Hi
With respect, it is Tobruk and not tubruk and did beer really play an important part motivation during in the siege?
The 18th Brigade, 7th Australian Infantry Division did their bit in Tobruk, Buna and Milne Bay. The 9th Australian Infantry Division came home from North Africa after the Battle of El Alamein.
Just a few of the achievements of Australian 2nd A.I.F. troops in North Africa; and 2nd A.I.F. and Militia troops in New Guinea are summed up in the articles below.
Siege of TobrukBetween April and August 1941 up to 14,000 Australians, under the command of Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead, were besieged in Tobruk by a German–Italian army commanded by General Erwin Rommel. The Allied garrison, largely Australian, consisted of the 9th Division (20th, 24th, and 26th Brigades), the 18th Brigade of the 7th Division, and four regiments of British artillery.
The Royal Navy and the RAN service kept the garrison supplied by means of the so-called Tobruk ferry, which included the Australian destroyers Napier, Nizam, Nestor, and Vendetta. Lost on the supply run were two destroyers including HMAS Waterhen, three sloops including HMAS Parramatta, and 21 smaller vessels.
The 2/13th Battalion was the only Australian unit left in Tobruk when the siege ended on 10 December. The Australian casualties were 3,009 killed or wounded, and 941 taken prisoner.
The German propagandist Lord Haw Haw (William Joyce) derided the troops as the Rats of Tobruk, a term proudly embraced as an ironic compliment.
More reading at:
www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/tobruk/581.aspwww.anzacday.org.au/history/ww2/anecdotes/tobruk.html39th Battalion (Hawthorn Kew Regiment) and their part in actions along the Kokoda TrackAfter the First World War the defence of the Australian mainland lay with the part time soldiers of the Citizens Military Force, also known as the Militia. The Militia was organized to maintain the structure of the First AIF and kept the same numerical designations. The Militia units were distributed in the same areas in which the original AIF units were raised.
The 39th Infantry Battalion was raised in Melbourne in 1921 and called the “Hawthorn–Kew Regiment”. Raised during the Great Depression, when little was spent on defence, the battalion initially had few volunteers. In 1937 it merged with the 37th Infantry Battalion, forming the 37/39th Infantry Battalion and, a few years later, with the 24th Infantry Battalion, forming the 24/39th Infantry Battalion. From October to November 1941 the 39th was raised as a single unit, comprised mostly of young men of 18 or 19 years who had been called up for national service.
Following Japan’s sudden entry into the Second World War, a new 39th was raised as part of the 30th Brigade to garrison Port Moresby. The 39th joined the 49th Infantry Battalion, already in Moresby, and the 53rd Infantry Battalion, which had been quickly formed in Sydney. The 39th arrived in Moresby at the start of January 1942, with little military training.
The 39th was initially used for garrison duties and working parties. In June it was ordered to proceed up the Kokoda Trail to block any possible Japanese overland advance. The 39th B Company and troops from the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) reached Kokoda on 15 July. Japanese forces landed at Gona, on the north coast of Papua, a week later and quickly moved inland.
The first clash occurred at Awala on 23 July and the Australians fell back to Kokoda. On 29 July the Japanese attacked Kokoda and the Australians were forced to withdrawal to Deniki early the next morning. On 8 August the 39th launched a counter-attack at Kokoda but, outnumbered and short of ammunition, fell back to Deniki after two days of fighting. The Australians eventually managed to repeal the ongoing Japanese attack and on 14 August the 39th and PIB fell back to Isurava.
Fighting ceased for almost two weeks. During this time the 39th was joined by the 53rd and the headquarters of the 30th Brigade. On 23 August the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions from the 7th Division 21st Brigade also reached the area. The Japanese resumed their advance on 26 August. Despite hard fighting the Australians were forced back to Eora Creek on 30 August, Templeton's Crossing on 2 September, and Efogi three days later.
Exhausted, the 39th was relieved and sent down the track to Koitaki to rest. The 7th Division 25th Brigade (comprising the 3rd Infantry Battalion and the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion) came in to reinforce the Australian effort. Bitter fighting ensued and the Australians withdrew to Imita Ridge on 17 September. However, the Japanese had reached their limit and on 24 September began to withdrawal. The Australians reoccupied Kokoda on 2 November.
Meanwhile, after a month at Koitaki, the 39th returned to Port Moresby in mid-October, where it prepared defensive positions at Pyramid Point. The interlude from fighting was brief.
Having pushed the Japanese back across the Kokoda Trail, the 16th and 25th Brigades and two inexperienced American regiments were engaged in the “battle of the beachheads” at Buna, Gona, and Sanananda. The Japanese positions were well-prepared and heavily defended. At the end of November the 30th Brigade was flown across the Owen Stanley’s to reinforce the attack. The 39th became attached to the 21st Brigade.
The 21st Brigade captured Gona village on 1 December and the Japanese withdrew to Gona Mission. The Australians advanced on the Mission on 6 December but were stopped by the Japanese. The 39th D Company was “literally shot to pieces”. The combined fighting strength of the 21st Brigade was now down to 755 men, of whom 403 were from the 39th. Nonetheless, on 8 December the 39th attacked again and captured half of the Japanese defences by nightfall. Gona Mission was captured the next day and on 18 December the 39th took the last Japanese position at the creek west of Gona.
Fierce fighting continued further along the coast and on 21 December the 21st Brigade and 39th moved to the Sanananda Track. The next morning the 39th moved into a forward position called Huggins’ Road Block. The 39th defended the area and attacked nearby Japanese positions. In the New Year it withdrew to Soputa and returned to the 30th Brigade.
The 39th had suffered heavily. When the battalion was flown to Moresby on 25 January it mustered a mere handful of soldiers – 7 officers and 25 men. It rested at Morseby and gradually gained strength as men returned from hospital.
In mid-February the 39th was instructed to stand by for operations in the Wau area in readiness for another Japanese attack. The attack never came and on 12 March the 39th boarded a troopship and returned to Australia. On 24 March the battalion was given only 14 days of home leave to recharge from five months in Papua.
In July the 30th Brigade, comprising the 39th, 49th, and now 3rd Battalions, was disbanded. Having performed so well along the Kokoda Trail and at Buna, this came as a disappointing surprise to the 39th. Members of the 39th who had originally been called up for service were absorbed into another Militia unit, the 36th Infantry Battalion. Volunteers for overseas service were absorbed into the 2/2nd Infantry Battalion.
Battle of Milne BayOffering a sheltered harbour, Milne Bay, on the south-eastern tip of Papua was selected for development as an Allied base - the key component of which was three airstrips - in 1942. These facilities also made it a key stepping stone for the Japanese in their drive towards Port Moresby and late on the night of 25 August 1942 a force of 2,000 marines were landed to capture them. From the beginning, the Japanese were at a disadvantage. The marines were landed 11 kilometres east of their intended landing area, and their intelligence had significantly underestimated the Allied garrison. Whereas the Japanese believed there no more than a few hundred troops defending the airstrip, there were actually almost 9,000 Allied troops including two Australian infantry brigades - the 7th and the 18th. The Allies had the additional advantage of having air support close at hand because the 75 and 76 Squadrons from the RAAF, both equipped with P-40 fighter bombers, were also based at Milne Bay. Initially, however, the Japanese met with their accustomed success. Supported by two light tanks, they advanced steadily westward. The 61st Battalion was first into action and slowed the Japanese, although unable to hold them back. The 2/10th Battalion was moved up on the night of 27 August, but faulty dispositions and other command failings, meant it was brushed aside by a renewed Japanese thrust, and disintegrated in a confused withdrawal. Reaching the edge of the eastern most airstrip on 28 August the intensity of Japanese operations fell away as they made preparations for their attack, which included landing 800 reinforcements. In the early hours of 31 August they charged the defences manned by the 25th and 61st Australian Battalions and the United States 43rd Engineer Regiment and 709th Anti Aircraft Battery. The Japanese suffered greviously, largely due to machine gun and artillery fire, and withdrew by dawn. Throughout their operations the Japanese were constantly harassed during daylight hours by the P-40s.
With the coming of daylight on 31 August, the commander of Milne Force, Australian Major General Cyril Clowes, seized the opportunity to counterattack and ordered the 2/12th Battalion to pursue the retreating Japanese. Clowes was in a difficult position throughout the battle because, although he outnumbered the Japanese, he received multiple reports indicating other Japanese to his flanks and rear. It was for this reason, that initially only a single battalion was sent after the Japanese. Despite the skilled and determined rear guard action that was characteristic of the Japanese at this stage of the war, the 2/12th, supported by the 2/9th Battalion from 2 September onwards, steadily advanced along the north shore of Milne Bay. Although the Japanese high command advocated a reinforcement of the force at Milne Bay, its commander, noting increasing sickness and exhaustion among his troops recommended an immediate withdrawal. Between 4 and 7 September the Japanese were evacuated at night from around their original landing areas at Waga Waga and Wandala. Of the 2,800 Japanese landed, only 1,318 re-embarked. It was estimated that up to 750 lay dead around Milne Bay and the majority of the remainder were killed trying to escape overland to the Japanese base at Buna. Allied deaths included 167 Australians and 14 Americans. Milne Bay is remembered as the first defeat of the Japanese on land during the Pacific War. Despite an oppressive combination of extreme humidity, voracious insects, and the tropical disease both combined to create, Milne Bay remained an important Allied staging area until victories in New Guinea made other more suitable areas available from September 1943 onwards.
Battle of BunaBuna, a village on the coastal plain of northern Papua, was the main base for the Japanese advance along the Kokoda Trail. The first Japanese landings in the area occurred at Gona, east of Buna, on 21 July 1941 and Buna was later occupied by troops on foot. Large scale landings subsequently occurred at Buna on 21 August. The Japanese presence forstalled the Allies' own plans to develop a base at Buna. From west to east, the Buna area encompassed Buna village, Buna Government Station, and, several kilometres to the east, two airstrips - "old" and "new".
Major fighting did not occur at Buna until after the Japanese had advanced and then retreated along the Kokoda Trail. American troops of the 32nd Division initially closed on Buna in November 1942 - one infantry regiment attacked towards the village from the south, while another advanced on the airstrips from the east. A combination of inexperience and poor leadership, however, meant they made little progress against the well-sited and heavily fortified bunkers with which the Japanese defended it.
The 18th Australian Brigade, command by Brigadier George Wootten, and a squadron of tanks from the 2/6th Australian Armoured Regiment were moved up from Milne Bay in mid-December to reinforce the Americans. By this time, Buna village had been captured but the Japanese remained well-entrenched around the airfields and the government station. The 18th Brigade's first attack was launched in the airfield area by the 2/9th and 2/10th Battalions on the morning of 18 December. Despite the support of the tanks, the fighting was slow and vicious, with the Japanese bunkers having to be destroyed one by one. By 23rd December this phase of the operations had achieved its objective of clearing the area between the airfields and the coast, and it was now time to tackle the core of Japanese resistance - the positions around the western end of the old strip.
The 2/10th Battalion made a series of attacks along the old strip between 24 and 29 December but few gains were made. The four tanks that initially accompanied the battalion were quickly destroyed, leaving the infantry to tackle the bunkers with only the most minimal artillery support. Brigadier Wootten's impatience to make progress meant the 2/10th was bustled into poorly planned and co-ordinated attacks and heavy casualties were the result. When more tanks began arriving on 29 December another attack was rushed through, with the same disasterous results.
Victory at Buna, only came with a pause in operations to allow proper planning, the reinforcement of the tanks, and the replacement of the tired and depleted 2/10th by the fresh 2/12th Battalion. They attacked on the morning of 1 January and, with the tanks and infantry co-operating closely, destroyed the bulk of the Japanese positions before nightfall. The destruction of isolated points of resistance continued the next day. In the meantime, American troops had also been attacking east from Buna village and secured the Buna Government Station, and effected a junction with the force moving west form the old strip on 2 January. The battle for Buna cost the Allied forces 2,870 casualties; the 18th Brigade had lost 863, including 306 killed. Close to 1,400 Japanese dead were countered, although their casualty toll was probably much higher when those killed or buried alive in destroyed bunkers are considered. (Source the Australian War Memorial - Canberra).
Regards
mgk