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Post by EXO on Jul 6, 2021 11:13:17 GMT 8
Well, I’ve been busy again, creating content for the website. One of my projects, which I am not going to provide a link to, involves a 50MB feature. You guys will have to find that yourselves. Thanks go to John Duresky and Tony Feredo for their assistance on this project. I was motivated this week to connect up another scanner, the one capable of scanning an A3 sheet. I’ve used this to do a few items from my father’s WWII footlocker. The link is to the Japanese announcement of the USAFFE Surrender in the Philippines. MacArthur anticipated Washington's placing Wainwright in command of all the USAFFE troops in the Philippines (rather than just those in Luzon), would gift the Japanese the ability to force Wainwright to surrender all the USAFFE troops in the Philippines. Sometimes I wonder whether the 'powers that be' Washington fully anticipated this, but would not admit it for the purposes of History. Had they consciously decided that it would be better for the USAFFE to surrender than fight, and thus placed the burden of surrender on Wainwright? This question is posed for the purpose of encouraging considered and in-depth private research, not as a cattle call for Facebook-style histrionics and MacArthur trolling.
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Post by xray on Jul 25, 2021 5:01:07 GMT 8
I have always thought it was a glaring and obvious error ,, Why appoint an overall commander for a sprawling archipelago right at the main point it is besieged ? I think they did it for troop moral and not likely things would have changed much if Mac had overall command from AUS and Wainwright just commanded the Rock. IF I recall correctly, upon hearing of the surrender Mac issued a statement that Wainwright was under extreme duress [which he was], his orders are invalid and appointed Gen Sharp as commander ,,, Which itself didn't last very long. Wainwright suffered through is years long captivity thinking he was going to be court martialed for presiding over the largest surrender of US forces in history, must have been very sweet for him to get hugs from Mac and welcome home parades in his honor.
Obviously an man in his position would have failed, there was just no salvaging our position there. I think his biggest error was not shelling Japanese positions settling up artillery right by and on our field hospitals in Bataan. His officers implored him to do it and he turned them down, fearing of course that we would blast our own men. Probably would have but he waited a full 3 days before targeting thse new and very dangerous positions, at which time the Japs were able to smother and overwhelm our guns. Had he acted immediately, the struggle could well have been prolonged weeks further.
Mac literally wanted the command to be fought to complete destruction to buy time, Wainwright was probably too much of a humanitarian for high command.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Jul 26, 2021 20:16:59 GMT 8
MacArthur's motive in seeking to retain command of the troops in the Philippines was the relief and reinforcement of the Philippines. He believed that the U.S. had built up a sizable number of troops and planes in Australia, and he hoped to quickly lead them north to the Philippines. MacArthur later wrote that he got the biggest shock of his life when he arrived in Australia and found that the garrison there was smaller than the one he had left in the Philippines. No relief expedition was possible.
When MacArthur left the Islands, Washington announced that Wainwright now commanded all troops in the Philippines, which enabled the Japanese to force him to surrender all those troops, not just the ones in Corregidor. Even without this change of command, however, there was no guarantee that Homma would have been satisfied simply with the surrender of Corregidor. It's entirely possible he would have held Wainwright and the men on Corregidor hostage until all Filipino and American troops in the island surrendered. As we know, the Japanese didn't always play by the rules. Of course, a month earlier, Homma had recognized that General King commanded only the troops on Bataan and didn't try to hold them hostage to coerce Wainwright into surrendering Corregidor, but by May 1942, Homma was under even more intense pressure from Tokyo to end the entire campaign and he might have played hardball even if Wainwright hadn't been given command of all Allied troops in the Islands.
Yes, MacArthur wanted the men on both Bataan and Corregidor to fight to the death. Some in Washington, like Secretary of War Stimson, shared this view. However, after King's surrender, FDR gave Wainwright full discretion, which included permission to surrender if necessary.
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