Post by EXO on Oct 15, 2021 7:10:40 GMT 8
Jus' tidying up an old hard disk, thought it worthwhile to share this. G-2 got it wrong.
To attack, seize and occupy CARABAO Island, and to destroy all hostile forces thereon, was the mission assigned the 38th Infantry Division by FO #13, Headquarters XI Corps, 3 April 1945. The G-2 estimate of the defense force strength was 336, the majority of which were believed to be enemy machine gun units.
Information of recent excavations was partially confirmed by PT boat and aerial reconnaissance on 9 April. Several emplacements on the West side of the island were thought to be occupied although movement was not conspicuous.
C-Day and H-Hour was designated 160930 April 1945. The 151st Infantry was given the mission and the 1st Battalion under command of Maj Morton K. Sitton, was selected as the assault battalion. Attached supporting troops for the assault force were: 1 Platoon Company C 113th Engineer (C) Battalion, Detachment Company B 113th Medical Battalion, 18th Support Aircraft Party, 239th JASCO, Artillery Forward Observer and Liaison Party, and 1 oil pump and crew with LCM from the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. The 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment furnished and manned the assault landing craft, and furnished amphibious evacuation and supply for the operation.
The Supporting Weapons Group was composed of the 139th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How), Battery A 150th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) with 1 Platoon 50 Caliber Machine Guns, 81mm mortar platoons from Companies D and M 151st Infantry, 1 Platoon Antitank Company 151st Infantry, 2 Platoons Cannon Company 151st Infantry, Detachment 113th Engineer (C) Battalion, and 1 Platoon Company C 82d Chemical Battalion (4.2"Chemical Mortars). Direct support was furnished by this Supporting Weapons Group from positions vicinity TERNATE on the mainland South of MANILA BAY.
Air support from C-6 to C-Day consisted of daily bombardment with medium bombers and fighter craft dropping 1000 lb bombs and executing strafing attacks. On C-4 moderate but in accurate anti-aircraft fire was received by the attacking planes. Devastating air strikes were made covering the entire surface of the island. The earth was torn and crumbled to the extent that great land slides closed up many tunnel entrances.
The use of C-47s, out of which were dropped 55 gal drums of NaPalm, was highly successful. Guns and emplacements were destroyed, much of the foliage and vegetation removed, and the island left scorched and barren.
Reconnaissance was conducted to locate positions for the Artillery on the mainland, possible enemy shore positions, landing beaches, walls, and enemy works on CARABAO, including mines, underwater obstacles, and wire; and to determine if the seawall had to breached to permit bulldozers, tanks, and SPM's to be landed and moved across beach. PT boats accompanied the reconnaissance party. On C-3 Artillery and 81mm mortars landed on the selected positions on the South shore of MANILA BAY. The Artillery registered in, then fired on targets of opportunity and night harassing fires from C-2 to H-1.
The landing beach selected was mid-way on the eastern coast and consisted of a flat stretch of ground 200 yards long by 75 yards deep. A vertical sea wall five feet high ran along the waters edge. This flat stretch was surrounded by vertical shale cliffs, in the face of which were four large caves. In the face of one cliff a sloping road had been cut out prior to the war. The beach on the North end of the island where a landing might have been attempted was well covered with mutually supporting emplacements, barbed wire and natural obstacles. High walls had been constructed at the waters edge at the entrance of all accessible ravines. Tunnels and emplacements built at the waters edge commanded the approaches. Precipitous cliffs a hundred feet high rose out of the sea at other points making assault impossible.
Naval gunfire 0-1 and 0-Day breached the sea wall and closed all possible caves that could furnish opposition to the landing. The coordination of Naval gunfire, fire from Rocket Boats, and the supporting Artillery was minutely planned and very well executed.
Between 0830 - 0900 C-Day air strikes with strafing were conducted to destroy emplacements and drive the enemy into caves. From 0900 - 0920 Naval gunfire bombarded the landing beach and the cliffs adjacent thereto. Between 0920 - 0930 Naval Rocket Fire gave close support while Artillery and Naval Fire neutralized all parts of the island.
Assault waves reached the hostile shore on schedule without opposition. The plan of attack called for two platoons to land, advance across the flat, and while one platoon secured the beachhead, the other to advance rapidly up the inclined road, and secure the top of the ridge where the road reached the top. Following units were to throw a block across the island on the North side of the connecting ridge, while the remainder of the Battalion secured the Southern end of the island.
Then the Western peninsula, followed by the Northern end, was to be secured. This was followed out to the letter and by 1140 the entire surface of the island was secured.
No enemy was encountered. The Engineers brought a bull dozer up to the high ground with winches and cables. The troops then proceeded to demolish all emplacements covered all tunnel entrances, and ignited several enemy ammunition dumps resulting in large underground explosions.
On the second day an investigation of all remaining emplacements, tunnels, and caves, disclosed the fact that CARABAO Island had not been occupied by the enemy for several days.
CARABAO ISLAND OPERATION
16 April 1945
16 April 1945
To attack, seize and occupy CARABAO Island, and to destroy all hostile forces thereon, was the mission assigned the 38th Infantry Division by FO #13, Headquarters XI Corps, 3 April 1945. The G-2 estimate of the defense force strength was 336, the majority of which were believed to be enemy machine gun units.
Information of recent excavations was partially confirmed by PT boat and aerial reconnaissance on 9 April. Several emplacements on the West side of the island were thought to be occupied although movement was not conspicuous.
C-Day and H-Hour was designated 160930 April 1945. The 151st Infantry was given the mission and the 1st Battalion under command of Maj Morton K. Sitton, was selected as the assault battalion. Attached supporting troops for the assault force were: 1 Platoon Company C 113th Engineer (C) Battalion, Detachment Company B 113th Medical Battalion, 18th Support Aircraft Party, 239th JASCO, Artillery Forward Observer and Liaison Party, and 1 oil pump and crew with LCM from the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. The 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment furnished and manned the assault landing craft, and furnished amphibious evacuation and supply for the operation.
The Supporting Weapons Group was composed of the 139th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How), Battery A 150th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) with 1 Platoon 50 Caliber Machine Guns, 81mm mortar platoons from Companies D and M 151st Infantry, 1 Platoon Antitank Company 151st Infantry, 2 Platoons Cannon Company 151st Infantry, Detachment 113th Engineer (C) Battalion, and 1 Platoon Company C 82d Chemical Battalion (4.2"Chemical Mortars). Direct support was furnished by this Supporting Weapons Group from positions vicinity TERNATE on the mainland South of MANILA BAY.
Air support from C-6 to C-Day consisted of daily bombardment with medium bombers and fighter craft dropping 1000 lb bombs and executing strafing attacks. On C-4 moderate but in accurate anti-aircraft fire was received by the attacking planes. Devastating air strikes were made covering the entire surface of the island. The earth was torn and crumbled to the extent that great land slides closed up many tunnel entrances.
The use of C-47s, out of which were dropped 55 gal drums of NaPalm, was highly successful. Guns and emplacements were destroyed, much of the foliage and vegetation removed, and the island left scorched and barren.
Reconnaissance was conducted to locate positions for the Artillery on the mainland, possible enemy shore positions, landing beaches, walls, and enemy works on CARABAO, including mines, underwater obstacles, and wire; and to determine if the seawall had to breached to permit bulldozers, tanks, and SPM's to be landed and moved across beach. PT boats accompanied the reconnaissance party. On C-3 Artillery and 81mm mortars landed on the selected positions on the South shore of MANILA BAY. The Artillery registered in, then fired on targets of opportunity and night harassing fires from C-2 to H-1.
The landing beach selected was mid-way on the eastern coast and consisted of a flat stretch of ground 200 yards long by 75 yards deep. A vertical sea wall five feet high ran along the waters edge. This flat stretch was surrounded by vertical shale cliffs, in the face of which were four large caves. In the face of one cliff a sloping road had been cut out prior to the war. The beach on the North end of the island where a landing might have been attempted was well covered with mutually supporting emplacements, barbed wire and natural obstacles. High walls had been constructed at the waters edge at the entrance of all accessible ravines. Tunnels and emplacements built at the waters edge commanded the approaches. Precipitous cliffs a hundred feet high rose out of the sea at other points making assault impossible.
Naval gunfire 0-1 and 0-Day breached the sea wall and closed all possible caves that could furnish opposition to the landing. The coordination of Naval gunfire, fire from Rocket Boats, and the supporting Artillery was minutely planned and very well executed.
Between 0830 - 0900 C-Day air strikes with strafing were conducted to destroy emplacements and drive the enemy into caves. From 0900 - 0920 Naval gunfire bombarded the landing beach and the cliffs adjacent thereto. Between 0920 - 0930 Naval Rocket Fire gave close support while Artillery and Naval Fire neutralized all parts of the island.
Assault waves reached the hostile shore on schedule without opposition. The plan of attack called for two platoons to land, advance across the flat, and while one platoon secured the beachhead, the other to advance rapidly up the inclined road, and secure the top of the ridge where the road reached the top. Following units were to throw a block across the island on the North side of the connecting ridge, while the remainder of the Battalion secured the Southern end of the island.
Then the Western peninsula, followed by the Northern end, was to be secured. This was followed out to the letter and by 1140 the entire surface of the island was secured.
No enemy was encountered. The Engineers brought a bull dozer up to the high ground with winches and cables. The troops then proceeded to demolish all emplacements covered all tunnel entrances, and ignited several enemy ammunition dumps resulting in large underground explosions.
On the second day an investigation of all remaining emplacements, tunnels, and caves, disclosed the fact that CARABAO Island had not been occupied by the enemy for several days.