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Post by The Phantom on May 2, 2011 6:16:25 GMT 8
I am reading a new book,
"GUADAL-CANAL THE DEFINITIVE ACCOUNT OF THE LANDMARK BATTLE"
BY RICHARD B. FRANK 1990
I'M ABOUT 1/3 INTO AN 800 PAGE BOOK, DESCRIBING THE BATTLE FOR GUADAL-CANAL AND AM VERY IMPRESSED WITH THE DETAIL AND FACTUAL CONTENT. THE STORY IS TOLD FROM THE AMERICAN, AND THE JAPANESE SIDES, ON LAND, AIR, AND SEA WITH THE BENEFIT OF ALMOST 70 YEARS OF HINDSIGHT.
ALL THE MAJOR CHARACTERS ARE ALSO DESCRIBED IN DETAIL AS TO WHY THEY SUCCEEDED OR FAILED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CORNERS OF THE WAR.
ONE PASSAGE CAUGHT MY EYE.
" THANKS TO RECENT SCHOLARSHIP BY JOHN J. STEPHENS, WE KNOW NOW THAT YAMAMOTO'S MIDWAY PLAN REPRESENTED ONLY PART OF A STILL LARGER DESIGN TO CAPTURE HAWAII.
YAMAMOTO POSSESSED PERHAPS THE MOST UNCLOUDED UNDERSTANDING AMONG SENIOR JAPANESE OFFICIALS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMMENSE IMBALANCE IN MILITARY POTENTIAL BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, AND HE REFUSED TO GLOSS OVER THE CHASM WITH WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT HOW SUPERIOR" SPIRITUAL POWER" WOULD ENABLE JAPAN TO OVERCOME THESE MATERIAL DISPARITIES.
YAMAMOTO RECOGNIZED, IN STEPHENS WORDS, THAT " JAPAN'S ONLY HOPE AGAINST SUCH A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY LAY IN BOLD MILITARY ACTION FOLLOWED BY SKILLFUL DIPLOMACY".
HAWAII FIT YAMAMOTO'S PRESCRIPTION PRECISELY: MILITARILY , IT WOULD SERVE AS BAIT FOR THE PACIFIC FLEET AND IT'S CARRIERS; POLITICALLY, WITH IT'S 400,000 AMERICAN INHABITANTS, IT WOULD BE THE LEVER THAT TOKYO WOULD USE TO EXERT PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON TO END THE WAR.
VEHEMENT OPPOSITION TO THIS PLAN ABRUPTLY COLLAPSED AFTER THE DOLITTLE RAID. FOLLOWING THIS THE IMPERIAL ARMY GOT INTO STEP WITH YAMAMOTO'S THINKING AND ISSUED ORDERS FOR THREE DIVISIONS TO BEGIN PREPARATION FOR THE ASSAULT ON HAWAII.
AFTER THIS PLANNING TRIUMPH, AND RECOGNIZING THE HIGH STAKES ON THE MIDWAY EFFORT, YAMAMOTO WROTE TO A FRIEND, ' THE FIRST OPERATIONAL STAGE' OF OPERATIONS HAS BEEN KIND OF A CHILDREN'S HOUR AND WILL SOON BE OVER, NOW COMES THE ADULT HOUR......"
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Post by okla on May 2, 2011 9:18:18 GMT 8
Hey Phantom....I read this book a few years back. It is, by far, the best work pertaining to Guadalcanal, that I have come upon. That terrible little island was truly a slug fest and had such implications that were so far reaching. I have forgotten what Japanese higher up it was who said that "the war was lost with our defeat at Guadalcanal". Have you ever read/heard about the French farmer who lived just outside Verdun, France. Of course, his home and farm were fought over countless times during 1916=18. So disgusted, and knowing that this type thing could happen all over again in the future, he pulled up stakes, moved just as far from European war/politics as humanly possible and began the agricultural life once again, creating a plantation on the tropical island of, you guessed it, GUADALCANAL. I don't know if there are any facts to back this story up, but I just gotta believe it to be true. Too good a yarn to dismiss, doncha think?
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Post by Deleted on May 2, 2011 10:27:32 GMT 8
ONE PASSAGE CAUGHT MY EYE. " THANKS TO RECENT SCHOLARSHIP BY JOHN J. STEPHENS, WE KNOW NOW THAT YAMAMOTO'S MIDWAY PLAN REPRESENTED ONLY PART OF A STILL LARGER DESIGN TO CAPTURE HAWAII. YAMAMOTO POSSESSED PERHAPS THE MOST UNCLOUDED UNDERSTANDING AMONG SENIOR JAPANESE OFFICIALS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMMENSE IMBALANCE IN MILITARY POTENTIAL BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, AND HE REFUSED TO GLOSS OVER THE CHASM WITH WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT HOW SUPERIOR" SPIRITUAL POWER" WOULD ENABLE JAPAN TO OVERCOME THESE MATERIAL DISPARITIES. YAMAMOTO RECOGNIZED, IN STEPHENS WORDS, THAT " JAPAN'S ONLY HOPE AGAINST SUCH A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY LAY IN BOLD MILITARY ACTION FOLLOWED BY SKILLFUL DIPLOMACY". HAWAII FIT YAMAMOTO'S PRESCRIPTION PRECISELY: MILITARILY , IT WOULD SERVE AS BAIT FOR THE PACIFIC FLEET AND IT'S CARRIERS; POLITICALLY, WITH IT'S 400,000 AMERICAN INHABITANTS, IT WOULD BE THE LEVER THAT TOKYO WOULD USE TO EXERT PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON TO END THE WAR. VEHEMENT OPPOSITION TO THIS PLAN ABRUPTLY COLLAPSED AFTER THE DOLITTLE RAID. FOLLOWING THIS THE IMPERIAL ARMY GOT INTO STEP WITH YAMAMOTO'S THINKING AND ISSUED ORDERS FOR THREE DIVISIONS TO BEGIN PREPARATION FOR THE ASSAULT ON HAWAII. AFTER THIS PLANNING TRIUMPH, AND RECOGNIZING THE HIGH STAKES ON THE MIDWAY EFFORT, YAMAMOTO WROTE TO A FRIEND, ' THE FIRST OPERATIONAL STAGE' OF OPERATIONS HAS BEEN KIND OF A CHILDREN'S HOUR AND WILL SOON BE OVER, NOW COMES THE ADULT HOUR......" I wish Yamamoto would have tried to invade Oahu. He would have run headlong into a buzzsaw of gigantic proportions. By June, 1942, All of the aircraft destroyed on 7, Dec. 1941 had been replaced and augmented several times over. Oahu was defended by two, full strength Army Divisions, several Marine Defense Battalions and enough coastal arttillery to provide 360 degree gunfire coverage for the entire island with 16" guns, not to mention dozens of other coastal defense batteries ranging from 3" up to 14" and beyond. These batteries covered all stragegic approaches to the island. There were also a number of railway mounted, 240mm howitzers, the same ones that were originally slated for emplacement on Corregidor, but were turned back after the Tydings(?) military Treaty in the 1920's. Oahu in 1942 was the heaviest armed outpost in all of the US or its territories.
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Post by Deleted on May 2, 2011 10:34:46 GMT 8
Just to give you an idea of what Yamamoto would have faced with his ships and men during a post Midway Invasion attempt:
The Harbor Defenses of Honolulu, Hawaii
FORT RUGER/ Diamond Head/ 1906-now/ Natl. Guard , State Civil Def., State Dept. Land & Nat. Res. / KK Harlow/ 8-12"/M /1910-1943 Birkhimer/ 4-12" /M /1916-1943/ rebuilt, site modified Granger Adams/ 2-8"/ BC/ 1935-1946/ Black Pt., destroyed #407/ 2-8"/ BCLRN/ 1942 NA/ tunneled into rock S.C. Mills/ 2-5" /BP/ 1916-1925/ Black Pt., guns from Mott, destroyed Dodge/ 2-4.7" /A/ 1915-1925/ 2-4" NP WWII, orig. barrels at NG Armory Wahiawa Hulings/ 2-4.7" /A/ 1915-1925 unnamed/ 12-2.24" /Ped./ 1915-1919/ emplacements for parapit mounts Ruger/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1942-1943/ destroyed
Wiliwilinui Ridge M.R./ private/ KK Kirkpatrick/ 4-8"/ 2xNT/ 1942-1948 Wili /4-155 mm/ PM/ destroyed
FORT DeRUSSY/ Waikiki Beach/ 1908- now/ Army recreation center , Army Museum/ K Randolph/ 2-14"/ DC/ 1913-1944/ 2 - 7" guns now in emplacements Dudley/ 2-6"/ DC/ 1913-1946/ destroyed '69 AMTB No. 5/ 2-90 mm/ F/ 1943-1946 / destroyed
FORT ARMSTRONG/ Kaakaukukui Reef/ 1899-1950s/ private/ MD, MC /X Tiernon/ 2-3"/ P/ 1911-1943/ destroyed
Sand Island Military Reservation/ K Sand/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1937-1943 / destroyed Harbor/ 4-7"/ NP/ 1942-1944 AMTB No. 4 (Sand)/ 2-90 mm/ F/ 1943-1946 / destroyed Ala Moana AMTB / 2-90 mm / F / 1943-1945 / destroyed Other locations- Honolulu ? #304/ 2-6"/ SBC/ 1942 NC/ Punchbowl #305/ 2-6"/ SBC/ NB/ Koko Saddle unnamed/ 2-240 mm/ H/ 1929-1941/ Waimanalo unnamed/ 2-240 mm/ H/ 1927-1941/ Kaaawa, buried unnamed/ 2-240 mm/ H/ 1927-1941/ Ulupau, destroyed 1992 Punchbowl /4-155 mm/ PM/ 1943-1944/ Punchbowl / 1 empl. remains Koko Head/ 2-155 mm/ PM/ 1941-1942/ Koko Head School/ 4-155mm/ PM/ 1942-1944/ Kamehameha School
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The Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii FORT BARRETTE/ Kapolei /1934-/ city/county park/ KKK Hatch/ 2/-16"/ BCLRN/ 1934-1948/ casemated-WWII
FORT WEAVER/ Puuloa/ 1899 (1922)/ Navy Housing/ K Williston/ 2-16"/ BCLRA/ 1924-1948/ ARF, destroyed AMTB No. 1/ 2-90 mm/ F/ 1943-1945 Weaver/ 4-155 mm/ PM
FORT KAMEHAMEHA/ Queen Emma Point/ 1908-1949/ Hickam AFB /MD?, MC /KKK Hasbrouck/ 8-12"/ M/ 1914-1943 Closson/ 2-12"/ BCLR/ 1924-1948/ casemated 1942 Selfridge/ 2-12"/ DC/ 1913-1945 Jackson/ 2-6"/ DC/ 1913-1943 Ahua/ 3-5"/ NP 1942-1944/ Ahua Pt. Barri/ 2-4.7"/ A-CM/ 1915-1924/ Bishop Pt., destroyed Chandler/ 2-3"/ P-CM/ 1915-1942/ Bishop Pt., destroyed Hawkins/ 2-3"/ P/ 1914-1943 AMTB No. 2/ 2-90 mm/ F/ 1943-1946 Kam/ 4-155 mm/ PM
Puu O Hulu M.R. KK "Hulu"/ 2-7"/ NCM/ 1942-1944 / incorperated into BCN# 303 #303/ 2-6"/ SBC/ 1942 NC/ tunneled into rock
Other locations- Pearl Harbor ? Arizona/ 3-14"/ NT/ 1945 NC/ Kahe Pt., from USS Arizona Burgess/ 4-8"/ 2xNT/ 1942-1948 / (Salt Lake) near Aliamanu Crater, destroyed Brown's Camp/ 4-8"/ RY/ 1937-1944/ Browns Camp, Kahe Point Adair / 2-6"/ A-CM/ 1917-1925/ Ford Island, empl. elsewhere earlier ? Boyd/ 2-6"/ A-CM / 1917-1925/ Ford Island "Homestead"/ 3-7"/ NP/ 1942 / Keaau Homesteads Nanakuli / 2-5" / NP / 1941-1943 / plus 1 - 3" NP / destroyed Oneula/ 2-5"/ NP/ 1942-1944/ Oneula Beach (Ewa) unnamed/ 2-240 mm/ H 1931-1941/ Laie unnamed/ 1-240 mm/ H 1927-1941/ Pupukea unnamed/ 3-240 mm/ H 1930-1941/ Makua Awanui/ 4-155 mm/ PM 1942-1944/ Brown's Camp Barber's Point/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1937-1942/ Barber's Point / destroyed X-Ray/ 4-155 mm/ PM 1942-1944/ Oneula Beach / destroyed Homestead/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1942-1944/ Makua Military Reservation Kahe Point/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1942-1944/ Kahe Point
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The Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay and the North Shore of Oahu, Hawaii FORT HASE/ Mokapu Point / 1942 / Marine Corps Base, Hawaii /KK Pennsylvania 3 14" NT 1945-1948 Ulupau Head, from USS Arizona Demerritt (#405) 2 8" BCLRN 1944-1948 Puu Papaa, tunneled into rock Sylvester 4 8" RY 1942-1944 RY guns on specially built tracks, later dismounted French (#301) 2 6" SBC 1944-194? Pyramid Rock AMTB 2 90 mm F 1943-1946 Pyramid Rock East Beach 4 155 mm PM North Beach 4 155 mm PM Pyramid Rock 4 155 mm PM
Paumalu M.R. /Waialee / X #408/ 2-8" BCLRN NB unnamed 4-8" RY NB
Kawailoa M.R / X? unnamed 4-8" RY 1940-1942 unnamed 4-155 mm PM
Opaeula M.R. / private /K Riggs/ 4-8"/ 2xNT / 1942-1948
Brodie Camp M.R. / Helemano / private / K Ricker/ 4-8"/ 2xNT/ 1942-1948
Kaena Point M.R. / KK #409/ 2-8"/ BCLRN/ 1942 NC/ tunneled into rock
Other locations- North Shore / K Kahuku/ 4-8"/ RY/ 1940-1944/ dismounted RY with shields, 1 empl. remains Cooper (#302)/ 2-6"/ SBC/ 1944-194?/ Lae o ka oio (opposite Kaioi Pt.), tunnels Kahana/ 2-5"/ NP/ 1942-1943/ Kahana Bay Wailia/ 2-3" / P/ 1942-1943/ Wailia Pt., guns from Chandler, repl by 90m F? AMTB No. 7/ 2-90 mm/ F/ 1943-1945/ South of Pyramid Rock AMTB No. 8/ 2-90 mm/ F/ 1943-1945 Kahuku/Ranch/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1941-1945/ Kahuku Loko/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1942-1944/ Kualoa Ranch Ashley/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1939-1944/ Ashley Military Reservation Kaena / 2-4" NP / 1942 / later converted to 155 mm site Kalihi / 2-4" NP / 1942 / Mokuoeo Is? Dillingham / 2-4" NP / 1942 / Mokuleia Kaneohe / 2-4" NP/ 1942 / Kaneohe Bay
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Oahu howitzer positions manned by field artillery units ? Kalihi/ 2-240 mm/ H/ 1941-1944 / Kalihi, atop Koalau Range "Quadropod"/ 2-240 mm/ H/ 1941-1944/ Paalaa unnamed/ 2-240 mm/ H
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Post by okla on May 2, 2011 23:59:53 GMT 8
Hey John....One thing for sure, had he tried, it wouldn't have been a "cake walk" as they enjoyed on the morning of December 7, 1941. We were armed to the teeth and on alert The only thing that bothers me is how much of our surface forces would have been available after whatever transpired at Midway. Even in victory we lost one third of our carrier strength. If Yamamoto had prevailed at Midway what shape would we have found ourselves in defeat? Anyhow, your point is well taken. Our Air and Ground forces on Oahu had plenty of time to gear up to repulse the Imperial Japanese invaders. Cheers. Postscript...This is excellent technical poop you have posted.
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Post by Deleted on May 4, 2011 4:17:49 GMT 8
Hey John....One thing for sure, had he tried, it wouldn't have been a "cake walk" as they enjoyed on the morning of December 7, 1941. We were armed to the teeth and on alert The only thing that bothers me is how much of our surface forces would have been available after whatever transpired at Midway. Even in victory we lost one third of our carrier strength. If Yamamoto had prevailed at Midway what shape would we have found ourselves in defeat? Anyhow, your point is well taken. Our Air and Ground forces on Oahu had plenty of time to gear up to repulse the Imperial Japanese invaders. Cheers. Postscript...This is excellent technical poop you have posted. Thanks, Oklahoma! I too believe Yamamoto would have really gotten beaten badly, had he tried to invade Oahu with only 3 divisions and in the face of such overwhelming defensive firepower and airpower too.
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Post by fots2 on May 4, 2011 20:28:24 GMT 8
Excellent information there John. Oahu could have been one of the major battle sites of the war.
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Post by okla on May 5, 2011 6:41:45 GMT 8
Hey John....Had this battle taken place, the Nipponese Admiral would have been going against a long accepted axiom that states that the invader/attacker should have a 3 to 1 ratio advantage in troops as opposed to that of the defenders. If memory serves, the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions left the comforts of Schofield Barracks and were firmly entrenched on the beautiful beaches of Oahu to go along with those Marine Defense Battalions that you mentioned. It would appear, as you also stated, that the American defenders were in pretty solid shape and surely could have beaten off the attack. I am still concerned as to how much Naval surface strength that our side might have brought back from a "defeat" at Midway. Even if we were deficient in this area, the Japs' three Infantry Divisions storming the beaches, where two American Divisions plus the USMC were firmly dug in, would have found pretty going, methinks.
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Post by Deleted on May 5, 2011 12:15:12 GMT 8
Hey John....Had this battle taken place, the Nipponese Admiral would have been going against a long accepted axiom that states that the invader/attacker should have a 3 to 1 ratio advantage in troops as opposed to that of the defenders. If memory serves, the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions left the comforts of Schofield Barracks and were firmly entrenched on the beautiful beaches of Oahu to go along with those Marine Defense Battalions that you mentioned. It would appear, as you also stated, that the American defenders were in pretty solid shape and surely could have beaten off the attack. I am still concerned as to how much Naval surface strength that our side might have brought back from a "defeat" at Midway. Even if we were deficient in this area, the Japs' three Infantry Divisions storming the beaches, where two American Divisions plus the USMC were firmly dug in, would have found pretty going, methinks. I very much agree with you Okla. The Japanese would have also labored without enough combat support ships, in short, the old quartermaster bugaboo of logistics. Historically speaking, in all of the Pacific War, the Japanese never mounted an amphibibious operation of this grand and great scale. The needed support ships simply didn't exist. Landing and supporting 3 infantry divisions ashore, so far from friendly bases would have plainly been beyond their overall capabilities. Added to this, there were few beaches on Oahu that would be considered "invasion friendly" Landing on the north shore might be fine on a surf board, but not in a Diahatsu Landing craft because of the oftentimes extremely high, unpredictable surf. Many, if not most other beaches around the island have vertical cliffs reaching hundreds of feet into the air, making invasion incursions inland difficult if not impossible. Oahu's geography plainly favors its defenders, while making it easy for those same defenders to consolidate the invaders into fixed enclaves before eventually destroying them piecemeal like during the Battle of the Points.,
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Post by Deleted on May 5, 2011 12:21:12 GMT 8
Excellent information there John. Oahu could have been one of the major battle sites of the war. [/quote Thanks Fots! Much obliged! I'm a huge fan of both this site and also the early days of the War in the Pacific. Okla and I are old pals who have chatted many times on other sites dealing with the Philippines and especially those sad, bad days immediatedly following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.]
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