|
Post by Registrar on Oct 27, 2014 15:30:23 GMT 8
Agreed, Okla. We have been this way before, we have beaten that poor dead steed before, you are so right! Indeed, and because we have been here before, I have warned myself that this post has gone completely off-topic. I have said too much already, I will say nothing further.
|
|
|
Post by xray on Oct 28, 2014 12:53:31 GMT 8
Hey All. ..Very intriguing stuff, to be sure, but with the aid of good 'ole hindsight, anybody who truly thought that the Japanese would actually by-pass the PI, must have been living in a tree. As it turned out the Philippines were included, big time, in their timetable of offensive operations, with jump off dates, times, etc all carefully planned out and ready for execution as soon as the bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor. In fact, didn't they jump the gun by an hour or two and started shooting in a remote area in Malaya prior to hitting Hawaii. I guess that the Brits actually fired the first Allied shots in the Pacific War if this scenario is actually so. It was truly a complicated situation and complex personalities involved. The main thing, though, was the Japs were cocked and primed, with a single minded plan and objectives that included the Philippines. Postscript.... Aside from why or why not the Clark Field B-17s didn't head North, those nimble Zeros would probably have chewed them up as was demonstrated later in the month. We have beaten that "dead horse" extensively in previous discussions. It is fun to hash it out, though. Cheers. Good points, obvious but overlooked by many and well worth repeating. The aggressors always have an advantage, at least initially, over their intended victims. Much like a robbery or mugging, the victim is by default at a disadvantage, and so it was for the Japanese and the Germans as well. Of course, we were not quite so oblivious to the imminent danger as as average mugging victim. It was well known that aggressive plans were afoot and that the initial months and years would not bode well for us, especially with the fate of Europe simultaneously hanging in the balance. But the crippling of US Pacific fleet in 1 bold stroke was a contingency not well planned for ,,, And I suppose if we did plan for it, not much could have been done different anyhow, short of repelling the boldly conceived and superbly executed attack itself. Philippines were simply an outpost too far, and the time to effectively defend them was wasted in the 1930's when our politicians ran on platforms of not sending American boys to die in foreign wars, and being tied up in disastrous treaties which tied our hands and strengthened the enemies. All of this was suddenly and brutally flung in our face in late 1941, and it was left for our soldiers to pay the price for the ineptness and lack of foresight and conviction of our leaders. Nice discussion, Mac always was and always will be a polarizing, controversial figure, I do think when its all said and done he was the right man at the right time in the right place.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on May 6, 2015 14:25:24 GMT 8
This has been dormant for some time but felt I should add some thoughts. 1. If you go to the MacArthur Memorial you will find a signet ring on display (or at least it was on display when I was there in the 80s). The story is that Quezon took it off and gave it to MacA as he was departing Corregidor, saying "when they find your body, I want them to know you fought for my country." It was a time of great, even apocalyptic, tension, as can be found in both the official record and in private accounts and reminiscences after the events took place. That events would quickly change --MacA would arrive in Australia ahead of Q-- was something I don't think anyone could predict. In such a situation I think the Filipino POV is to pay debts of gratitude both for past services rendered and for the heirs. Executive Order No. 1, series of 1942 can be understood in this sense. www.gov.ph/1942/01/03/executive-order-no-1-s-1942/2. The stir caused by Petillo was the "discovery" in the files of Sutherland; there's Rogers' recollections. Might be relevant that just a month ago, the descendants of Gen. Basilio Valdes, who was the Philippine Army Chief of Staff (and Secretary of National Defense in the Commonwealth War Cabinet) gave my office their surviving papers and in them we found an unsigned, carbon copy, of the EO. In which case one could deduce it was known in official circles at the time; certainly, at least it shows there were other copies, but between moving around and the poor record keeping that is somewhat understandable under the circumstances, and that it was official. As I understand it, the debate is not the propriety from the point of view of what was authorized and legal under Philippine laws, but whether it was proper and legal under American laws and practices. 3. A similar offer was made to Eisenhower, around May, 1942 when the PH government was already in America; Ike diplomatically said a medal rather than a gratuity would suffice. That's recorded in Eisenhower's diary. We recently found some paperwork on this but it still awaits fuller study by historians. Suffice it to say Ike personally vetted the phrasing of the correspondence, for the record, on both the PH government proposing, and his declining (in very gracious terms), "remuneration and reward" for past services rendered. Nor did it cause a breach in their friendship as correspondence between the two continued until Q fell quite ill and his energy was consumed with the succession crisis in 1943 (the last exchange of correspondence is when Ike was in North Africa). 4. Rogers asserts backdating, and again it might be best to review the debate on taking the Philippines out of the war that took place from Feb. 6-12, 1942 see philippinediaryproject.com/2013/02/10/the-debate-on-taking-the-philippines-out-of-the-war-february-6-12-1942/ ; foiled as that proposal was, one cannot discount the possibility that Filipinos were grateful for MacA supporting the Filipino position --which would continue to have its own POV often, but not always aligned with, the American/Allied position of course.
|
|
|
Post by joeconnor53 on May 7, 2015 4:34:36 GMT 8
Fascinating information. Thank you for posting it.
|
|
|
Post by Registrar on May 7, 2015 13:16:29 GMT 8
The issue of legality under American practice may not be all that tricky actually, having regard to the date of the agreement. MacArthur had retired as at 31 December 1937, and by virtue of that retirement was free to contract his services to the highest bidder. (Not unlike retired military personnel who contract with media networks, retired Generals getting directorships with military contractors (MacArthur did that too), or retired Presidents who receive fees for speeches in Kazakhistan.)
Eisenhower's position was quite different. He remained in the US Army employ the entire time (so I understand), and thus as an employee he was enjoined from accepting any emoluments. To compare MacArthur and Eisenhower's positions, is thus an apples and oranges comparison.
MacArthur was recalled to active service July 26, 1941.
As to the issue of propriety, I see that the word "propriety" has taken a real bashing these last few months, with all sorts of people drawing the distinction between what might well be considered as improper still being lawful. I am not sure how one measures propriety any more, and I am not at all sure it exists in such fields as politics or government. The more things change, the more they stay the same, I suppose. Haters got to hate.
|
|
|
Post by joeconnor53 on May 7, 2015 20:46:50 GMT 8
A few points:
1. While haters have to hate, worshipers have to worship. That's the problem with virtually any discussion of an issue involving MacArthur. Too many people approach and analyze the issue based on their preconceived notions about MacArthur.
2. To look at propriety, we have to examine the standards of propriety as they existed in 1942. Those standards are far different than contemporary standards. At the very least, there is enough here to suggest that those involved did not see the propriety of the payments to MacArthur and his staff as clear beyond question. On the other hand, those in Washington who were aware of the payments did not stop them. The payments, standing alone, do nothing to suggest that MacArthur was corrupt. Their significance, at this late date, is that they may (or may not) shed light on MacArthur's actions in 1941-42.
3. The Philippine government also made payments to members of MacArthur's staff: Sutherland, Marshall and Huff. It appears that all three had worked in the Philippines with MacArthur after his retirement but before his recall to active duty. This supports the theory that these payments were a reward for past (i.e., pre-war) services to the Philippine government. It would also explain why a payment was offered to Eisenhower, who was on MacArthur's staff before MacArthur's recall to active duty, and why no payment was offered to Courtney Whitney, who I don't believe joined MacArthur's staff until after MacArthur's recall. It also suggests that any impropriety would be for members of MacArthur's staff, who were on active duty when they rendered the services for which the Philippine government was rewarding them, and not MacArthur, who was retired and an employee of the Philippine government when he rendered these services.
4. One issue that has not received enough attention is the unique status of the Philippine government. Like Guam, Hawaii and Alaska, the Philippines were an American possession, not an independent country. However, unlike Guam, Hawaii and Alaska, they were slated for independence in the near future and, in anticipation of that independence, had a functioning government in place. Their president (Quezon) was a strong nationalist figure.
The interests of the Philippines and the United States did diverge. Neutrality would have been best for the Philippines. It would have avoided making the islands a bloody battleground (twice), it would have avoided years of harsh Japanese occupation, and it would have saved the lives of countless Filipino soldiers and civilians. The interests of the United States were to fight a delaying action in the Philippines (if the islands could not be held). As Gen. King told his staff shortly after the surrender, the Allied troops had been asked to lay down a sacrifice bunt.
Although not an independent country, the Philippines (through Quezon) had quite a bit of leverage because of manpower. At the beginning of the war, there were only about 31,000 American troops in the islands. Given that small number, the defense of the islands depended on Filipino personnel: 28,000 Philippine Scouts and 120,000 members of the Philippine Army. Thus, the defense hinged on the support of the Philippine government. Think of what would have happened if Quezon had defied the U.S. government and declared the islands neutral.
|
|