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Post by okla on Aug 16, 2016 1:31:10 GMT 8
Hey Guys....I would imagine, with all the chaos surrounding the Corregidor defenders, that the news reporting "tanks on Island" most likely brought the same reaction of being informed that an armored force akin to one of Rommel's Panzer Divisions was approaching Malinta Hill. Just sayin'.
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Post by wwalker on Aug 16, 2016 1:52:15 GMT 8
Thanks for sharing the info about espionage, EXO. I have been looking into these cases for quite some time. Although I know that some might disagree about the importance of said espionage, especially in regards to the Japanese invasion of 1941-42, I cannot help but wonder what intelligence information the Japanese had about the defenses and to what degree the information influenced their strategy. It appears to me that the question was shrugged off in the past as being inconsequential, and maybe it was, but I believe it worthy of further investigation. By reading Allison Ind's account, Bataan: The Judgment Seat, it seems that there is cause to believe that the Japanese had spies on the ground, even after the outbreak of hostilities. I've found further evidence in diaries that leads in the same direction.
Furthermore, I spoke with two Corregidor veterans who knew of special agents of the United States being in the Philippines during the peacetime months leading up to the hostilities. One of these agents ended up becoming a Warrant Officer after the war started.
Sorry to have diverted the question, down what might very well be a "rabbit hole."
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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 16, 2016 2:07:06 GMT 8
The espionage information is really fascinating. What I find interesting is that the agents apparently never got hold of War Plan Orange or Homma would have known that the exodus into Bataan was a strategic withdrawal, not panicked flight.
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Post by wwalker on Aug 16, 2016 2:19:46 GMT 8
That's a very good point, Joe. Apparently the Japanese did not know about WPO. Interestingly, most of the suspicions of "on the ground" espionage, are found only in the accounts of American soldiers in the Manila area between Dec. 8-Dec. 25. As of yet, I've not found one person who witnessed, or was even suspicious of espionage on Bataan, after the evacuation of Fil-American forces from Manila. It was only during the first weeks of the war in the Manila area that suspicions were voiced and written.
I think that the Japanese were mostly interested in American military installations, and since the US had very little on Bataan, it stands to reason that they did not focus much of their attention there.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Aug 16, 2016 8:31:12 GMT 8
Really good point. Every personal account of the campaign mentions suspected fifth-column activities but I can't recall any first-hand account of any fifth columnist getting caught in the act.
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Post by cbuehler on Aug 16, 2016 9:11:02 GMT 8
The intelligence aspect is indeed interesting. It is apparent that Japanese did their homework prior to the invasion of the Philippines, but just how much of this is affected the outcome is something we cannot be sure of. We are aware of the tendency to tie in Pearl Harbor and the loss of PI to spies and fifth columnists as a convenient way to help explain the loss. After all, Pearl Harbor was a "sneak attack" was it not?
CB
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Post by wwalker on Aug 16, 2016 10:11:23 GMT 8
I agree with the skepticism raised here. I'm not insinuating that the spy-game is the lone culprit. Of course, there is much more to the fall of the Philippines than some spies. I can promise that there is nothing "convenient" about this explanation. It's not an excuse either. However, in my opinion it is a relevant piece to the puzzle. Do we really know what the Japanese knew? Please enlighten me if we really know.
Over many years I've had the pleasure of speaking with many veterans who were the ones who paid the price of an unprepared defense. Not once did any of them make excuses for what happened. The theory of Japanese spies is completely my own. I don't think that what I've discussed was solely the excuse either. Simply put, I think it was a factor.
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Post by EXO on Aug 16, 2016 13:16:19 GMT 8
I agree with wwalker, the intelligence game is a factor, not a determinant.
Japan had been an ally of the US, and a number of young Japanese attended the US universities and colleges. The 14th Japanese Imperial Army, under the command of General Masaharu Homma, were almost as familiar with WPO as the Americans. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, WPO had been studied at West Point by the Army's prospective second lieutenants, and by the Japanese exchange officers who studied there as well. Thus, WPO3 (which was sufficiently long in the tooth as to be almost obsolete even by 1935) came as no surprise, and I believe that we run a risk of considering the the clash of armies as more important than it truly was. The essential Japanese over-arching plan was naval, and designed as a counter-plan against the US Naval plan to sail across the Pacific. It mattered little that the US Army was seeking protection up in Bataan because they were the bait, not the prize. The Japanese figured that the US fleet, or what remained of it, would be sent to do battle with the IJN, could be harried by submarines along the way, and that there would be a major IJN-USN fleet confrontation, which the Japanese would soundly win. Pre-Midway fashion, in a navy against navy clash, this was sound planning.
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Post by wwalker on Aug 17, 2016 10:32:40 GMT 8
That's an angle I've never thought about, EXO, but boy am I in total agreement with your post. Japan prided itself as a great naval power, and to provoke a decisive naval battle would have been excellent strategy for them at that point in the war. The Fil-American soldiers were "waiting for ships that never come in," while the Japanese might very well have been waiting for them too.
Nice turn of phrase you used there, wwalker, conjuring up "The Battle Fleet that Never Came." Yet the NOT sending of it probably saved the USA, and pissed off the Japanese Admirals no end. The concept that there were strings of Japanese submarines stretched across the Pacific waiting for the USN, and a Japanese fleet ready to dispose of the survivors, is most illuminating. No wonder Washington wanted to make it appear to everybody that there would be a rescue of the Philippines. For a long while I have argued that MacArthur was the most lied to American general, and this concept of the 'Double Game' establishes further reason why he was never put in the position of knowing the truth until he absolutely needed to know. No doubt this is another reason he became so upset (upset seems a somewhat mild word for it, I imagine) when he arrived in Australia, only to find out that the US Forces available there to retake the Philippines was an under-strength troop of boy scouts armed with penknives and slingshots. - EXO -
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Post by batteryboy on Aug 17, 2016 14:50:17 GMT 8
A number of US M3 light tanks were left abandoned when the Bamban bridge in Tarlac was prematurely blown up during the retreat as they could not cross. A number of them were captured by the Japanese and incorporated to the IJA 7th Tank Regiment and used in Bataan.
Wainwright's decision when he heard that Japanese tanks were in the island was a judgment call based on overall situation. It was a major factor for him.
The local field commanders should have been more creative in dealing with the tanks.
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