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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 10, 2013 21:03:51 GMT 8
One of the most puzzling features of the Philippine campaign was how MacArthur let his B-17s get caught on the ground at Clark Field. I recently came across this post-war quote from MacArthur: "(O)ur fighters...to protect our bombers in the Formosa attack...did not have the necessary radius of action. An attack would have been doomed to failure." Has anyone seen this quote before or know its authenticity?
It strikes me as an after-the-fact rationale. On 12/8/41, standard doctrine was that the B-17 did not need fighter escort because it was faster than fighters and had sufficient firepower to fight off any fighters that got near it. As the Air Corps learned in the Philippines and as the Eighth Air Force learned later, neither was true. Fighter escort was essential, but I can't believe that MacArthur knew this on 12/8/41.
Of course, what he said was accurate, even if he did not know it on 12/8/41. If I remember correctly, the early B-17 models were in the Philippines. They lacked self-sealing gas tanks and had no tail guns. Therefore, they were especially vulnerable to fighter attacks and would probably have gotten slaughtered if they had tried to attack Formosa on 12/8/41.
I suppose we'll never know why MacArthur refused to authorize an attack on Formosa that morning or why he didn't insist that his bombers be sent to Del Monte field in Mindinao, out of the range of Japanese fighter and bomber attacks.
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Post by rik on Oct 10, 2013 21:56:19 GMT 8
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Post by okla on Oct 11, 2013 1:08:06 GMT 8
Hey Joe....You are so correct in saying that we probably will never know the real story behind Genl Mac not getting those B-17s down to Del Monte with the other half of his heavy bombardment aircraft. Of course, the B-17s that were in the South were chewed pretty quickly in the following days. One thing is for sure, Genl Sutherland and others were very adept in covering for their leader when he "screwed up". MacArthur was a great General and I am certainly glad he was on our side, but he did have that glaring ego problem. Anytime, anything went awry, i.e.theClark Field fiasco, the Chinese assault at the Chosen Reservoir in late 1950, etc it was immediately proclaimed by him and his underlings to not be his fault. The Korean reverses, suffered when the Red Chinese interred the conflict is a glaring example of what I speak. All Intelligence pointed to the Chinese being on the move in great numbers, indicating their entrance into the campaign to be imminent and it was totally ignored to our great regret in those bleak days. To his dying day the good General was in denial. His later success in leading the way to the defeat of Japan in the SW Pacific tended to obscure the dismal decisions regarding Clark Field and the almost fatal delay in withdrawing into Bataan. Methinks, Skinny Wainwright should be given the lion's share of credit for what success we did enjoy in our delaying action against the Japanese after the USAFFE slipped past the Emperor's pincers that were rapidly closing from both the North and South of Luzon. These ramblings are just my humble opinions, to be taken with grains of salt, lol.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 11, 2013 5:44:57 GMT 8
Well, Okla, the Manchester book, American Caesar, makes it appear as if there were two separate McArthurs. The bad McArthur routed the Bonus Army, butchered the PI campaign in '41-42, and got caught napping in North Korea. The good McArthur brought West Point into the 20th century, waged a brilliant campaign from New Guinea to the PI, brought the Japanese political system into the 20th century, and changed the Korean War with his master stroke at Inchon. The most interesting general in American history, no?
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Post by okla on Oct 11, 2013 6:42:08 GMT 8
Hey Joe....You got that right. I say, again, I am glad he was on our side. I give him extra kudos on his insistence on liberating the Philippines rather than following the other proposed strategy of going into Formosa. I suppose taking Formosa would have been cheaper, casualty wise, but we owed it to the Filipino people to get the Japanese boot off their necks ASAP. Also liberating the PI separated the Japanese homeland and vicinity from their considerable forces in the South, just as our presence in Formosa would have done. I say, for the umpteenth time, just my very humble opinion. Cheers. Nice kibitzing with you.
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Post by Registrar on Oct 11, 2013 6:51:34 GMT 8
Why hadn't the B-17's completed their transfer from Clark down to Mindanao? The orders that they be transferred had been made, signed, and had begun to be implemented. However, there was to be a birthday party for Gen. Brereton at the Manila Hotel on Saturday night, and a number of the crews had held back, intending to be a part of the celebration. MacArthur had attended the celebration, but had left early, as was his habit. The news of Pearl Harbor came during the course of the activities, thus the pilots in attendance had to make a scramble back to Clark, still suffering the effects of alcohol. The fact that the transfer hadn't been completed, as ordered, when ordered, and had Ben concealed from him, soured the relationship between Brereton and MacArthur. Brereton would later "come good" in another place, in another time, but his relationship with MacArthur had been ruined .
The pilots, hung over still, were back in their planes, awaiting orders. As a hangover cure, some of the men went on oxygen. By lunchtime, some had actually exhausted their oxygen supplies, and there was a delay in recharging the aircraft oxygen supplies - I believe there was only one machine available - the others having been transferred south, or in the course of being sent there.
As for the delay in ordering a raid? I believe there was, behind the curtain of American-Philippine Commonwealth solidarity, a concern that although there was a state of war between Jappan and the US, there was at that time no state of war between Japan and the Philippine Commonwealth, and Quezon was objecting to offensive raids being commenced by the US from the Philippines. He had, readers might recall, secretly gone behind American backs trying to stitch together a form of neutrality with Japan! and may well have attempted to stay MacArthur's actions. I believe that this is one of the reasons why there are a few hours during that morning, that MacArthur was "in conference and unable to be disturbed" (my words, not a quote) as he was attempting to get Quezon saddled up to the recognition that the situation had now gotten beyond the powers of mice and men.
Yes, the B-17's were early models, and not deserving of the "Flying Fortress" repute. For all the doubt and fog of war, I am of the view that had they been intercepted by the Japanese fighters, they would have been swept from the skies. They were a strategic bomber, not a tactical weapon, and the nature of the expectations that people might have of them today do not reflect their true lack of worth in that theater and in that time.
There is no limit to the number of other reasons and excuses given about that day, but at the core of it seemed to lay a number of human, very human factors, one of the greatest of which was the reluctance of people at peace to confront the thought that a war was about to be upon them. I believe that the phrases "We were expendable" and "hung out to dry" best reflect the pathetic circumstance of good men sent by Washington, to do a job that couldn't be done no matter how much bravery and sacrifice were applied to them.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 11, 2013 23:16:37 GMT 8
This is great to be able to discuss these issues with guys who know their stuff!
1. The Quezon issue may explain the failure to OK the bombing mission, but it is a weird scenario. The Philippines were a U.S. commonwealth, not an independent nation. Quezon had no legal authority to negotiate with the Japanese. The only way Quezon could do so is if the U.S. granted the Philippines early independence but there was no way FDR or Congress would go for that, given the strategic importance of the Philippines. However, McArthur had to play his cards right because Quezon could, at times, be an unguided missile and if he got his nose out of joint, he could undermine Filipino-American cooperation and the defense of the Philippines. If I recall correctly, Quezon went renegade on Corregidor several months later when he learned the full import of the U.S. Europe-first policy.
Remember that McArthur had worked for Quezon before being recalled to active duty. Sometimes, I think they acted as if that employer-employee relationship still existed. I've read about a rice depot in central Luzon that held enough rice to feed the troops on Bataan for anywhere from six months to a few years. The Army wanted to transport that rice to Bataan but there was a Philippine law that prohibited the transportation of rice from one province to another. McArthur's HQ enforced that law and threatened to court-martial anyone who tried to take that rice. That rice, of course, would have been very helpful on Bataan.
2. The real loss at Clark Field was the P-40s. A couple of dozen P-40s could have done wonders on Bataan, if for no other reason to act as aerial artillery spotters and to chase away the Japanese planes that were acting as aerial artillery spotters.
3. I am amazed that in late 1941, a year after the Battle of Britain, the U.S. military still did not understand the full importance of radar as an advance warning system for air attacks. If the U.S. had several up-to-date radar stations in northern Luzon, the planes would not have been caught on the ground at Clark Field. If I remember correctly, there was only one radar station on Luzon and that one was outdated (i.e., it could not detect altitude).
4. I am also amazed that the War Dept. never disseminated the "scouting report" that Chennault had filed on the Japanese Zero. He had analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the Zero and the P-40 and had devised tactics that enabled the P-40 to successfully fight the Zero. If the airmen in the Philippines had had that information, they would not have engaged in the suicidal mission of trying to dogfight a Zero. They also could have made bomber attacks on Luzon far more costly for the Japanese.
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Post by okla on Oct 12, 2013 0:10:44 GMT 8
Hey Guys....Every time I get into discussing the, for lack of a better wording, "comedy of errors" or "Greek Tragedy" that unfolded in those late days of 1941, it is almost mind boggling, viewing it in hindsight. Everything that could go wrong, went wrong. Overriding the whole senario was the "peacetime mentality" that had its' grip on the people in the Far East and Hawaii. It seemed that nobody could see the imminent threat staring is in the face with red flags going up almost daily if not hourly. The Cabanatuan rice depot fiasco typified those crazy days on Luzon. Why the powers, that be, didn't say "to Hell with the law", we are trucking that vital resource into Bataan to feed the USAFFE forces. Why risk letting the Emperor's legions feast on it. Absolutely crazy and incomprehensible to contemplate from the present time. I am getting a headache just reviewing those long ago decisions. Cheers. Postscript....My fragile psyche can't handle the examination of our handling of Fighter Interceptor Operations, i.e. ground control/interdiction, etc of incoming Japanese formations. If only we had a few former RAF filter center vets from the 1940 London Blitz overseeing our feeble efforts. I wonder if there might have been a few on hand at Singapore, due to the "build up" at that Allied bastion, who might have given our guys a few tips prior to December 1941. Seems that I read of a visit by some RAF Air Marshall,etc who did inspect our layout earlier in 1941, who came away unimpressed at our situation,etc. I say, again, Harry Truman was so "on target" when he made his famous statement regarding "hindsight".
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Post by joeconnor53 on Oct 12, 2013 2:59:31 GMT 8
About the only break the Fil-American forces got was that Homma didn't realize the retreat into Bataan was a strategic withdrawal, not a rout.
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Post by okla on Oct 12, 2013 4:50:28 GMT 8
Hey Joe....So true. Homma was "Hell bent" on taking Manila, figuring that would be the "ball game" ending the PI Campaign, but not so. Had we not won the little tank battle at Plaridel the whole withdrawal of General Parker's South Luzon Force would have stalled. That little known engagement pitting American Stuart Light Tanks against Nippon's armor was key to the whole contingent (both I and II Corps) of USAFFE getting into the Peninsula. Seems like, if my memory is still intact, which I sometimes wonder about) that a whole platoon on those Stuarts were left at the side of the Bataan Hiway for lack of fuel. There for the taking because disabling actions had not been carried out. That American tank, used by the Japs in the landings on Corregidor, probably, was one of these intact tanks captured by the enemy. Another little piece to the "Comedy of Errors". Cheers.
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