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Post by okla on Nov 16, 2013 22:18:43 GMT 8
Hey Registrar....Fully agree. It is certainly true that the seeds of the "Greek Tragedy" were sown years before Pearl Harbor. The actual harvest began that fateful day. Plus, the icing on the cake was those strategic errors of judgement made by USAFFE early on regarding the immediate moving of supplies (especially the Rice stored at Cabanatuan) to the Peninsula, attempting to stop the enemy on the beaches of Luzon, the Clark Field disaster, etc. I will cease. The old "Dead Horse" has been beaten beyond recognition, but I can't help but to keep looking out toward the South China Sea, hoping to view the approaching Task Force, led by the USS Enterprise and her escorts, racing to the rescue of her embattled countrymen. Yes, I realize one cannot change history, but I can still fantasize. Cheers.
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Post by varsity07840 on Nov 17, 2013 0:16:34 GMT 8
Much food for thought there, Okla. Even the P-40 was no match for the Japanese fighters. Multiply their numbers by two, and the outcome wouldn't have changed. Multiply the numbers of submarines by two and the outcome would not have changed. This had been discovered via the AVG experience in China, where it had been learned - the hard way - that the P-40 could NOT dog-fight a Zero and expect to get the better of it
The problem was not so much the P-40 itself as much as it was the pilots flying them. Most of them were right out of flight school and none of them were aware of the capabilities of the Zero. The survivors of the fighting in the PI brought their experience to Java, Australia and New Guinea and developed tactics that minimalized the Zero's advantages. Ironically, while Chennault did provide information about the Zero, the AVG never fought against it.
Duane
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Post by okla on Nov 17, 2013 2:47:58 GMT 8
Hey Varsity....You touched on something that I only became aware of just a few short years ago. I, for the longest time, thought that the "Flying Tigers" went up against the Japanese Air Force prior to December 7, 1941, and in China itself.. Not true, as it turned out. I have forgotten the exact date, but it was later in the month, around Christmas, and in Burma, rather than China itself. Old assumptions "die hard", at least in my case. Thanks for posting. Cheers.
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Post by Registrar on Nov 17, 2013 6:49:17 GMT 8
I am reaching back many years and I no longer have my aviation collection, but I seem to recall that what we now generally refer to as the AVG, did not go under that name originally - indeed, they started as a sort of amorphous, mysterious group of civilians called together for an operation the existence of which could not be revealed. So initially, even the idea that there had been an American group being formed, pre-war, with the specific role of fighting the Japanese as private pilots in the hire of a Chinese "front" company, was pretty secret. As a "black ops" style of operation, started when Roosevelt was assuring the populace that their sons would not be fighting a war and that the US was still pushing an officially neutral foreign policy, Roosevelt had authorized it fairly much with a "nod and a wink" and secret funding so as to be consistent with the prevailing Washington spin that the United States was not seeking hostilities against the Japanese. It was all total deniability. Thus, all the personnel had to be civilian (wink wink), and became civilian contractors to a Chinese entity. This is where my memory gets hazy, I think that the entity was something like CAMCO - the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company, with their supposed cover story being that they had been hired by a Chinese company to protect a privately owned factory.
I used to be up on those things a bit better in my early days, as I had encouraged a young friend of mine, Sid Moore, to sign up for a reunion tour with the AVG when China first allowed tourists in. This he did, and he found himself on tour with a bunch of the AVG people, and he set out to become an indispensable dogsbody for Dick Rossi, David "Tex" Hill, RT Smith, Chuck Older and others. I have an autographed photo somewhere by all of them, and a small pile of AVG Association newsletters from the 1970's or 1980's which were owned by "Tex Hill". (They are for sale $100 plus postage). My friend was luckier - he ended up with one of their original "Hells Angels" flying jackets, which he later traded back to the manufacturer Willis & Geiger for a handsome sum plus two new jackets, one of which I still have.
Speaking about stuff for sale, I do have a grouping of stuff concerning Paul Tibbets. It includes a signed leather patch with Enola Gay's tail markings (both of them),a signed book, a signed airshow program, and a bunch of twenty or so Hiroshima pictures. Getting them all together and on to eBay is such a hassle. Somewhere too, at the bottom of a box, is a tiny piece of Enola Gay (pre-restoration), but only if I can find it.
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Post by xray on Nov 18, 2013 5:16:45 GMT 8
I always like "what if" warfare scenarios, its what guys like us do. Haven't been part of or even seen previous ones mentioned here, but its logical for us to focus sometimes on what might have been. It is true, hindsight is always perfect, muddy mistakes made shine through with stunning clarity when looking back, and it must always be kept in mind that we are talking about men in the heat of battle making decisions in real time. We are talking about desperate men with limited resources who were well aware of the precarious situation they were in. I think a couple of salient points do stand out:
* There was no good excuse for having a large portion of our air fleet caught on the ground and destroyed early on. A lesser commander might have been harshly disciplined or relieved of command, but considering the man and circumstances, that would have only compounded the mistake. Those aircraft could not have significantly affected the coming campaign, I think we all can agree on that. The largest affect of their loss was probably hurt moral. * Mac is hailed as a daring, tactical genius for altering WPO and ordering a withdraw into Bataan, but that was really about his only option [not to take away from his order, which doubtless took some gumption to make, or the skillful bravery that made the maneuver under extreme duress a success]. It was painfully obvious that we could not stop the Japs from landing almost at will. Once landed, it was also painfully obvious that they could not successfully be engaged at the landing sites. Once built up and broken out from those sites, it was obvious that we could not effectively engage those superior forces with our resources at hand ... So at that point, it became a matter of simply prolonging the campaign as long as possible to buy time for other theaters of war, so with that as the goal, withdraw to Bataan was the only option.
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Post by okla on Nov 18, 2013 6:10:00 GMT 8
Hey X.....Wasn't the withdrawal into Bataan, hunkering down there, and awaiting relief from Stateside, the original senario of Orange, if war with Japan broke out? Correct me, if I am in error, but didn't General Mac put forth the idea of meeting the enemy on the beaches and having the decisive battle at that point rather than adhering to the original War Plan??? Again, with hindsight, getting the Southern Luzon Force up from the South, thru Manila and across the Calumpit Bridges and into Bataan was a "near run thing", but we got away with it. The little tank fracas at Plaridel, forgotten to most folks, was certainly a key event. If the Japanese had gotten astride that hiway from Manila to San Fernando events would have been devastating. Military Historians tell that had General Homma not been so obsessed with the capture of Manila there would have been no Battle of Bataan and Corregidor would probably have run up the white sheet much earlier. Just sayin'. Cheers.
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Post by xray on Nov 18, 2013 6:52:04 GMT 8
Okla, if I'm not mistaken, I believe that he made the decision and gave the necessary orders to withdraw to Bataan, declare Manila an open city, and transfer his command to Corregidor about 2 weeks after Dec 7, 1941. The original WPO was of course created years before Mac took command, and though it was revised on a continual basis, was probably outdated by 1941. It envisioned 1]Engaging and defeating the enemy on the landing sites. If that failed, 2]Engaging and defeating the enemy in central Luzon. If that failed, 3] a retreat to Bataan, with the defense of Manila Bay being the primary objective.
Apparently, Mac quickly determined that the 1st 2 were not viable options, and opted to focus the primary effort in Bataan.
Interestingly, there never was an option #4. No mention was made of plans if the position on Bataan became untenable. Presumably the planners calculated that a relief expedition would have battled its way into the region by then, or else all was lost anyhow ,,, And events were to prove that true.
I, like you, stand ready to be corrected. Obviously, what I offered is very basic anyhow.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Nov 18, 2013 8:39:50 GMT 8
My recollection is that the original WPO called for the Fil-American force to withdraw to Bataan as soon as the Japanese landed on Luzon in force. The idea was that Bataan would be fully stocked with food and other supplies and that the Fil-American forces could hold out there until the Navy fought its way across the Pacific to reinforce and resupply the garrison.
Several months before Pearl Harbor, however, MacArthur persuaded the Joint Chiefs to modify WPO, which he felt was defeatist and defensive. Under the MacArthur plan, the Fil-American forces would contest the Japanese landings, which were expected to occur at Lingayen Gulf. This required food and other supplies to be placed in dumps in central Luzon instead of being stored on Bataan. When the MacArthur plan fell apart, much of this food and many of these supplies were abandoned in Luzon. There just wasn't enough time or resources to transport it to Bataan. The shortage of food on Bataan was crippling.
MacArthur based his plan on several misconceptions:
1. He believed that the Japanese would not invade Luzon in force until April 1942. By then, MacArthur would have received considerably more troops and equipment from the States; and
2. He overestimated the combat-readiness of the Philippine Army. With experience, they became good troops. However, at the beginning of the war, they were severely undertrained and were no match for the Japanese Army. MacArthur shares a good deal of the blame for this because before being recalled to active duty, he worked for the Philippine government and was in charge of organizing the Philippine Army. He was a strategist, not a nuts-and-bolts organizer.
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Post by xray on Nov 18, 2013 15:11:53 GMT 8
Even in hindsight, a very fluid and confusing situation. Maybe the confusion in mission goals is due to the differences in the "original" WPO, and its subsequent revisions. I am going by the one in affect when Mac took command, revision #3. "Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. (See Map 4.) The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops, had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the "last extremity." The Decision To Withdraw to Bataan www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_06.htmSo the original [revised] WPO-3 did not call for the immediate withdraw into Bataan but considered the possibility. Mac, with his aggressive fighting spirit, did try to put more teeth into the plan that did not take into account the possibility of a last stand in Bataan, but unfortunately his plans were based on what he might have expected to have in early 1943, not early 1942 and was left with no option but to disregard the thought of any major action in central Luzon or defending Manila, and withdraw to Bataan.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Nov 18, 2013 21:25:59 GMT 8
That sounds accurate, xray. My only quibble is that I don't think WPO envisioned the main effort to be defeating the Japanese on the landing beaches in northern Luzon. It envisioned that the northernmost fighting would be in central Luzon but the main effort would be to hold Manila Bay, which assumed eventual withdrawal into Bataan. This plan assumed that reinforcements could not immediately be sent to the Philippines so the garrison would be limited to only the men and supplies on hand at the beginning of the war. The MacArthur plan, on the other hand, envisioned defending all of Luzon and aggressively contesting the landings. The philosophical difference was that WPO envisioned only a holding action until relief arrived while the MacArthur plan envisioned throwing the Japanese back into the sea. Perhaps the practical difference is that the MacArthur plan put most of the eggs in his basket on defeating the landings while WPO was based on the practical reality that a withdrawal into Bataan and a prolonged defense of Bataan would be required.
My main source is The Fall of the Philippines (1953).
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