The Loss of the S.S. Corregidor

[chadhill]

Ok fots, good luck and here's hoping you find one...wouldn't that be something?

Okla, I read Bunker's diary ("Bunker's War") a year or two ago and thought it was a great piece of history. A couple of things struck me. First, the diary contained what I thought today would be considered sensitive, possibly classified, information. I was surprised that Bunker included it in case the diary was found by the Japanese. Second, I was surprised by his frequent critical opinions of other officers, both superior and subordinate. ..which would have caused him some trouble if the diary had been found by fellow Americans!

John Gordon, in "Fighting for MacArthur" (p. 73-76), faintly implies that Bunker may bear some responsibility for the tragic sinking of the SS Corregidor with the loss of over 900 lives, mostly civilian, on the night of December 16-17, 1941 (there is no mention of it in the diary, which begins on January 3, 1942).



The SS Corregidor, departing Manila Bay for the southern PI, was approaching La Monja when it struck a mine between Corregidor Island and Sisiman Cove, and quickly sank.

According to Gordon:

"Apparently the Navy was not informed of the ship's intention to depart Manila Bay that night. No word of SS Corregidor's intent to leave the Bay was passed to the Seaward Defense Command on Corregidor, where the Army's electrical mines were controlled. The gunboat Mindanao spotted SS Corregidor as she headed toward the entrance of the Bay. Since the ship had not been officially cleared to depart, the gunboat tried to force her to stop, but to no avail.

"The ship's master, Apolinar Calvo, was an experienced captain who had already made trips through the tightly controlled entrance to the minefields...

"Army observers on The Rock spotted her approaching the North Channel and preparing to turn into the lane through the minefield. There was confusion at the Army's Seaward Defense Command headquarters on Corregidor. Some duty officers recommended that the Army's electrically controlled mines be switched to the "safe" setting. According to several accounts, Colonel Paul Bunker, the Seaward Defense Commander who controlled not only Corregidor's big guns but also the Army's mines, ordered that the mines remain active, having not received any word of the ship being cleared to leave the Bay.

"The tragic sinking of SS Corregidor was never properly investigated...Apparently some Army officers unofficially told a reporter from a Manila newspaper that the mines were set to the safe position immediately after the explosion..."

Some internet sources state that the SS Corregidor may have been sunk by a mine laid in early December by the Japanese sub I-124.

[okla]

Hey Chad...Thanks for the follow up poop on that tragic sinking. Some of the stuff I have read in the past and also have seen earlier on this forum pertaining to the good Colonel's almost callous actions (whether the SS Corregidor was "cleared" or not, Colonel Bunker should have disabled the minefield. Yamamoto with his Task Force wasn't lurking outside the harbor entrance, poised for a dash into the Bay) and decisions in regard to that tragedy leaves me "cold" in my view of this officer. He may very well have been an outstanding Coast Artillery Commander, braver than Sergeant York/Audie Murphy,etc, but his views concerning others, the USMC/Navy, Filipinos, personal comfort, RHIP, etc, just colors my opinion of the man to a large degree. Cheers. Postscript...The SS Corregidor was a larger vessel than I had imagined. Fine looking steamer. Too bad she had such a tragic end, plus such a large loss of life, especially civilian. Escaping the Japanese threat was a difficult enough ordeal without facing flawed, for whatever reason, decisions by the powers that be.

[fots2]

Hi Chad and okla,

Great photo there, I have not seen that before.

In the past okla and I had a little discussion about the SS Corregidor and Bunker's role in the sinking.

I will repost this account that corroborates the text you posted that Bunker was aware of the ship coming toward Corregidor and refusing to deactivate the mines.

- - - - -

This article (from another US officer’s diary who also served on Corregidor) says that Col. Bunker knew it was a civilian ship that departed from Manila and he refused to order the mines be de-activated. Irregardless of the actions of the SS Corregidor’s captain, this disaster could have been prevented by Bunker.



Text of the SS Corregidor sinking from “Captain George Steiger: A POW Diary”

www.fsteiger.com/gsteipow.html


“The Army and the Filipino skippers had long been butting heads. All the channels out of Manila Bay had been mined for many months. At this time, the mining was strictly up to date and operational. At 1 AM on 16 December, the SS Corregidor, carrying 760 refugees, attempted to go thru the mine field without asking clearance. This request would have been granted. The Lieutenant who was on watch in the mine casement, on sighting the SS Corregidor called his superior, who in turn, called the seaward defense commander, Col. Bunker, requesting information as to whether he should de-activate the contact mines in the channel. With a lifetime of experience with the Filipino, going back to the '98 Insurrection, Col. Bunker said "No!" My first knowledge of this affair came when my duty watch called me at 12:55 AM. The Corregidor had struck one of our mines and in the four or five minutes it took to reach my battery command post, the vessel had sunk. Approximately 500 lives were lost. The 260 or so who survived came on the Rock. Thereafter, we had no trouble with unauthorized Filipino boats attempting to traverse the channel”.

- - - - -

Too bad we cannot read Col. Bunker's diary that predates the one used for the book. It would help to understand the reasons for his actions that night.

Chad, many of the comments in the diary surprise me too.

[chadhill]

Thanks guys, my purpose was to retell history as it was and not to intentionally defame the reputation of a doubtless patriot who had his faults and made his mistakes, sometimes terrible ones. I recall that after Bunker hauled the colors down on 5/6/42 he cut out a piece of the flag before burning it, and carried the piece with him until his death as a POW.

Great link with lots of info, fots. I noted that a Mr. Kerwin Ronquillo, who claimed to have lost three relatives on the SS Corregidor, wrote Steiger in 2005 that the ship was originally supposed to have an escort through the minefield. Captain Calvo, however, feared that his ship would be bombed by Japanese aircraft and decided to leave that night, ahead of schedule.

(Chart courtesy of Corregidor.org)


According to Gordon, by coincidence that day the USN had changed their procedure by marking the Army's minefield channel with lighted buoys instead of posting a gunboat there, as they had done previously. I wonder if Calvo had expected to follow a gunboat thru the channel and when none showed up, he ran afoul of the buoys, not realizing their meaning.


Howell's "The Battle for Corregidor" (p. 186) quotes Frank Jonelis, a LT in the 91st CAC(PS) Battery A and range officer at M Prime West, a fire control post. Battery A controlled off-shore mines, and at M Prime West vessel traffic was observed and plotted. When a vessel was spotted, Jonelis said:

" We would notify our group commander's station which controlled lights, artillery and mines. The group commander was COL Paul D. Bunker. Next, we would notify COL Carl Engelhart at the casemate building in James Ravine. COL Engelhart was in technical command only.

"...When M Prime West notified Group (COL Bunker's C-1 Command bunker) that a large ship was leaving Manila Harbor through our channel and requested permission to set all mines in channel on alert (meaning "safety"-CH), COL Bunker ordered "Leave them on contact" which would cause immediate explosion of the 400 lbs. H.E. when the mine tilted. Because of this the ship SS Corregidor, about 5000 tons, got tangled in the cenetary cables and almost instantly sank..."

[fots2]

With the exception of a couple paragraphs, everything I have read about Col. Bunker has come from his own words i.e. his diary in a book. I get the impression he was a good war-time officer but in my mind, the events of this night are hard to justify. Like everything else we try to investigate, unfortunately we will never know the whole story.

Lt. Jonelis mentions that the M Prime West control station was informed of a ship “leaving Manila Harbour through our channel” (the North channel). This station has no view of ships coming toward them from Manila so I assume M Secondary East just above the North Shore Road near Battery James told them. M Prime West which is south of Battery Hanna still exists although the roof is heavily damaged. The direct viewing area of this station is north across to the southern tip of Bataan plus west and south into the South China Sea. M Secondary East could probably see the lights of Manila on a dark night.

[chadhill]

Fots, I agree absolutely. The events of that night and Bunker's apparent role in them are most difficult to justify.

Thank you for pointing out the location of M Prime West, south of Battery Hanna. I didn't know where it was. Now you've got me thinking...

I've been trying for a couple hours to find the sunken location of the SS Corregidor. Seems like I bookmarked a shipwreck map from the web for Manila Bay/South China Sea when I was looking into the Casiana yacht thread, but cannot find it anymore. My maps from the 1980s do not show it, either. Can anyone enlighten me?

Here's my point. Consider the minefield chart from above. The Army's two minefields went from Bataan-Corregidor and La Monja-Corregidor, with the Navy running the others. As you pointed out, M Prime West was south of Battery Hanna, on the extreme west coast of Corregidor. If LT Jonelis did indeed see the ship then perhaps it had somehow penetrated the Bataan-Corregidor minefield unscathed, and was headed towards the second minefield between La Monja-Corregidor (or even the Navy mines NW of La Monja).

If we knew the location of the wreck it would confirm which minefield did the ship in. Furthermore, if by chance the wreck is somewhere between the two minefields, that could suggest the I-124 may have played a hand as some think.

Just my $.02, and maybe I'm out of my paygrade-

[fots2]

Hi Chad,

I think we are in the same boat here. Long ago I saw a map online that pointed out the location where the SS Corregidor sunk. I have no idea where the creator of the map got his information. Of course, no way can I find that map now to show you.

One thing I do remember that seemed odd to me is that it showed the ship going down south of the Points in the area where the Navy contact mines were. I had always read that it was an Army mine that they struck (or even a Japanese submarine laid mine as you mentioned).

I think you will be interested in the following detailed sketch of the Corregidor Minefields in 1941. Note the locations of M’W and M’E. This is the only time I have ever seen M’W labeled anywhere. (The sketch is compliments of Peter Parsons)

[wwalker]

Dear Fots and other members,

I have a nice piece of information from a first hand account and eye witness of the sinking of the SS Corregidor. The excerpt I'm about to post was published in a book called "Life as an American Prisoner of War of the Japanese" by Charles Balaza. I highly recomend the book. Mr. Balaza served with Battery K, 59th Coast Artillery on Corregidor. Here is his remembrance of that night:

Pg. 32

"One night after being relieved from unknown hours of duty (I don't remember if I fell asleep, or passed out from lack of it), my short rest was ended by one of my crew telling me that a ship had just struck a mine in our area.

Due to the fact that it was our searchlight that controlled this area of entrance from the China Sea into Manila Bay, and part of the North Channel between Corregidor and Bataan, I was very concerned as to what happened. We never received any orders from our command post to stand by for action, or to illuminate the buoy markers for any vessel's safe passage through the minefield. I immediately gave orders to interlock with searchlight #3, which was already in action, helping the rescue operation.

Just then our phone rang, it was our command post ordering us to illuminate the area where the ship had hit one of the mines. I told them our light was already in action and had the ship in sight. I was ordered to keep the light in action until further notice.

I looked at the vessel, it had struck a mine near a little island called Monja. It was in a vertical position, with its bow looking up to the heavens of the dark sky, as if begging for mercy by some great unknown miracle to be spared from her dreadful fate.

In a few short minutes, it disappeared into its murky, watery grave, making sounds like that of a coffee percolator from the bubbling water that was filling its insides. At that moment, I forgot about my loss of sleep and minor problems. Our problems were insignificant compared to the men, women, and children who were trapped in shark infested waters trying to survive. I felt very helpless until I realized that our searchlight played a very important part in the rescue.

Without our searchlight, the rescue mission would have been hampered by the darkness, making rescue operations more difficult in finding the people who were still alive. There was no moon, and the only light came from a few shining stars. Tired as we were, no one asked to be relieved from duty. We all stayed up until early dawn assisting in the rescue.

Our concentration on rescuing the remaining survivors was soon broken when we heard what we though sounded like a flight of bombers. A dreadful fear spread among us, but no one suggested putting out the searchlight. We were committed to stay in action until further notice, and committed we stayed. To our joy, the noise that sounded like bombers was PT boats coming from Mariveles Naval Base in Bataan to assist in the rescue operations of the people who looked like little black specks in the distant waters.

At about 4:30 or 5:00 AM we heard the sound of a fighter plane coming up from behind our position. It came up so quickly that it took us by surprise, and we all ducked for cover. The plane flew by without incident, so we thought it was our one and only plane going to help in the rescue. However, it banked right, and opened fire on Searchlight #3. I don't know why he didn't open up on us, we were perfect silhouette targets for him.

As daylight broke, we secured our searchlights and could see PT boats circling the area looking for remaining survivors. After we couldn't help anymore, my crew and I passed out from exhaustion. I'm sure we weren't the only crew that had this problem. I was told that I even slept through a bombing that morning without flinching an eyebrow.

I don't know the true reason why the captain of the SS Corregidor tried getting through the minefields without permission or searchlight assistance. On that dark night he nearly made it, only to strike a mine a short distance from the open sea."

This is a very indepth account of what the scene was like that night. This seems to be a very controversial issue, and I'm not sure that I've seen enough evidence (through my own personal research) to arrive at a complete conclusion as to how this happened. However, I do believe the information is out there somewhere. Hope this helps.

Sincerely,

WW

[chadhill]

That is an incredible map, fots. I have not seen such detail about the Army minefields before.

The legend notes there are 28 groups of 19 mines each (for a total of 532 mines). The mines are 100' apart with an "Effective distance or danger area 75' " and the 28 groups are 100' apart. The channel for safe passage is 600 yards wide through each field. What is even more remarkable is that on close inspection the electrical control cables for each mine group can be seen connecting to the casemate in James Ravine.

I am curious as to the meaning of the phrases "Observation for channel mines necessary" and "Observation for other mines possible". I read somewhere that the Army had no control over the Navy mines since they were of the "contact" type. That being the case, the only safe passage for a vessel transitting from the South China Sea to Manila Bay would be through the 600 yard wide channels between La Monja and Corregidor, and Bataan and Corregidor, where the vessel could be closely monitored in low visibility weather.

I searched the web and my library for information on the location of the SS Corregidor's sinking, and was quite surprised how little there is. Winslow's book "The Fleet the God's Forgot" says the ship hit a mine off Sisiman Bay. Some accounts of MTB-3's PT boats, which picked up 282 survivors (7 later died) leave the impression that the ship struck a mine in the North Channel. Gordon's book by far has the best account overall but says only that the ship exploded as it "moved through the lane in the direction of the tiny island of La Monja". I wonder if that would be the mine groups #16-21 in the chart?

Searches on the web revealed almost nothing more until I came across excerps from the Moore Report on- you guessed it-corregidor.org! Under the section "War Damage, Appendix E, Eyewitness Statements" dated 6 OCT 45 were brief statements by two officers from the 91stCA(PS):

LTCOL Carl E. Englehart (mentioned in Reply #24 above):

"On 8 December I was in the office of G-2, Philippine Department. Upon evacuation to Fort Mills I was appointed mine director principally because of my detailed knowledge of the new mine system.

"Two mine fields had already been planted, one called Monja Field, consisting of three lines of nine groups each, a total of 500 mines. There was a smaller field in the North Channel..."

COL Joseph P. Kohn:

"At 0002, 17 December, the SS Corregidor missed the gate in the MONJA MINEFIELD (capitals are mine-CH) and was sunk by our mines with the loss of about 500."


The only info I've been able to find so far about the Japanese sub I-124 theory appears to stem from a 1983 book by the German author Jurgen Rohwer titled "Axis Submarine Successes 1939-45". It is reported the book claims the SS Corregidor was sunk by a Japanese mine planted near Corregidor by the I-124 on December 8th. The I-124 was later sunk off the coast of Darwin on January 21, 1942.

* * * * * * * * * *

LATE ENTRY!! P.S.- wwalker, what a great post you made! I was typing and researching this one of my own and did not realise you had posted yours until I was done! This extra information you provided sure seems to strengthen the case for the ship going down in the Monja minefield. Nice job, good research.

[EXO]

The SS Corregidor issue is something that has always intrigued me, but even more so when Fots raised some pertinent issues a while back.

The most extraordinary facts, in the sense they are the most direct, are contained in Captain George Steiger: A POW Diary. Here is the link:

www.fsteiger.com/gsteipow.html

I will not excerpt the pertinent passages, and expect interested persons to familiarize themselves with what Capt. Steiger writes of the incident.

There will be a quiz.

PS With regard to the comment correctly raised by Chadhill, ("Some internet sources state that the SS Corregidor may have been sunk by a mine laid in early December by the Japanese sub I-124.") I did pursue the Japanese sub articles, and came to the conclusion that the articles cannot be relied upon. Without referring to my (informal) notes, my recollection is that a series of subsequent articles referred to an earlier published article, and that no confidence in the speculation in the earlier published article is warranted. (It's sort of like citing Chariots of the Gods by Erich von Daniken as proof that time travelling astronauts built the pyramids.) The causative issue in the SS Corregidor sinking was - and in some places still is - a very sensitive factor in respect of US-Philippine relationships, and the story about the Japanese sub was a convenient misdirection serving U.S. interests during the early part of the war, and remained in play for some years thereafter. Ultimately, the official U.S. Navy Chronology of WWII did set the matter straight, quietly and authoritatively attributing the incident to an Army mine.

Here's a good topic for some Foreign Policy Major to write a thesis, if ever there was one.

I have discussed SS Corregidor with John Gordon, and I consider what he writes about the incident to be entirely reliable.

The short of it is that, yes, some internet sources do blame a Japanese mine, and they are wrong. The man who was the direct and proximate cause, closer even to the cause than the ship's master, didn't survive the war, and his published diary conveniently does not publish any entries prior to 1 January 1942 excised.

Lest the original Steiger page disappear, there is a backup hosted at Corregidor.Org