
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Post by cbuehler on Aug 10, 2016 1:20:10 GMT 8
It may not have been so much an issue of errors, but of circumstances, some of which joeconnor53 mentioned. Although the Japanese had some serious problems in the early stages of the landing (leading to Gen. Homma's "agony of mind"), Col. Sato was able to change the situation quite rapidly, which would, I suppose, lead to some questions as to why.
CB
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Post by wwalker on Aug 10, 2016 1:46:13 GMT 8
A most interesting question because it is immensely multifaceted. This is just an initial reply of my first thoughts. It is my understanding that Fort Drum did pour a substantial amount of artillery fire onto the Japanese embarkation point on Bataan with some success, but I'll have to check my facts on this. I also seem to remember references to American artillery fire endangering their own men on the tail of the island. That's not even to mention the relentless barrages being laid on the tail in the pre-landing stages by the Japanese.
Another important element is the Japanese artillery batteries on Bataan. These guns were focused on American artillery batteries (that is, what was left of them) with great precision. They had had plenty of time and observation to pinpoint each of these sights. Due to the antiquated, open air design of the American batteries, the coast artillerymen manning the guns were subject to almost immediate counter-battery fire as soon as they opened up. These batteries were kept silent because of long concentrated counter battery fire.
Lets just say for instance, that Wainwright had ordered everyone off the tail. Then allowed the Japanese to land unopposed, and then poured artillery fire on that tail. Japanese counter-battery would have prevented that from happening because the American batteries would've been silenced. The only option at that point would have been Ft. Drum because of its turreted guns.
All this aside, the Achilles heel was communications. All communications were shattered. The right hand didn't know what the left was doing, etc.
WW
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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 10, 2016 2:06:10 GMT 8
Ordering everyone off the tail is an interesting idea. U.S. Army doctrine at the time was that the only way to defeat an amphibious assault was to stop the enemy on the beaches when, the saying goes, he had one foot on land and one foot in the water. That's what MacArthur tried without success to do at Lingayen Gulf.
What about air observation? The Japanese had planes to act as aerial spotters for the artillery. We didn't.
Yes, communications were gone. The Japanese artillery destroyed all the wires and cables, and good luck getting runners through that bombardment.
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Post by beirutvet on Aug 10, 2016 2:06:12 GMT 8
EXO
Excellent food for thought.
I too, had often wondered why more fire support had not come from the other forts. From what I have gathered, Drum was still pretty much intact and ready to go on with the fight. While also bombed and shelled, Fort Hughes did not suffer as much abuse as Fort Mills. Can anyone here give us a brief synopsis of the extent of shelling/damage and what was still operational on Fort Hughes at the time of surrender? Were there not other M1890 mortars on Hughes and Frank? Were they still functional the day of the Japanese invasion? With their plunging trajectory, they would have been best suited to defend against a landing on the other side of another island. You are correct, EXO, they certainly had more than enough time to coordinate and register. They all knew the invasion would come to Corregidor, not the other islands so pre-planning for fire support from the other island batteries seems only logical.
BatteryBoy
Yes, there was a regiment of Marines there but were on half and one third rations for how long? Lack of medicine and water were also big factors as were the obsolete weapons. I thank God that I have never been on half rations, or less, but the battle effectiveness of any force of any size would be diminished after receiving the undivided attention of the entire Japanese air and artillery forces for a straight month with little food, water, or medicine. And even then, did not Homma himself despair that the invasion was a disaster because the defense of the island was, in the words of the Japanese themselves, savage? I believe the Japanese disregard for human life, even their own played a huge factor as well. Their casualties equaled our own even before they made landfall. What Allied commander would have continued under those circumstances?
As for the artillery there, how much was actually usable come time to use it? As for the 75 MM on top of Malinta Hill, We have all seen the pictures and have discussed the fate of the 1.1 AA gun just yards away from the position of the 75, could that not have suffered the same fate as the 1.1? Does anyone have info on the status of that 75MM on D-Day? From such an exposed position, its survival would seem unlikely. Just a guess there. From what I have read, those 37MM were able to be hidden from bombardment and acquitted themselves bravely and successfully.
joeconner53
Well put. I believe your 5 points sums everything up nicely.
EXO
And here we are, 74 years later and the debate rages on. Nicely sparked conversation. Kudos.
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Post by fortman on Aug 10, 2016 4:44:15 GMT 8
A very interesting discussion indeed. Another factor which probably weighed on Wainwright's mind was the large number of civilians and other non-combatants whose lives were also at stake. This was also Percival's problem at Singapore.
fortman
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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 10, 2016 6:52:27 GMT 8
Well, fortman, we know that Wainwright was very concerned about the nurses, who were in Malinta Tunnel. I'm sure the rape of Nanking was in his mind.
He surrendered 11,000 people. I wonder how many were civilians? We know that Philippine government officials (e.g., Quezon and his cabinet) had been evacuated, as had American government officials (e.g., Sayre). I believe that all the American news correspondents were gone. Given its isolation, Corregidor was sort of an invitation-only party. Civilians couldn't get there as easily as they had been able to get to Bataan. I'm sure some civilians were able to get to Corregidor when Bataan fell, probably by small boat or by swimming.
Here's something to consider:
1. The food would be gone by the end of June. Fresh water might have been gone earlier.
2. If the May 5-6 assault failed, it would undoubtedly have taken the Japanese several months to mount another amphibious assault. Their losses were horrific and they would have needed reinforcements and more landing craft.
3. That seems to mean that even if the defenders had been able to repel the May 5-6 assault, they might have been starved into submission before the Japanese could launch another landing.
4. It seems that these factors may have entered into Wainwright's decision-making.
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Post by wwalker on Aug 10, 2016 7:24:00 GMT 8
I'm in total agreement on Wainwright's decision. I think it was wise, for all the reasons joeconnor has presented, and I believe most of his men thought so too. However, I do remember a conversation with an old veteran who was quite angry when the surrender came. One of his battery mates said that he was relieved that it was all over. The veteran told me that he felt like "putting that boys teeth through his bottom lip" after hearing it. But it was an emotion of anger and youth and frustration and probably fear. Not to mention he was a brave man.
The real question is what could have been done before the night of May 5.
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