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Post by joeconnor53 on Nov 13, 2013 22:12:05 GMT 8
Here's an interesting article from American Heritage magazine concerning the problems with American submarine torpedoes during World War II. Of special interest is some discussion of Admiral Hart's plan for the defense of the Philippines and what kind of damage American submarines with properly working torpedoes could have done in Lingayen Gulf. The author, a World War II submariner, notes that the Germans quickly fixed the problems with their torpedoes while we didn't. As for the Philippine campaign, he says: Had the Germans been in our place in Lingayen Gulf, it is my opinion that the Japanese landing would have been frustrated. Of course this cannot be proved, but I will always believe the loss of the Philippines could have been prevented. As it was, the entire battle for the Philippines was not only a failure, it was a shameful failure. We lost control of the air on the first day, and our effort to control the sea with our submarines, or at least contest it, was pathetically inadequate. The root cause of the debacle at sea was almost complete failure of the submarine weapon, the torpedo.www.americanheritage.com/content/200-years-under-sea-3%E2%80%9Cculpable-negligence%E2%80%9D
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Post by Deleted on Nov 15, 2013 2:44:37 GMT 8
Actually I think American submarines had decent torpedoes Mk8 I think, though they were weaker and shorter ranged than what japan had. The real problem with American Torpedeos was the Mk10s that the destroyers had almost never detonated, went in circles and had no range or speed. The problem was that the magnetic tip was being destroyed on impact with the target.
Also one time a destroyer accidently fired a full load of live torpedoes at the battleship that FDR was on. They all missed or did not detonate.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Nov 15, 2013 7:31:28 GMT 8
I believe that the submarine torpedoes were defective, too. Here were the problems: (1) they ran deeper than they were supposed to; (2) their detonators were defective; and (3) they had the nasty habit of circling back and endangering the sub that had fired them. Because the Navy Bureau of Ordnance refused to acknowledge these defects, it took far longer than it should have for these defects to be fixed. The Bureau of Ordnance blamed the sub skippers for the poor performance of the torpedoes when, in fact, the torpedoes were defective. This article provides a concise explanation of the problems and how they were eventually solved: fleetsubmarine.com/torpedoes.html
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Post by okla on Nov 15, 2013 9:12:23 GMT 8
Hey Joe....I have always believed that Bureau of Ordnance actions during this fiasco bordered on criminal negligence. When our submarines finally started using the new "fish" the Japanese Merchant Marine was riddled with losses. What a difference effective torpedoes, from the outset of the war, could have accomplished is mind boggling to contemplate. Just sayin'.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Nov 15, 2013 9:37:00 GMT 8
I agree 100%, Okla.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Nov 15, 2013 9:38:29 GMT 8
I agree 100%, Okla. It sounds as if the Bureau of Ordnance was operating with a peacetime bureaucratic mindset.
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Post by xray on Nov 15, 2013 12:58:09 GMT 8
No one disputes the well documented problems we had with torpedoes, it was well known at the time by sub crews, and took well over a year after the war started for it to filter up and grab attention. I am not aware if any heads rolled for this critical failure, but they should have. Don't think Nimitz wanted a scandal while the bullets were flying, and once it was over that entire matter lapsed once again into obscurity. The notion that we could have checked the Japanese invasion force in the Philippines if only we had torpedoes that worked I think is wishful thinking, at best. They could have caused some damaging losses, but we didn't have a sub fleet at that time capable, without a fleet or even air corps to back it up, of sustained operations against a foe like the IJN. There was nothing we could do to prevent the loss. This was envisioned in war plan orange, as related to the Philippines, years before the war started, and didn't take into account the possibility of our main surface force being mutilated as it was. With no hope of counter strokes, reinforcements or even resupply, the writing was on the wall faster than anyone realized it. Now, if we had seriously started prepping & fortifying in 1935 then of course things might have been different ,,, But we in fact took the opposite course and held off on any major upgrades to the defensive capacity of the Philippines, partly out of fear of provoking the Japs. I think the mauling of our air fleet at Clark was also pretty much a non issue and far as being a decisive factor either way, we could not have done that much with that bomber force, certainly nothing that would have turned the tide in our favor. Obviously, they should have all flown south upon outbreak of hostilities, en masse with proper fighter support they could have been a potent factor disrupting landings and supply dumps, but still far from capable of changing the outcome to any appreciable degree.
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Post by joeconnor53 on Nov 15, 2013 21:04:52 GMT 8
I can't argue with your conclusions, xray.
1. The B-17s would not have made a difference. They were the early models without self-sealing fuel tanks and tail guns. They would have been easy prey for the Zeroes, as Colin Kelly and his crew found out. Unfortunately, our military did not yet understand that to be effective, B-17s needed to fly in substantial numbers, in tight formations and with fighter escort. The Eighth Air Force would learn those lessons the hard way in the skies over Europe. The loss of so many of our P-40s on the first few days of the way was probably a more serious loss than the loss of the B-17s.
2. The submarines might have disrupted the landings but I doubt that they could have stopped them. There weren't enough subs and their skippers had not yet learned the most effective ways to attack ships. However, could the submarines have disrupted the invasion sufficiently to give our ground troops in Lingayen Gulf a better chance to contest the landings?
3. I've often thought that one of the keys to the Philippines was Admiral Fletcher's Wake Relief Expedition. If Fletcher had proceeded more aggressively, he would have caught the second Wake invasion force without air cover. Those Japanese ships should have been easy pickings for our carrier-based fighters. If Fletcher could have stopped the second Wake invasion, that might have seriously disrupted the Japanese plans for the Philippines. That second invasion took place on 12/23/41. The invasion in Lingayen Gulf occurred on 12/22/41. Might the need for a third attempt to capture Wake have siphoned off men and supplies bound for the Philippines?
4. I've often wondered what would have happened if our troops still held Bataan at the time of the Battle of Midway. Would the results at Midway have encouraged attempts to try get supplies etc. to the Philippines? I'm not sure that would have been practical but it is interesting to think about.
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Post by okla on Nov 15, 2013 21:21:13 GMT 8
Hey X....Methinks you have pretty well summed it up. We have beaten this dead horse numerous times on this Forum and usually come up with the same outcome. Our guys, way out there in the PI, were doomed the minute the USS Arizona blew up and the USS Oklahoma rolled over and buried her masts in the Pearl Harbor mud. The fate of the Philippine forces was sealed. I have always thought too much faith was put into the B-17 build up. The Fortress was a formidable, strategic, heavy bombardment weapon, but FEAF had no real strategic targets to speak of. Midway showed that high altitude bombing was totally ineffective against surface forces. Even if the heavy bombers had not been caught on the ground at Clark, they and the ones already removed to Del Monte would have been chewed up by the Zeros over the following days and weeks. Look what ME-109s and FW-190s did to much more heavily armored versions of the B-17 over occupied Europe. Attrition would have accomplished what the enemy did on December 8th at Clark. Still having more P-40s available during the Bataan fighting couldn't have hurt, but where would they have operated from to have any meaningful time over the ground forces in interceptor and support activity??? We could have, with effective torpedoes, and most of our P-40s, etc taken a heavier toll of the Japaneses invaders, delaying their advance, tying down more of their Forces, shipping and materiel, but in the end the outcome would have been the same. I say again, 'ole Harry Truman had it right when he said "hindsight is 20/20".
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Post by Registrar on Nov 16, 2013 14:05:13 GMT 8
....Still having more P-40s available during the Bataan fighting couldn't have hurt, but where would they have operated from to have any meaningful time over the ground forces in interceptor and support activity??? .... Much food for thought there, Okla. Even the P-40 was no match for the Japanese fighters. Multiply their numbers by two, and the outcome wouldn't have changed. Multiply the numbers of submarines by two and the outcome would not have changed. This had been discovered via the AVG experience in China, where it had been learned - the hard way - that the P-40 could NOT dog-fight a Zero and expect to get the better of it. The only way a P-40 could deal with the Japanese fighters was to attack from altitude, build up speed in the dive, shoot the target on the way through, and then break off at lower altitude. Unfortunately, what happened in the Philippines happened because the US was not yet ready to go to war, and the Japanese had been at war in China for several years. I believe "Doomed at the Start" is overly-optimistic, as they were doomed by decisions made years before, in budget decisions made in Washington. One cannot surely look at the history of the 1930's, in which the US had been governed by the Democrat Party which had a majority in both the House and the Sente, and the Presidency. The manner of the war's outbreak, of course, was tragic and shocking in the extreme, but that is what happens when one invests the national prospects and prestige on the basis that diplomacy will solve hitherto unsolvable issues, and that if war comes, we shall have time to deal with it. Not much unlike the US approach to Iran's acquisition of a nuclear capability - certainly it must give us folks who have studied the coming of the Pacific War something to find modern parallels with.
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