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Post by EXO on Dec 12, 2009 5:45:34 GMT 8
There were even some suggestions that in the months leading up to the war, Quezon had been in secret talks with the Japanese about establishing the Philippines as a neutral country. I think he may have flown to Japan secretly to pursue this. I can't recall the time frame. One might well think that he was playing a devious "double game" here. Perhaps the constraints which he placed on the USAFFE in the opening days of the war were the result of his desire to have the running of the country entirely to himself, independent of both US and Japanese interests. Seated, left to right: George H. Dern, Secretary of War; President Franklin D. Roosevelt, signing the Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth; Manuel L. Quezon, President, Philippine Senate; standing, left to right: Brig. Gen. Creed F. Cox, Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department; Frank Murphy, Governor General of the Philippine Islands; Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; Key Pittman, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate; Pedro Guevara, Philippine Resident Commissioner; Miguel Cuaderno, Vice President, Philippine National Bank, Manila, P. I.; Manuel Roxas, Representative, Philippine Legislature, Delegate, Constitutional Assembly; Francisco A. Delgado, Philippine Resident Commissioner. I don't want to go into any more detail on this, for it's getting us away from our ' Rockhead' topics, but certainly the pressures and constraints on USAFFE to fight the war militarily weren't just the regular ones they deal with in the "Official History" texts. Suffice it to say, I believe that without Quezon's meddling and interference, and his constant and consistent opportunism, which in the end benefited the Philippines little or none at all, the campaign would have been fought differently.
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Post by D Kydell on Dec 12, 2009 18:58:50 GMT 8
John Bryan writes: "Had MacArthur's forces held out into June or July of 1942, it could have caused a major change in how the war was militarily planned and waged from Washington. As a result, President Roosevelt would have been under enormous public pressure from the civilian public to find some way to bring relief and reinforcements to the men on Bataan. "
I am curious now. Did the US have any options of relief for the Philippines, given the blow the navy received at Pearl Harbor? How would the planning have changed? Or would they have been forced just to watch while the US forces in the Philippines were slowly worn down, even if the correct preparations had been made?
Also EXO writes: "Suffice it to say, I believe that without Quezon's meddling and interference, and his constant and consistent opportunism, which in the end benefited the Philippines little or none at all, the campaign would have been fought differently."
This is interesting. How do you think the defense of the Philippines would have been carried out without Quezon's actions. Do you think the original WPO would have been followed? (Conjecture again !!)
From the posts so far, I am thinking that without political interference and with good military planning, the US troops would still have been in a no-win situation and would have eventually fell to the Japanese.
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Post by okla on Dec 12, 2009 22:55:41 GMT 8
Hey DK...Your last paragraph about sums it up in my humble. It would seem, under the best of conditions, that the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor were ultimately doomed. They were surrounded, too far removed from available and timely relief. Even as late as 1944 and 1945, when we had the muscle to begin our move up the southern island chains and across the central Pacific, it was a slow, costly, slugging match. The guys clinging to hope in Manila Bay just didnt have the capability. even if there had been more food, medicines, etc stockpiled, to resist till late 1944 for salvation. I will always feel that those guys still stunted, to some degree, the Japanese move south and a longer period of resistance would have helped us even more in stalling the emperor's drive to rule the western Pacific. All this is, as I always have said is pure conjecture. One more thing....if nothing else, after Singapore and the Dutch East Indies had fallen our guys, along with the Filipinos were still getting a few times at bat and this had to help morale at home at least to a small degree till we blew the Japanese carriers away at Midway. Nice talking with you.
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Post by EXO on Dec 13, 2009 7:01:50 GMT 8
Those are all good points, and illustrate well the nature of war gaming.
How would the Bataan campaign have changed had the troops there been properly fed and not cut off from their supplies? I think the immediate effect would have been that the USAFFE forces would have been in better health. Thus they could have held out longer. This may have tied down more Japanese, thus constraining their campaigns further to the south.
It is very difficult to conceive of what the war may have been like without, say, the Guadalcanal Campaign. How would it have played out had the Japanese not committed the atrocity of the Death March? Would the Japanese have taken New Guinea? Would the US buildup in Australia have occurred? Would the Battle of the Coral Sea have been fought? Would there have been a major fleet action off Midway?
Short answer is, I don't know.
But none of this is going to stop us from "what iffing" when it comes to looking at the tragic mistakes made, and wondering how things might have played out had they not been made.
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