Post by joeconnor53 on Jun 13, 2015 23:43:37 GMT 8
One of the problems was that the U.S. military vastly overrated the capabilities of the B-17. Don't get me wrong. The B-17 was an amazing, effective, durable workhorse, but it wasn't the super plane it was expected to be:
1. It was vulnerable to fighter attack and need fighter escort. The U.S. military, on the other hand, believed at the beginning of the war that the B-17 could out-run or out-fighter any fighter plane. No one knew these limitations at the beginning of the war.
2. While the Norden bombsight was very good, B-17s operating at high altitudes were not effective against ships. We saw that in Lingayen Gulf and, as has been pointed out, at Midway. Precision high-altitude bombing couldn't deal with ships that can maneuver quickly. This lesson was learned fairly quickly and dive bombers and lower-altitude skip-bombing were used against ships. The heavies were reserved for attacks on Japanese land bases. Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't believe Japanese high-altitude bombers had much better luck against our ships than our high-altitude bombers had against theirs. At the beginning of the war, the Air Corps really thought that there was nothing that high-altitude bombing couldn't do.
As for MacArthur and his April 1942 prediction, he sometimes got into trouble when he thought he had an uncanny ability to read the enemy's mind. This is what got him into trouble with the Chinese intervention in Korea.
As for the submarines in the Philippines, there were several problems. The most obvious was with the torpedoes and their faulty detonators. The other problem was the failure to deploy a sufficient number of subs to intercept the Japanese invasion fleet before it got into Lingayen Gulf. As I understand it, Lingayen Gulf is relatively shallow and a very dangerous place for subs to operate.
1. It was vulnerable to fighter attack and need fighter escort. The U.S. military, on the other hand, believed at the beginning of the war that the B-17 could out-run or out-fighter any fighter plane. No one knew these limitations at the beginning of the war.
2. While the Norden bombsight was very good, B-17s operating at high altitudes were not effective against ships. We saw that in Lingayen Gulf and, as has been pointed out, at Midway. Precision high-altitude bombing couldn't deal with ships that can maneuver quickly. This lesson was learned fairly quickly and dive bombers and lower-altitude skip-bombing were used against ships. The heavies were reserved for attacks on Japanese land bases. Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't believe Japanese high-altitude bombers had much better luck against our ships than our high-altitude bombers had against theirs. At the beginning of the war, the Air Corps really thought that there was nothing that high-altitude bombing couldn't do.
As for MacArthur and his April 1942 prediction, he sometimes got into trouble when he thought he had an uncanny ability to read the enemy's mind. This is what got him into trouble with the Chinese intervention in Korea.
As for the submarines in the Philippines, there were several problems. The most obvious was with the torpedoes and their faulty detonators. The other problem was the failure to deploy a sufficient number of subs to intercept the Japanese invasion fleet before it got into Lingayen Gulf. As I understand it, Lingayen Gulf is relatively shallow and a very dangerous place for subs to operate.