The Battle To Retake Corregidor - an unidentified source doc
Dec 2, 2015 8:34:17 GMT 8
Karl Welteke, chadhill, and 2 more like this
Post by EXO on Dec 2, 2015 8:34:17 GMT 8
I found this document on an old computer, and felt that it might be of assistance to members. I have no record where the document came from or how it came into my hands, other than that the file name was "THE BATTLE TO RETAKE CORREGIDOR ISLAND 20 Nov 07.doc" and the version on my computer was created 13 March 2013. It refers to maps and sketches which are not included, which is one reason I did not paste the document on the ROCK FORCE Website. Nor do I have any means of determining whether the typed version is faithful to the original documents referred to in it. It makes interesting reading, nonetheless.
I am overseas and presently have no access to my reference books, so wonder whether the page references indicate if the source might be Flanagan or Devlin.
exo
THE BATTLE TO RETAKE CORREGIDOR ISLAND
February 16, 1945
SETTING THE STAGE
February 16, 1945
SETTING THE STAGE
That obscure piece of information which came to CT-34 on February 1st – “Japs observed withdrawing from Bataan to Corregidor via small boats”-had smoldered like the fuse of a time-bomb for a dozen days. On February 13th, it burst into flaming significance.
The bombs had been dropped in hundreds. Air reconnaissance had flown mission after mission. Water-borne reconnaissance had sailed to within yards of the shore. Informants had reported – the enemy had been constantly observed. The moment had arrived for the final plans, and the mission had been assigned.
On February 16th, at 1030 hours, BLT #3 – Third Battalion, 34th Infantry (Reinforced) – would land on BLACK BEACH, at SAN JOSE, CORREGIDOR ISLAND.
Field Order #1, issued from Headquarters BLT #3, APO 21, 13 February – is herewith quoted in part.
“BLT #3
3d Bn, 34th Inf w/ Bn Med Sect.
Attchd: Co A, 34th Inf
3d Plat, Ch Co., 34th Inf
3d Plat, AT Co., 34th Inf
½ Mine Plat, AT Co., 34th Inf
Det Serv Co. 34th Inf
Det Co C, 24th Med Bn.
3d Plat Co C., 3d Engr
Det 603d Tk Co.
Det 174th Bomb disposal Sqd
Det ?ABCO
Det XI Corps Sig Co
Det 5526 EB & CB (Co??)
18th FBH
592d EB & SR (Shore Party) (ASP)
a. Will: on L-plus-1 - (16 Feb) –“land on BLACK BEACH AT H-plus-120.”—(1030 hours)-
“(1) Secure IBH
(2) Seize and secure MALINTA HILL.”
The garrison on CORREGIDOR was reported by Guerrillas to be between 250 and 320 on December 17th. After that date, it was known that the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Field Artillery Regiment, less 1 battery, armed with 150mm guns and totaling approximately 500 men, had come to the Rock. This placed the minimum estimate of enemy troops present to oppose landings at 850. Prewar armament repaired and put in firing condition was reported to include two 12-inch guns, two 10-inch disappearing guns, and 3-inch mobile anti-aircraft guns, and two 37mm split trail guns. So far as was known, the only additional enemy installed artillery on the island was six 75mm guns. Guerrillas reported that “The Rock” well supplied with food and ammunition.
Air reconnaissance, 3 days prior to the Rock’s assault indicated that the entire island was heavily defended – found 16 coastal defense gun positions, 17 of which appeared to be occupied, noted myriad caves and preparations around Malinta Hill, San Jose, and SOUTH LOCK, pinpointed 14 light and medium anti-aircraft installations, all in use, and commented on the excellent, all-weather road net that covers the island.
So much of these observations as apply to the operation of BLT #3 are noted in the subsequent map-sketch. Considering the appearance of this terrain the completion of preparatory aerial bombing and naval gunfire, it is difficult to imagine such through identification of objects on the ground possible.
BLT 3 SECTOR SHOWING
REPORTED Japanese INSTALLATIONS
Map on Page 131. See First Sketch
The plan was for “L” company and “K” company to land in the initial wave, each with 2 platoons abreast. “L” company was charged with the seizure and securing of the southern half of Malinta Hill and the tunnel entrances ranging around that portion. “K” Company was given the northern half of the hill and its tunnels.
“I” Company, coming ashore 8 minutes after “L” and “K”, would establish the Initial Beach Head (IBH) and detach one platoon to destroy machine guns which were known to be present on the west or left flank of the beach.
“H” Company was to be prepared to support the attack with its heavy machine guns and mortars and as directed by the commanding officer.
“A” company, initially in tactical reserve, would furnish one platoon per Landing Craft Troops (LCT) for unloading bulk cargo, and stand ready to attack on order.
The Anti-Tank Platoon of the 3d Battalion would land on the east half of the beach, the 3d Platoon from Regimental Anti-Tank Company on the west. Initially, this latter platoon would assist in the destruction of the hostile machine-gun positions on their flank. Both platoons would fire on targets of opportunity.
Demolition squads of the THIRD Battalion would land on the east half of the beach, the 3rd Platoon from Battalion A&P Platoon. All mines on the beach were to be at first marked and later removed by the detachment from the Anti-Tank Company’s Mine Platoon. Additional assistance for the rifle companies in matters of demolition, removal of obstacles on the beach, road repair, and the destruction of fortified positions would be provided by the 3d Platoon, “C” Company, 3d Engineers. Detachments from 603d Tank Company and 34th Regimental Cannon Company would land and stand by to engage targets of opportunity.
Each man was ordered to carry ashore his own medical aid kit and 30 days supply of Atabrine, and two full canteens of water. One unit of fire was to go ashore individually and/or mobile landed. One 1/3 K and 2/3 D ration would be carried, for use ashore on D-plus-one and D-plus-two.
Each company station in the battalion command net-SCR 300, Channel 37 – as seen as practicably possible after landing, would report in and monitor continuous watch until further instructed from BLT Headquarters. Initial communication with platoons of the 503rd Parachute Regiment would be established by the 592 ??330 Detachment. This detachment would maintain a station in the command net until wire communications could be installed...
Nineteen Jeeps, 3 three quarter ton trucks, 1 ton-and-a-half, 7 two-and-a-half ton GMC’s, 5 ambulances, 2 L-6 dozers, 3 -7 SPM’s, 6 37mm anti-tank guns, 2 medium tanks, 3 two-hundred-fifty gallon water trailers, the supplies and equipment in previous paragraphs, and the individual arms and equipment and intestinal fortitude of 1103 officers and men – those were the elements of BLT #3 – the equipment and the men of which their commanding officer said … “There’s is no place to go, once you are there, but forward. We simply take the hill at all costs and stay there until we have killed all the Japs or the Japs have killed all of us.”…
…the men knew what they were getting into – and went – and came back victorious.
Page 133
JAPS – XXXX –XXX SLT??
MESSAGE
No. - Date: 16 FEB 45
To CO CRAZON ?
LANDING SUCCESSFUL. HEAVY OPPOSITION. SITUATION
DEVELOPING WITH u/n NUMBER JAPS FIRING FROM
BUNKERS. OUR CASUALTIES NIL.
Tensely, the regiment had waited at Subic Bay for word from BLT #3. The first message came at 1350.
Much more tensely, BLT #3 had waited out the night of February 15th, dug in on the MARIVALES Shore, across the North channel from CORREGIDOR, waited for dawn and the LCM’s and 1030, and the landing, and what lay beyond.
Next morning, out on the water, headed for South Channel and BLACK BEACH, watching the paratroopers of the 503rd come down through perilous crosswinds from a scant 300 feet, watching the shells and bombs and bombers and rockets do their devastatcy, the men sat tight at their assault boats moved down and around and forward and inward toward the beach. And somebody uttered aloud the prayer they’d all been making. Someone said – “I hope it works.”
It did.
“L” Company had the honor of carrying the flag ashore. It landed, two platoons abreast as planned, and moved immediately inward. “K” Company came in right beside it. The hour 1000 – 30 minutes earlier that expected. “I” Company came in the second wave – with the heavy weapons of “L” and “K”. “H” was in wave number 3, “A” and the BLT command group in 4, the remainder of the team in the 5th.
The landing beach east of the South Dock had proved unsatisfactory for use. The beach west of the dock seemed ideal, at first, from every standpoint, including enemy opposition. The first wave came in without receiving heavy fire or serious opposition. They crossed a thick field of conical mines, so poorly camouflaged they were easily avoided, and found beyond a heap of ugly, misshapen, and unidentifiable, sun-bake rubble which had been made from buildings and installations by the bombs and shells.
As the 4th and 5th waves approached the shore, the enemy cut loose a fusillade of heavy machine gun fire, most of which originated on the western shore off BREAKWATER POINT. Vehicles coming off the boats of these waves detonate the mines in the fields the foot-troops had crossed. One of the tanks was knocked out –then an SEK?. An anti-tank gun, the jeep that pulled it, and the man who drove the jeep were blown sky-high. Several other vehicles were knocked out or damaged.
“K” Company, with 3 men wounded in the boats before they hit the beach were scrambling ashore as machine guns from San Jose Point on the right flank joined the guns from Breakwater Point in crossfire over the beach, and mortar shells began to drop on the beach and among the boats approaching it.
Despite the havoc wrought by the mine field and the hazard of the accurate enemy fire, “H” Company’s machine gun sections quickly assembled and found cover. The mortar platoon, with bulkier accessories, were slower but no less calm and efficient as they came through the crossfire and went into positions, making use of the huge bomb craters in the IBH sector for cover. The company set up the beach defense and awaited the need of their support of the riflemen up ahead. They had 2 more men wounded, 1 killed, 1 missing, after they hit the beach.
As the successive waves came in, mortar shells took a sharp toll, wounding two of the officers of the staff – narrowly missing the commanding officer. The silt and rubble of Black Beach was hot. Hot under the beating sun – hot under the flying steel.
Meanwhile, companies “L” and “K” progressed well against stiffening opposition. “L” Company’s first platoon fanned out to the east and made for the road that skirted the southern end of Malinta Hill. The remainder of the company began the excruciating climb up the southwest slope of the hill.
The platoon on the road, reaching its sharp bend a San Jose Point, received machine gun fire from the mouth of one of the minor tunnels and was denied further progress. The platoon set up a road block beyond the tunnel, leaving 6 men to guard it. The action had cost them 1 BAR – 1 man wounded.
The rest of the company gained the top of the hill at about 1130 hours. On the way up, they knocked out a 75mm gun a captured a knee mortar, both of which were in caves. The Second Platoon, climbing the western slope, had received small arms fire – the Third had encountered resistance from a pillbox and a tunnel mouth. Neither sustained casualties.
“K” Company had as its immediate objective the northern reaches of Malinta Hill and MALINTA POINT. Its 3rd platoon moved around the base of the hill to secure the point. The rest of the company climbed. On the way to the top of the BLT objective, they met only light resistance. From the west entrance to the Hill’s central tunnel came a burst of machine gun fire. Rockets, fired point-blank into the position silenced the guns for awhile. Two squads dug in above the tunnel mouth to keep the Japs inside – or get them as they came out. The company went on to the top.
The Third Platoon, rounding a curve on its way to Malinta Point? met heavy fire from the entrance to “Hospital Tunnel”. They worked past the fire and around the point, leaving a gauntlet of enemy steel between the rest of the battalion and themselves –a perilous but not impossible gauntlet. Coming around the point on high ground, they approached what remained of some buildings by the road. Under good cover among these ruins, they stared into the gaping mouth of another tunnel – this one opening in the northeast end of the hill. Although it was apparently from this tunnel that future Japanese counterattacks stemmed, and although the platoon had excellent fire coverage of the position, the “K” company men were under fire and out of communication for the greater part of the ensuing 2 or 3 days. They were able neither to put an end to the fire from the tunnel nor to keep all of the Japs inside.
The message – “EVERYTHING SUCCESSFUL. BLT #3 ON OBJECTIVE AT 1300” – was received at OLONG APO at 1946 hours. During the hours between 1300 and 1946 – although Malinta Hill was occupied – the action of the enemy actually became more intense in his activity and countermeasures.
With the exception of the elements of companies “K” and “L” which were on Malinta Hill, the BLT remained liquidly mobile, shifting elements to meet threats and situations as they arose – which was with great variance and in rapid succession.
“I” company had landed, dispatched one platoon, as planned, against machine gun positions on the west flank of the beach. The remainder of established the IBH and moved out, on relief of company “A” to occupy a spot of high ground about 300 yards south of north dock. From this position, they looked straight into the opening of the central tunnel and covered the ”Hospital Tunnel” opening from which General Wainwright had surrendered 3 years before. [This was the largest opening in the northern end of Malinta Hill. It faced toward the west and “Topside”].
“I” Company exchanged fire for some time with the gunners who’d fired on “K” from the central tunnel. Only a small aperture remained at the tunnel mouth, the rest having been sealed off by previous bombardment. The BLT Commander ordered a tank forward. The tank fired into the tunnel. The fire from the tunnel stopped.
“A” Company had had all three platoons on a southern extension of the same high ground. Around midday, all of “I” Company moved westward to the lower reaches of the “Topside” Mountains on the IBH west flank, “A” Company expanded its occupation of the high ground across the islands midriff.
At 1400 hours, 2 platoons of “A” Company – the First and the Second – were recalled to the beach to assist in unloading procedures. The platoons had to cross a piece of low, open ground on which lay a pulverized railroad bed. As they left cover, the drew fire from hillside positions some 300 yards northwest, in the vicinity of a well reverted building which had been used as an ice plant. Several casualties were sustained by the platoons, but they got across. During the rest of the afternoon, still under crossfire on the beach, they unloaded the boats in San Jose Bay. Just before dark, the First platoon was sent out to set up a road block on the south end of Malinta Hill, where the road snakes like a narrow shelf above the bay.
The whole afternoon had been swathed in peculiar quiet for “K” company, atop northern Malinta Hill. A brace of squads were sent out to a brace of knolls to affect a more or less integrated line, extending from the company perimeter on the southwest to 3rd Platoon on the northeast. There was nothing to do but sit tight. A similar situation existed on the southern half of the tunnel-ridden hill. “L” Company performed the “holding’ part of its mission.
At first, it appeared that “A” Company’s First Platoon – out on the roadblock – was going to experience the warmest night. Scarcely had the fat blue flies that swarmed over the island begun to retard their buzzing, when the platoon, constantly under fire, saw a great section of the cliff above them lurch into the night with a deafening roar. The Japs had mined it – filled it so full of explosive charge, that when the fuse was touched off and the charge blew, it sent the rock designed to fall across the road, blocking it, over the heads of the troops below, and on out into the bay. Only impotent chips and dust fell on the road and the “A” Company men.
During the night of the February16th, the Second Platoon of “A” Company, protecting the beach with elements of “H”, killed 23 Japs who attempted to swim around their position from San Jose Point.
The night’s really bloody paragraphs were written where the day had left blank pages – on the north of Malinta Hill by “K” Company.
Just before midnight, the sudden shouts of men, the piercing rataplan of gunfire told of a fight on the knolls below. The line to the 3rd Platoon went out. Mortar shells burst in the company position. One of the men from the First Squad outpost north of the company struggled up the hillside, carrying a comrade with a mangled leg, helping another whose hands dripped blood. A moment later, two men from the outpost squad nearest 3d Platoon clambered in. Third Platoon and both squad outposts had been suddenly attacked by an enemy party trying to drive a wedge southward to the dense little San Jose Beach. Third Platoon had driven them off. The two squad outposts had been all but wiped out. Of both, those 5 and one other were all that ever got back.
Before any attempt could be made to rescue the still-living wounded of the outposts who’d been left out front, the Japs came. Impossible thought it may sound, they came straight up the almost perpendicular northwest side of the “K” Company hill. They came with all the fury of the dammed – in the epitome of the “Banzai’s” tradition. Their weapons were anything from American rifles to spears. The cliff they climbed was so steep that those who were hit at the top fell straight into the faces of their comrades farther down – straight to the bottom of the gorge below.
It was a major midnight two-wave counterattack. It got within 10 feet of the “K” Company perimeter. “K” turned it back.
The following day, “K” Company’s commander, Frank Centanni, dispatched patrols to bring back the dead and wounded from the squad outposts the Japs had swamped. Devastating fire turned them back. Then the company commander himself took a patrol. He wanted to bring his wounded in. He had gone but a few yards, at the head of his patrol, when a Japanese rifle cracked and he fell out of view, just over a little hump in the ground. His men viciously returned the enemy fire – crawled to within inches of him, tried to again to bring the officer back. Three grenades exploded almost on top of him. The Japs kept his body covered by fire. The men had to leave him there.
The company could only see to count 35 Japanese bodies in front of their positions and in the gullies below them.
SITUATION CLOSE OF FEBRUARY 16. See Second Sketch.
“I” Company, on the second day, set about the mission of cleaning out enemy positions at the base of the “Topside” Mountains where they dropped off onto the saddle midriff. The company commander personally led the attack – directed the use of flame-throwers – blew and dug and burned the hard-fighting Japs out of position after position. The day’s action netted the company a score of 31 counted Japs dead.
At 0300 on the morning of the 17th, two parties of Japs appeared from out of nowhere and attempted to infiltrate the “HQ” Company perimeter at the beach. Both parties were beaten off – one by the 2nd, one by the 4th platoon. Daylight disclosed a total of 59 bodies laying in the rubble a stone’s throw away. The squads that accounted for most of them were machine-gun squads…but oddly enough, not a single machine-gun was fired. The Yanks did the work with carbines and grenades.
Many a fine target was found for the 81’s of “H” Company during the day. The mortars fired always with good effect.
An “L” Company patrol, augmented by a demolition squad, went out on a mission to seal off two large caves on the eastern side of Malinta Hill, just below its crest. The occupants of the first cave were easily and effectively trapped. The much-encouraged patrol continued to the second cave, where, a little overzealous, they installed so profound a charge that – instead of being blown shut – the cave was blown open as wide as a cellar door in a country town. The Japs inside were flushed like a covey of quail to the delight of the sharp-shooting Yanks nearby.
A 75mm Edgewood Arsenal gun was found by the company on the east side of the hill. It was duly knocked out. A sort of a trap-guard was set up around the blasted caves as the company settled down for the night.
For “K” Company, the day was scorching, but quiet. Communication with 3rd Platoon was finally reestablished. Firing had been heard all day from that group’s position on Malinta Hill. They had spotted a water-hole where the Japs around ENGINEER POINT cane for what apparently their supply of water. All day, they picked off Nips by ones and twos.
The order was to sit tight. “K” Company sat. The BLT was so thinly spread out that reinforcement was impossible. Most of the canteens in the company were empty…most of them in the battalion were empty…but the Nips had destroyed the distilling plant from which the BLT had planned to supply itself with water. The only source was MARIVALES, 5 miles away across the water.
The big blue flies buzzed and lit and stuck and persisted and swarmed. The sun was relentless. Japanese machine guns pop-popped now and then…not long enough to disclose their locations, often enough to slow things down and keep everybody ducking. The Navy hammered the cliffs on the western shore of Breakwater Point. Still fire came from them.
At 1700 the previous day, remote contact had been made with the “Topside” troopers of the 503rd. At 1000 February 17th, their regimental commander met the CO of BLT #3 near what had been San Jose like Stanley meeting Livingston. Coordination of plans was made on the spot. The 503rd had serious landing casualties, many battle casualties, all of them needed evacuation. The only road from San Jose to the western mountains was well covered by Japanese fire from many angles – most notably the ice plant installation.
BLT #3 began immediate preparations to get transportation for the wounded through.
Tank fire was called for again, to quiet the Japs in the west entrance of the main tunnel. “A” Company’s 3rd platoon, on the
Page 144 is missing.
went for more, until finally the Japs had had enough. When the enemy had gone back down the hill, “K” Company counted 20 of its men hit –among them the officer who had taken over the company when the CO was killed. Another Lieutenant assumed command, the company’s third leader in as many days.
The company officers – only three of them now – crawled through the moonlit gloom checking their men. Eight men left in the 1st Platoon. Nine in the Second. Eleven in the weapons platoon.. Third Platoon far away on Milamta Point. A few clerks, linemen, cooks, etc. to help out. Thirty men and three officers… and the whole northern half of Malinta Hill to hang onto.
There were 8 grenades in the company when the Japs came up the hill again at 3 o’clock on the morning of February 18. It was a monstrous, bloody, twisting turmoil of flesh and sweat and shells and hot lead and cold steel. They kept coming until 4 o’clock. Then they had spent themselves.
“K” Company counted off again. Thirty-three men – three officers fit for duty.
Before them and below them in the churned-up limestone of Malinta Hill, 150 Japanese cadavers stared unblinking into the dawn.
Early in the morning of the 18th, the 2nd platoon of “A” Company, running a gauntlet of fire from the ice plant which covered the only available trail, carried sorely needed water and rations up to “Z”[“A”] and “L” on Malinta Hill – brought down “K” Company’s casualties.
“I” Company moved to clean up pockets of resistance around North Dock. It had been done by early afternoon.
“L” Company, making maximum use of precisely accurate naval gun fires, continued cleaning out caves and minor tunnel entrances on Malinta Hill. They blow up 3 naval guns in installations and one 14-inch piece. They accounted for at least 30 more Japs. They size proved that the enemy expected the landing to be made East of San Jose, rather than at San Jose, for the eastern side of Malinta Hill literally bristled with the guns of heavy caliber that would have brought tragedy down upon any invading force they could have hit
Engineer Point, commanding the roads which led out onto the eastern reaches of CORREGIDOR was still in enemy hands – still holding out. Air support struck it with demolitions and Napalm at 1400. The effect was good.
“A” company’s 3rd platoon still held on the little ridge south of North Dock, still received occasional machine gun and mortar fire, still dished it out.
“K” Company’s 3rd platoon stood fast on Malinta Hill, cut off to all intents and purposes, but a definite plug in a definite gap.
Twice, the 1st platoon of “A” Company tried to push patrols around the bend of the road at San Jose Point and up the road on the east slope of Malinta Hill. Twice, they were driven back by heavy machine gun fire fro enemy pillboxes.
During the day, a concentrated, coordinated attack was made on the ice plant which had been delivering such tolling fire against BLT #3 –and which had maintained the gap between the THIRD battalion team and the 503rd “Topside”
Force. Cannon Company’s SPM’s not only assisted in the attack, but – after the road had been cleared (1500 18 Feb) – began an ambulance run to the 503rd aid stations, bringing the wounded down to Black Beach for evacuation.
Between 1730 and 1800, three platoons from “I” Company and attachments of heavy machine guns from “H” began completed relief of “K” on north Malinta Hill. Three heavy machine gun squads were sent from “M” to attachment with “L” Company. The Malinta Hill line was considerably strengthened.
But for heavy fire received by “K” company’s 3rd platoon on Malinta Point (their communications lines went out again), the night was quiet.
SECOND BLAST AT SOUTH ROAD See Third Sketch.
Page 147
On the morning of the 19th, “I” Company moved out to take what was dubbed “Goalpost Ridge”. This was the ridge –below the “K” (now “I”) Company position on which the nearest squad outpost had met disaster that first night – the ridge on which “K” Company’s commander had met his death. Under fire cover from the 3rd platoon, the 1st platoon made the assault. Grenades, small arms, and automatic weapons fire stopped them. The 4th Platoon was dispatched to their aid. It was driven back by an extreme concentration of sniper fire.
The platoons withdrew. “L” Company’s 81’s went to work. They fired between 2 and 300 rounds that day. Those they let fly at “goalpost ridge did the job. “I” Company’s 2nd Platoon seized it shortly before dark and dug in.
Meanwhile, the Japs set up a road block of their own at the south end of Malinta Hill. They began pecking away at the “A” Company block which was partially covered from their fire by the curve in the road.
“A” Company had shifted platoons. First was relieved at the road block position by the 2nd, and in its turn it relieved 3rd on the little ridge near North Dock.
The Japs didn’t know that elements of “L” Company were looking down on their road block from a well concealed position 100 feet above it. After letting the enemy get well in place, “L” Company fired one shot, wounded one Japanese, and scattered his companions.
The second Platoon of “A” Company then accompanied a tank around the bend. The tank fired point-blank into the temporarily abandoned position, destroying it. In the Cliff above, the “A” Company men found 2 caves from which the block could be covered by fire. Those were destroyed with a few well placed demolition charges. The platoon then withdrew to their original roadblock to pass and uneventful night.
“K” Company spent the 19th carry rations up Malinta Hill to “L” Company and bringing down 8 of their recovered dead.
“I” Company held the hot corner now. As night fell, intense barrages of 90mm mortar fire began to fall on their positions. At 0500 on the morning of the 20th, 20cm and 50 caliber fire was suddenly directed on the company from INFANTRY POINT…and up that same, impossible cliff again…came the Japs. The Yanks caught their grenades and threw them back. “I” Company’s 60mm mortars dropped death-dealing rounds among them. More hopeless from the beginning than those against “K”, the abortive assault failed disastrously.
February 20th was a quiet day. “L” Company sent a patrol to Engineer Point. They had nearly reached the patrol objective when a naval observer informed them that they were walking into a Japanese ambush. His observation was perfect. The patrol withdrew, and the guns of a supporting destroyer blasted the position. The patrol accounted fro 4 Japs who tried to sneak around them.
“I” Company moved farther north, under cover of heavy supporting rifle fire, and, with the use of flame-
throwers, complete cleaning off the northern end of Malinta Hill.
“A” Company sent its 3rd Platoon to reinforce the South Malinta Hill roadblock. Second Platoon rechecked the caves it had demolished the previous day. The roadblock was moved forward about 200 yards. The men settled down for a quiet night.
“K” Company’s 3rd Platoon sent a party down for rations and water. Their situation, tactically, was much improved, but they, like everyone, suffered from shortage of water.
It was known that that there was a goodly number of Japs still in the large tunnels under Malinta Hill. A scheme was devised thereby they might successfully be driven out or eliminated. An “L” Company patrol was sent down to the East Tunnel Entrance with smoke grenades. The grenades were to be thrown into the tunnel, in the hope that the rising smoke would seek outlet from the tunnel through the air vent servicing it. The vent could then be blocked, and the Japanese’s air supply shut off.
The patrol drew a lot of sniper fire, threw its grenades, killed a Japanese or two, and retired. The smoke stayed in the tunnel.
At 1400, “K” Company was ordered back up onto the hill. The position they would occupy would complete a solid line across the BLT Objective, re-establishing physical contact with their 3rd Platoon and bringing it into formation on the north flank of a strong line of threat and denial to enemy elements on the east of the island.
A squad from 1st Platoon, “A” company was sent to replace the elements guarding the west entrance to Malinta Tunnel.
The scene was quiet when night fell.
Situation Map on page 150. See Fourth Sketch
So far, mention has not been made of a threat which, from 1130 February 16th on was as real s the terrible nuisance of the island’s millions of blue flies. Everyone knew that the tunnel net under Malinta Hill was, in all probability, filled to capacity with all manner of supplies and munitions. Engineers had estimated that these tunnels, properly loaded and detonated, could constitute a charge of sufficient blast to lift Malinta Hill out of the earth, scatter it in fragments, and leave a canal through the island where it had stood.
Deep concern for this possibility had kept many of the men awake many hours.
On the night of February 21st, the Japs made their first try at it. In the main purpose – if, indeed, their purpose was to blow up the hill completely – that first try failed, and in failing rendered the through accomplishment of the job forever impossible.
However, BLT #3 suffered. At 2130 hours, a deafening explosion rocked the southern end of Malinta Hill. Flame and smoke and debris jutted from caves and tunnel entrances. Rocks flew in every direction.
The 3rd Platoon of “A” company was deployed along the road under the overhanging bank of the hill. Six of their men were guarding one of the caves in the bank. The whole hill seemed to crumble on them. A sudden inescapable landslide threw men to the ground, cutting and bruising them, isolating “A” Company’s road block detachment, and burying alive the 6 men who had been guarding the cave.
At almost the exact same time as the explosion, about 50 Japs, in a column of twos, marched out of the west entrance as if they were on parade. The “A” Company squad allowed them to proceed about 50 yards, and then opened up with everything, cutting them down like grain. A few minutes later, Japs started trying to infiltrate out of the tunnel by ones and twos. They were picked off as they appeared. It was one of those irreconcilable Japanese acts. It netted them nothing but corpses.
Attempts were begun at 10:30 that night – and continued until 4:30 on the morning of the 22nd – to rescue the “A” Company men – particularly the wounded – cut off by the explosion and landslide. PT boats came in to the bottom of the cliff on the bay below, but most of the wounded were in conditions too serious to permit lowering them by rope, and a heavy concentration of Japanese machine gun fire on the Marooned men much movement impossible.
The road itself had been blown out, and, since it was hewn out of a sheer bank that dropped to the bay, nothing was left now but the sheer bank. The entire area of the landslide was and undulating mass of crumbled rock. It couldn’t be traversed.
Nothing was left to do but wait fro daylight. Only 6 men remained in fit physical shape on the other side of the blow-out. They maintained the road block throughout the night.
At the crack of dawn, a rescue party was led to the other side of the slide by the commander of Company “A”. Guide, advisor, director, chief rescuer of the was a corporal whose profession prior to the war had been mountain climbing. His tireless work and deft skill were the greatest contributing factors to the extrication of the isolated men, wounded and still alive.
By 1030, February 22nd, the casualties had all been brought out, and the rescue party had completed its mission. During the rest of the operation, “A” Company had no Third Platoon. The platoon leader and all but 6 men had either been killed or wounded. Those 6 who came through whole were distributed among the other platoons.
Again on the 22nd action was nil. Patrols were active throughout the day. Naval gunfire was continuously employed with great accuracy – and this was the case throughout the operation – by its use, the tunnels’ openings were sealed off, one by one, Japs sealed inside.
During the night, another fatal attack was made against “I” Company, and the Japs were hurled back again – down the steep hill up which they had so often tried to push night attacks.
On the 23rd, preparations were made for a final push against and clean-up of enemy elements in the BLT 3 sector. “L” Company was relieved by “A” Company on Malinta Hill, and moved into position for an attack, the following morning, on Engineer Point.
Engineer Point was pounded fro sea and air and by mortar fire in preparation for the attack.
During the night of February 23-24, the enemy made his most serious attempt to demolish Malinta Hill. In the early morning hours, 7 explosions, all in quick succession, threatened to tear the hill asunder. Foxholes crumbled, flames belched from every hole in the central and northern portions of the hill, and with it belched parties of Japs – either corpses blown out by the blast, or men driven out into the American fire and death.
It was devastation – stark, awe-inspiring, and terrifying. But for the Japanese – not for its intended victim.
At 0830, the d24th day of February, the final air preparation struck Engineer Point after an hour and half of grinding fire from mortars, machine guns, and naval guns. At 0840, “L” Company and a battalion of the 503rd jumped off to assault the point.
The foot troops were preceded by two tanks which blasted the mouths of the tunnels on the northern slope of Malinta Hill, in front of the infantry advance. The momentum of the shock attack was never lost. The Japs were wiped off Engineer Point and the attack mission was complete at 1100 hours.
And it was at 11 o’clock that the enemy forces I Hospital tunnel made the last feeble gesture they would make at BLT 3…at the men who had struck them hard and tied them down and thoroughly, conclusively beaten them. They launched and impotent, quickly-repelled “Banzai Attack” at “K” Company’s Third Platoon.
As the assault and conquest of engineer Point was completed, a battalion of the 151st Infantry began relief of BLT 3. They completed the purpose for which they had landed, that day. And on February 25th, Third Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment (Reinforced) – left “The Rock”.
Etched in the memories of the men were the faces and habits and friendships of the comrades they had left there. Ringing in their ears was the message their Corps Commander had sent to them:
“My hearty congratulations on the magnificent work being done by all officers and men of your force. You are making history in the eyes of all Americans as the avengers of the Corregidor of 3 years ago.”
The final touch of meaning was added on March 1st, when the Commanding Officer of BLT #3, commanders of all the companies of his team, and several of the battalion’s Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO’s) – returned to participate in the ceremony in which the American Flag was raised once more on the staff from which she had been ignominiously lowered by the forces of tyranny, brutality and ignorance.
And there should be another total, too, of things destroyed by BLT #3 in those 10 days; and lost to the enemy forever.
Type: Japanese Personnel
Number: 3000/6000.
Under Malinta Hill, which BLT #3 had held and sat on for days were vast supplies of Japanese supplies of all kinds. The demolition of those supplies must have been quite through, in this soul-shattering explosion that shocked the island’s roots. It was a staggering loss to the enemy- a priceless prize for the battalion team.
HEADQUARTERS OF SIXTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 442
SUBJECT: Commendation
TO: Commanding Officer, 34th Infantry Regiment, APIO 321.
THRU: Commanding General, XI Corps, APO 471.
1. Upon the release of the 34th Infantry Regiment from the Sixth Army, I desire to express to you and to the officers and men of the regiment my personal appreciation and official commendation for the very effective manner in which the regiment carried out its assignments in the Luzon
Campaign.
2. Fighting with skill, courage and great gallantry over the difficult terrain of historic Bataan, Zambolos and on Corregidor, the 34th Infantry Regiment has added greatly to its already fine combat record and contributed materially to the success of the operations of Sixth Army. As the regiment leaves my command, I wish to each of its members Godspeed and good luck.
/s/ Walter Krueger
/t/ WALTER KRUEGER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding
File: 201.2 (10 Mar 45) C 1st Ind.
From: HEADQUARTERS XI CORPS. APO 471, 16 MARCH 1945.
To: Commanding Officer, 34th Infantry Regiment, APO 321.
1. It is with sincere pleasure that I transmit the commendation.
2. I concur, in all the Army Commander has said and add thereto my own appreciation and praise to you and every member of your command, for the accomplishment in a superior manner, of a most difficult mission.
/s/ C.F. Hall
/t/ C. P. HALL
Major General, U, S. Army
Commanding.
