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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 22, 2014 22:58:22 GMT 8
I came across an article recently showing that in early 1942, when MacArthur was on Corregidor and when it was becoming clear that the defense of the Philippines would not end well, Manuel Quezon signed an executive order giving MacArthur a $500,000 payment from the Philippine treasury (and lesser amounts to members of his staff). In today's dollars, that $500,000 equals $7.3 million. Interestingly, Quezon also offered a payment to Eisenhower, who had served in the Philippines as an aide to MacArthur, but Eisenhower refused to accept it. www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/pandeAMEX103.htmlWhat do you make of this? Does it shed any light on MacArthur's motives on 12/8/41 when he was unavailable when Gen. Brereton was seeking permission to bomb Formosa? Does it shed light on MacArthur's insistence on recapturing the Philippines when other military officials wanted to go in a different direction? This payment lay hidden until 1979. It came to light only because the executive order was found in Richard Sutherland's papers. We know that MacArthur and Sutherland had a falling out later in the war. I wonder if Sutherland's final revenge was leaving this order in his papers for a future historian to find.
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Post by chadhill on Oct 23, 2014 5:05:56 GMT 8
Historian John Toland mentioned this in a piece I read many years ago. I am unable to verify which book or article it was (am AWOL from my library at this time) but it may have predated the year 1979 mentioned in your link. As I recall MacArthur first checked with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and was given the OK to take it.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 23, 2014 5:54:42 GMT 8
I checked a little further and see that Toland mentioned it in "Gods of War" several years after the 1979 article. www.nytimes.com/1985/05/19/books/l-macarthur-in-the-philippines-247634.htmlHere's a news story shedding a little further light on it. news.google.com/newspapers?nid=860&dat=19800130&id=SjAQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=lo8DAAAAIBAJ&pg=6803,1835463 What's unclear is whether Stimson approved the deal before it occurred. What's interesting about the news article is that Carlos Rumulo, who was close to both MacArthur and Quezon, denied any knowledge of this payment and called the story libelous. William Manchester, one of MacArthur's better biographers, greeted the story with skepticism. He felt that if such a payment had ever occurred, historians and biographers would have discovered it before 1979. I don't have access to "Gods of War" and would be very interested in hearing how Toland described the incident.
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Post by xray on Oct 23, 2014 11:16:01 GMT 8
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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 23, 2014 21:26:18 GMT 8
Thanks for that link, xray. I'm not sure it resolves the matter, although it certainly sheds light on it:
1. Rogers obviously adored MacArthur. (p. 100). Therefore, we have to factor in his pro-MacArthur bias. This also illustrates a recurring problem with assessing information regarding MacArthur. Some of those writing about him adored him and their writing tended towards idolatry while others loathed him and their writings tended to be scathingly critical. Petillo, whose 1979 article initially raised the $500,000 issue, does not appear to be a MacArthur fan. Is the truth somewhere in the middle?
2. Rogers' reply raises a couple of obvious issues. If this transaction was completely honorable, why did he feel compelled to "camouflage the facts" to satisfy his "sense of propriety"? Rogers is convinced that the executive order was issued on 2/13/42 but backdated to 1/3/42. (p. 94). Why backdate the order if this was completely above board? Rogers does not know whether the idea for this payment originated with Quezon or MacArthur.
3. Enough currency was segregated to cover these payments in the event a wire transfer into MacArthur's bank account was not permitted. (pp. 94-95). The currency was given to MacArthur's staff for safekeeping. Rogers admits that Washington could have blocked the wire transfer. (p. 95). Was MacArthur setting up a scenario where he would get his payment even if Washington disapproved? Rogers says the segregation of funds made no sense. (p. 95). However, it makes no sense only if the transaction was viewed as legal and above board.
4. It appears that FDR, Stimson, Marshall and Ickes were aware of the transaction but it is unclear if they were simply aware of it or if they affirmatively approved. The timing is interesting. The executive order was dated less than a week after Quezon had proposed neutralizing the Philippines. Rogers noted that Washington was still "quivering" from Quezon's proposal. (p. 96). Washington was still trying to persuade Quezon to leave the Philippines so that he did not fall into Japanese hands. Whatever FDR, Stimson, Marshall and Ickes felt about the propriety about the payments to MacArthur and his staff, they must have realized that it was not a good time to be saying "no" again to Quezon. He was a volatile character.
5. Rogers' analogy to the payments made to Pershing and Haig is a poor one, although Petillo's attempt to debunk that analogy goes a little too far.. Petillo is correct in noting that those payments were made by the governments that had employed Pershing and Haig as generals. However, she overlooks that the Philippine government had employed MacArthur before he was recalled to active duty. The Philippines were still an American possession, not scheduled for independence until 1946. Thus, this was not a payment by a foreign government. However, it is also true that the interests of the U.S. government and the Philippine government may have diverged by early 1942 so, yes, I suppose that this payment might create the appearance that MacArthur's loyalty would not be given 100% to the U.S. government.
6. Rogers refers to his unpublished manuscripts concerning his time on Corregidor and the relationship between MacArthur and Sutherland. (p. 94 n. 2). He states that both are in the MacArthur Memorial Archives but not available to the public. That sounds like it might be a valuable resource for scholars if it is ever made public. I wonder how much currently unknown information is in those manuscripts.
Joe Connor
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Post by okla on Oct 25, 2014 8:38:20 GMT 8
Hey Joe....Have you ever heard/read anything about one of the reasons that MacArthur declared Manila an open city was because he didn't want any damage done to the San Miguel Brewery since he had financial interests in that enterprise? I heard this, probable, "Urban Myth" from a couple of guys I served with while in the USAF during the Korea War. Both these men, "old sweats", were ex-POWs, Death March survivors, etc. I found it hard to believe but they accepted it as "Gospel". I served with several different ex Bataan/Corregidor POWs during my time in the AF and the others had never heard the yarn nor believed it when I queried them. I find it a bit MUCH myself, but this Quezon "payoff", thing brought it back to mind. Just askin".
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Post by Registrar on Oct 25, 2014 10:57:49 GMT 8
The inventiveness of venal gossip about MacArthur knows no bounds. People have a tendency to collect any gossip that supports their predisposition. However, here's two circumstances which come to mind that deal with similar circumstances.
The first is that MacArthur had a significant shareholding in the Manila Hotel. This is almost certainly true as he had at one time been appointed to its Board of Directors. Yet in 1945, there is not a single credible suggestion that he sought any different treatment of the Hotel, target-wise, than from the rest of Manila. No special treatment.
When it comes to the San Mig Brewery, the story is that Soriano had sought out special consideration for its treatment - and was politely told that in the event the Japanese chose to use it as a defense strongpoint, then they would deal with that eventuality with the lives and safety of the troops as the primary consideration, not the ownership of the target. No special treatment.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 26, 2014 8:39:23 GMT 8
This is what makes MacArthur so fascinating. Some think he was the most dangerous military commander/politician that this country ever produced. Others see him as the most brilliant commander/statesman we've ever produced. The wild thing is that each side can produce solid facts to bolster its position. Maybe the truth is that at various times MacArthur was both. Manchester is the biographer who best captured this duality.
I had never heard the stories about the San Miguel Brewery or the Manila Hotel. Frankly, on their face, those stories are difficult to swallow. I'm sure MacArthur and his staff had substantial investments in the Philippines. They had been there for a long time and were hooked into Manila's social and economic elite. (Wasn't Courtney Whitney also a big-time corporate attorney in Manila before the war?). However, I think 1945 is the wrong time to focus on. Perhaps, 12/8/41 would be a better time. MacArthur's refusal to see Brereton in the first hours of the war remains inexplicable. We know that Quezon thought and hoped that the Japanese might somehow bypass the Philippines. (Months later, he thought the Japanese might honor a Philippine declaration of neutrality). Any chance that the Japanese would leave the Philippines alone would, of course, have been dashed if any offensive action was launched from the Philippines (at least before the Japanese attacked the Islands). I just wonder if MacArthur's ties to Quezon and other members of the ruling elite caused him to pull his punches in the first hours of the war in deference to Quezon's belief that the Philippines might be bypassed.
What has always bothered me is an exchange between Sutherland and Brereton early on the morning of 12/8. As you know, Brereton was hot to launch a bombing raid on Formosa. Sutherland denied permission, saying that MacArthur didn't want Brereton to "make the first overt act." The obvious follow-up question is what the hell was Pearl Harbor if not an overt act of war. Sutherland's comment would, however, make perfect sense under the theory I raised earlier. From an American perspective, the U.S. had been attacked and Pearl Harbor was as overt as it gets. From the Philippine perspective, there had yet to be an overt act against the Philippines. Therein lies the rub.
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Post by Registrar on Oct 26, 2014 19:54:32 GMT 8
Quezon's attitude and position had a chilling effect upon MacArthur - he still had the power to constrain MacArthur until the overt act had occurred, and MacArthur was not - at that time - the person who had the authority to make the decision and thereby sever civilian control of the Philippine Commonwealth. MacArthur was still under very specific orders, and for a very specific purpose. At that point, MacArthur was subservient to the purposes of diplomacy and politics, not their governor. Washington had decided that hostilities had to be a black/white circumstance, not to be dogged in any way by shades of grey. Washington needed their causus belli to unite the country so as to get on with the Europe first strategy. There had been a series of very "complicated moves" by Washington, directed at maneuvering the Japanese into firing the first shot. Woe betide anyone sending off a bombing mission without the political and diplomatic ducks not being lined up.
In this respect, what Stimpson later recalled of the "delicate situation" which the War Cabinet had to confront on November 25, 1941 is most illuminating. I won't repeat it all here,it's in the books. General Marshall later concedes "...we would make sure that we would not be in such a dangerous position that we would be forced to fire the first shot ourselves." In my view, it was not then open for a theater military MacArthur to decide to fire those shots.
Don't ignore, either, that in those first hours, there were still people who believed that the Japanese were not going to make war on the Philippines, and who believed that they must allow things to run their course. Quezon still believed he could deal with the Japanese and get some concessions - if not neutrality then some concessions short of it. The US believed that Quezon shouldn't be allowed to have the opportunity. An overt attack was not yet something that Quezon would support - he still had the legal reins of a civil government, even if not the power over defense, and he would continue to govern as he saw fit. (eg forbidding rice to be transferred across provincial lines to Bataan.) In the face of wars, people do grasp at old shibboleths. In the period prior to Pearl Harbor, the Quezon-MacArthur relationship had been at a low point. So no, things were not sweetness and light at the time. Cracks existed, and post-war, they needed to be papered over and everyone needed to get their stories pat.
One also has to look at the actual point at which the lawful authority over the Philippines could change from the Commonwealth, to a pure military control. As nothing had yet occurred on Philippine soil,(or having occurred, was not yet confirmed known in Manila) the civilian government was in control. It wasn't a click-switch of ON/OFF as many armchair strategists seem to think. No single person could throw the switch. One almost has to be a master of laws to answer that issue to the satisfaction of both major parties.
I am sorry the two stories aren't to your liking, but they can't be dismissed with a wave of the hand. I am not going to chase the Soriano - Battle of Manila anecdotal reference for you, but it has been published. I'm sure your further reading will uncover it. It's not something which you'd expect Soriano to want to repeat. Good luck finding someone diarizing a radio call from Gen. MacArthur that they NOT attack the Japanese artillery spotting post on top of his Manila Hotel. MacArthur was a big boy, he took his lumps.
One must also recognize that MacArthur was not the tactical commander, he had generals and colonels below him whose job that was. The reality was that some were better than others. On some accounts, Brereton had just been caught disobeying a direct order and not moving the B-17's south to Mindanao, and concealing it. Brereton's failures didn't cease in the Philippines.
D. Clayton James, who wrote the better biography - but who wasn't half the wordsmith Manchester was, nor had the better book agent, commented to the tune that he felt positive about MacArthur on some days, and negative on others. It depended on the day of the week.
Personally, I think there's a lot more column space which might be allocated to examining the decisions of FDR. In 1940, it had become a declaration of the Democratic platform: no war, "except in case of attack." We all know that politicians don't lie, and that very powerful politicians have the truth rearranged for them.
There's an awful lot of goings on relating to the interrelationship between the US and the Philippines not reduced to writing. You have to dine at tables to hear the inside skinny on what really went on. Definitely not for internet chatter.
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Post by okla on Oct 26, 2014 22:51:38 GMT 8
Hey All. ..Very intriguing stuff, to be sure, but with the aid of good 'ole hindsight, anybody who truly thought that the Japanese would actually by-pass the PI, must have been living in a tree. As it turned out the Philippines were included, big time, in their timetable of offensive operations, with jump off dates, times, etc all carefully planned out and ready for execution as soon as the bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor. In fact, didn't they jump the gun by an hour or two and started shooting in a remote area in Malaya prior to hitting Hawaii. I guess that the Brits actually fired the first Allied shots in the Pacific War if this scenario is actually so. It was truly a complicated situation and complex personalities involved. The main thing, though, was the Japs were cocked and primed, with a single minded plan and objectives that included the Philippines. Postscript.... Aside from why or why not the Clark Field B-17s didn't head North, those nimble Zeros would probably have chewed them up as was demonstrated later in the month. We have beaten that "dead horse" extensively in previous discussions. It is fun to hash it out, though. Cheers.
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