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Post by EXO on Jul 7, 2011 8:50:30 GMT 8
I have long known that Valtin's illustrator got the details wrong, so I never made a big issue about using the map as a definitive feature of his article, it's just a piece of marginally relevant eye candy, of no great consequence. When we examine how the five waves of the 34th were to be directed once they crossed the beach, it's noteworthy that the climbing of the hill had to be accomplished from a point within a few hundred yards of the beach by an early wave, because that was the purpose of the landing. I tried to get a handle on the sequence of tactical dispositions when I transcribed the setting SETTING THE STAGE article, but collided with (a) a poor photocopy copy of the original document - which took days to decipher and retype and (b) the fact that the existing authorities (Devlin, notably) present a different loading of the five waves - at variance with the official Reports. Setting the Stage is at rockforce.org/rock_force/report/report_01.htmlThe map of the dispositions as at the close of the first day is definitive. Looking in a modern context of what's the case if we consider that Valtin's word Hospitall is wrong in describing some feature other than the one we all now know is the Hospital lateral, Valtin does make sense. From the point of an infantryman who has no access to maps, it's quite likely the EM's mis-named the features, and that the erroneous names continued for days, perhaps for ever. That's something that we have to consider always, that the "fog" of war sometimes doesn't dispel, ever. As subsequent waves came in, they took further positions around Skipper Hill. But they needed more. A small group did make it around Malinta Pt., but came under fire and are trapped out of communication for the greater part of the next two or three days. So we cannot count them, or their experiences, other than in "God" mode. They'd become irrelevant to the necessity to take and hold the crest-line. I was looking for my working document on comparing the waves/dispositions/objectives, but cannot locate it. If I find it in my travels, I will post it. What that leaves us with are men attempting to hold positions atop the crestlines of Malinta Hill, successively S to N, with the aspects overlooking bottomside, as it straddles Corregidor. If they could not be physically on those points, they had to be overlooking them. There HAD to be coverage from the highest points so as to prevent the Japanese from reoccupying any position facing an easterly direction. Unfortunately for some, that meant outpost duty at the northern end of the ridge, over Malinta Pt. Of possible assist, there is an illustration at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_crest indicating why both an actual crestline and a military crestline need to be taken under certain circumstances. There's another issue which I won't go into, though it does need to be considered - and that is the extent to which Malinta Hill was not a solid monolith, and that the crests became porous at night as perimeters of the positions came under attack.
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Post by fots2 on Jul 7, 2011 11:25:58 GMT 8
Why use eye candy of no great consequence in an article designed to detail the events of history? Valtin obviously considered it relevant. Notice that his text follows his map (or vice versa). Being incorrect in critical areas places all of his article in question. Hospital is wrong, North entrance is wrong, where do we stop? Trying to justify Valtin's mistakes lowers this whole exercise to the level of opinions and not historical fact. That is fine as long was we all understand where we are headed. I can understand your difficulty in trying to create accurate content for your web site. It sounds like you are sorting through different and sometimes conflicting information the same way we are trying to do now. EXO, what is the source of your comment that the 34th never made it past Malinta Point on the first day? The 'Situation Close Of Feb 16' sketch on Page 5 of your article IS indeed definitive. It shows shows a pocket occupied by the 34th that is well past (east) of Malinta Point. Note the contour intervals of Malinta Hill, the pocket is definitely north of that. I don't see any comments about inaccuracies in Cain's description of events regarding Goal Post Ridge. Why is that? Paul Cain's letter giving permission to the Taro Leaf Magazine (24th Infantry Division Association magazine) to use his story. Paul's story was written "with the help of several people who were with us at the time". His credibility goes up a notch or two. Here is a great snapshot of a point in time. After landing on Corregidor the morning of February 16th, 1945, 34th Infantry soldiers split up. One group (mid right) heads directly up the hill and a second group (top right) walk the North Shore Road on their way to Malinta Point. You can see the soldiers in this photo. (Photo courtesy EXO).
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Post by EXO on Jul 7, 2011 13:09:30 GMT 8
The valtin illustration was in the book, for what it was worth, good or bad, and thus it went into the article. I have found that there is a significant number of people 'out there' who do not bother to read any article which is pure text. The site has many natures, and one of them is like an omnibus reader. It collects things and makes them accessible when they weren't formerly. I am the last fellow who ever had difficulty finding material on Corregidor. If you wish to write a definitive critique of which veteran is wrong, then I encourage it. It can build upon your original post which is now permanently in the FIELD NOTE section. For those who cannot find anything without a direct link, that's corregidor.org/fieldnotes/htm/fots2-110706.htmIf we start throwing out entire books because of a few errors, there will be not a single book on Corregidor remaining. Throw out the daily reports as well, there's hardly one without at least a single grievous error or omission, as Bless 'em All endeavors to show. Most people haven't read all the authorities,and judging by the feedback through the years, I suspect only less than a dozen have ever read Valtin. Many don't have Devlin, never heard of him. Some have only read Flanagan, which is both good and bad, as it's a "quickie' as far as history goes. You and I both know there are fellows who do not consider anything noteworthy happened on Corregidor between 1942 and their arrival there. Don't you read "Setting the Stage" to mean that a small group of the 34th got caught in the generator sheds at Enlisted Men's Beach for two days, pinned down, unable to be rescued - and even thought of as lost? I do. It was an overreach, and they were lucky to get out of there alive. Taking a point and losing it by day's end isn't taking a point. There may have been men atop the Malinta Point, and a telephone line for a time, but for a few days (and nights) they weren't masters of their positions. 3d Platoon - had been sent around the base of Malinta to secure Malinta Point on the 16th - they are fairly isolated from the rest of the Co. [Sgt. Lewis Vershun, Pvt. Emil Ehrenhold & Pvt. Ronald Paeth, manning an outpost above North Shore Road, will be cutoff and out of contact with the rest of the company until 23 February. They kill 23 IJM's in the final charge towards their position.) It's not until the 24th that the 1st Bn 503 make it around Malinta Pt. and through to the northern entrance. Only by the end of that day is the knoll overlooking Enlisted Man's Beach taken. Guthrie (at 205) Pity we do not have the date of that aerial photo. Initially, Karl and I had different views on the where goal post ridge/big knoll, little knoll positions were, but I am now more inclined to the view that the position is at the end of a notional line drawn along the actual & military crests between the CP atop Malinta and the position at the end of the telephone line above Malinta Pt. here's not enough hours in a day. I am falling behind on an important project elsewhere.I will now take a break for a few days and let the rest catch up. There's a lot of background reading a lot need to do before they get to your speed, John, let them catch up.
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Post by fots2 on Jul 7, 2011 14:19:48 GMT 8
No one can write a definitive critique on the little information we have, especially when it conflicts. None of us were there so we can only rely on what we read. I am not saying throw a book out for errors. I am saying its historical significance diminishes with each error, simple as that. Regarding "Setting the Stage", here is different sketch for you and Karl. It shows more detail of the soldier's penetration by days end, February 16th. See the shaded area - 2400 16Feb? As you can see, the 34th was well past Malinta Point and got as far as between Engineer and Artillery Points. Night Position Feb 16, 1945 at 2400. Yes, we are beating a dead horse with this one. We are left with only opinions which is not what I would prefer to see. We may be right or we may be wrong. Hopefully present day accounts of this action make note of the controversy associated with the location of Goal Post Ridge and not present a story as the undeniable truth. Show me your two pipes and I will show you my two pipes. ;D Good effort though guys. Thanks.
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Post by The Phantom on Jul 8, 2011 4:18:40 GMT 8
Maybe somebody out there can explain something for me.
What was the pre-war function of the "Goal Post" on the Knoll between Engineers Point and Artillery Point?
We all know its remnants are still there, in the present, not just in the past descriptions, described in the heat of battle or from second hand information gleaned from several individuals who were there, or not.........
A description from one source states;" On one of the knolls a cable hoisting contraption which resembled a Goal Post was found."
My question is, what was it for, and does it connect to the other post of like dimensions, (pictured above) that Fots found on Malinta Hill? And what of the substantial cable in the ground near this post on Malinta Hill? What was it anchoring?
Was this "cable hoisting device" associated with the mine fields off shore? Was it run up to the top of Malinta Hill to bring construction supplies, food water, coal, up and down before the road, or in case the road went out, as it has a habit of doing even today?
Was it located on it's knoll to be sure the cable being used was high enough going over North Shore Road? Does your post / cable line on Malinta line up with the Goal Posts below Fots?
This is out there........... The Goal Post Hill area is located between both Enlisted Men's and the Officers Swimming beaches below, to the left and the right, did this cable have anything to do with the substantial shark nets that were in place at both beaches? ( Could be just getting the shark nets out there for discussion.)
Could there have been other Goal Posts on the side of Malinta Hill where Karl is referring to?
I will enjoy inspecting these areas on my next visit, always something to do, you gotta love Corregidor!
Oh yeah, almost forgot, if there was a cable running up Malinta Hill from Goal Post Knoll, was it the first ZIP LINE?
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Post by fots2 on Jul 8, 2011 15:54:09 GMT 8
You get 10 days in the Stockade for mentioning that zip line!!! Unfortunately I cannot tell you for sure what those vertical pipes were used for. You have some good possabilities though. No map I have shows anything on those ridges such as a pole line etc. Location of the pipes found on and north of Malinta Hill.
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Post by Karl Welteke on Jul 8, 2011 18:54:15 GMT 8
Here is the way I see it.
I read Valtin’s story many years ago and it fascinated me that the K and L companies got up to Malinta Hill almost without casualties. That they sent the 3rd Platoon (of K Co.) around to get to Malinta Point. It was obvious the sloping ridgeline from the north top of Malinta Hill down to Malinta Point had to be covered and they send down two squads.
When I seen the graph of Valtin’s story and read his story it made absolutely sense and to me that the graph fits the story, that the Goal Post Ridge and the Little Knob were along the ridge line between the top and the point. When some of my Corregidor friends mentioned that they believe or think that those two points were maybe on the ridgelines of Engineer Pt or the next knob, ridge, point or knoll to the east of it. I shook my head and said “that can’t be”.
I’m sure that the Valtin’s graph was made with the help of people who been there.
A clarification on the next or second knoll or knob passed the Engineer Point (where the two pipes are that fots2 found recently and I seen in 2008) it is not the Artillery Point. It is rather a knoll, knob, a little inland and is between the Engineer Pt. and the Artillery Pt.
Knowing the geography , the steepness of the north slope, not the ridge line to Malinta Point it would have been impossible for that trooper to carry a wounded comrade up and pull another one along by hand that first night from the Engineering Pt. or the 2nd knob. He only could have come from one of those two knobs or knolls on the ridge line between the top and Malinta Point.
Again based on my experience of having been on the ridgeline between the north top of Malinta Hill and the Malinta Point several times I think the grade of that ridge lends it self of getting the impression that there are some knobs along this ridge. Matter of fact one can not go straight up that ridge one has to hook around or descend to the west at the bottom.
Malinta Point, where VII-S-1 is, is very unique and qualifies as a knob or knoll, it only can be reached over a narrow land bridge from the SE, all other sides are almost vertical. It could be a real fortress or a trap. None of the three reports mentioned so far or are not clear to me at all where exactly 3rd Platoon, K-Co. was. Yes the reports say they where at Malinta Point, but what does that mean in view they only could have come across that bridge if they were there. They could have got there by actually going around the point and then up and back or get on the ridge line between the point and the top and then to the point. It would have been a fortress position.
Everything between Engineering Pt. Ridge lines, the 2nd Knob and the real Hospital Tunnel exit must have been Indian country from the get go. I’m sure the ridge line and the knob or knoll were manned by the Japanese and there are at least 4 openings from the Malinta Tunnel to the north side where the Japanese must have come out to attack K Company and the ridge line between the top and Malinta Pt. There were many small tunnels and ravines also and the entrance to the big RJ43 tunnel was next to the 2nd knob. This area was also relative protected from most Allied artillery. It must have been hell of a Japanese honest nest and I don’t see how any one could get thru there for days.
Two of the reports say that only on the 8th day the Rock Force got past the real Hospital, i.e. the Malinta Tunnel north entrance, and than with tanks only. Nothing convinced me that the Engineering Pt Ridge or the 2nd Knob were the Goal Post Ridge or the Little Knob. The K Co. commander and soldiers never could have got down to those places there to get killed and then his body and the soldiers could not have been recovered before the assault with tanks.
The Cain Report speaks of going to Goal Post ridge several times, some time Japanese where there sometime not. It also says that K Co. personnel, after they got relieved at the top, went there, from the Bottomside, I presume, to get casualties. Those two actions never could have occurred, going to the Engineering Ridge line or the 2nd Knob. To me it only could have been to points on the ridge from the top of Malinta Hill and Malinta Point.
It was obvious to me that Valtin was speaking about a number of tunnel entrances on the west side of Malinta Hill and not the real Hospital Tunnel, i. e. the North Entrance of Malinta Hill. We know there were many big Malinta Tunnel entrances on the west side. Equally the Cain report could have got it wrong also re the distance of the fire from Infantry Point, or even the point. One thing for sure there must have been a lot of mortar fire coming from the east.
EXO, thanks a lot for the 3rd report, ‘Setting The Stage’ I hadn’t seen it yet. And as you said it was a work of love getting it typed from a hard to read copy, thanks. But that report convinces me even more of my view, and interpretation as two where the two places in question were. The gallant action of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry inspires me. Those solders were just ‘Regular Doggies‘, (Pardon my Navy Speak) not elite troops like the paratroopers. They done a most outstanding job and this report sheds a lot of light as to what happened Bottomside, Salamat.
That’s the way I see it or how I interpret the reports.
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Post by fots2 on Jul 9, 2011 0:59:36 GMT 8
Good reply Karl. Yes Valtin's story is fascinating but then he was a writer before the war so he knew how to put words together. I agree that the graph indeed does fit the story. The problem is, the graph is obviously wrong and you know the island well enough to see that. What does that say about the story? Valtin does say the troops got past the tunnel entrances on the first day so they surely could have gotten as far as the lower 175ft ridge. Remember Valtin's text about skirting tunnels as they passed Malinta Point? Do we believe him or not? It would still have been Indian country between the lower hill and Malinta Point the first eight days which was evident due to ambushes and night attack reports. You are basing much of your theory on the idea that casualties and troops passed from down the hill to Malinta Point and then east towards the lower ridge and back. You say it is impossible to come directly up or down the top of Malinta Hill to the lower ridge. You are correct. My question to you is, if you were on the 175ft ridge and wanted to get on top of Malinta Hill, would you take the longest route (via Malinta Point) or hardest route (direct)? The answer is 'none of the above'. They need not do either one to get on top of the hill. It is not impossible at all to carry/drag a wounded comrade from the lower hill (where the 2 pipes are) up to the top of Malinta Hill. I wonder if you are thinking that the lower hill is a bit further west to where there are vertical cliffs and extremely steep hillsides. You are probably saying, how do I know it is possible? Simple, I have walked/climbed from beside the lower 175ft ridge to the road up Malinta Hill and YOU were with me one of those days! There IS an easier and shorter route. The hike I am speaking of was March 16th, 2011. We were walking on the North Shore Road back to Bottomside and you wanted to have a look for a possible tunnel entrance facing east coming from the 1000 bed Hospital. First we had a look at the round concrete platform I found a couple years ago. You might not realize it but that is only 206 feet from the 2 pipes and at roughly the same elevation. We continued on towards the ravine where the NE air shaft hits the surface. You banged your leg and took a break while I wandered around and found the gun position higher up. Later we met up a bit further on the road heading to the top near where the 3-inch gun was located. From here a soldier could take the road to the top or even a couple shortcuts although those do require some effort. We need a map to let everyone else see part of our trek that day (the red line). It shows (1) the lower 175ft hill, (2) the unknown concrete disk, (3) the NE air shaft, (4) the new gun platform, (5) the cave where the 3-inch gun was and finally the road to the top of Malinta Hill. (GPS waypoints assisted with number placement). Additional points are (6) top of Malinta Hill, (7) ridge line between the top of Malinta Hill and Malinta Point, (8) Malinta Point, (9) Bottomside. Yellow is the North Shore Road. Note the terrain between Points #1 and #5. It is steep near #5 but not too bad. If it was possible to loop slightly further east then it is even easier. This eastern slope would also have been Indian territory until it was finally cleared. Whatever route they took, there were engagements but they generally made it. Do I know if this was the exact route they used from the lower 175ft hill to the top? I do not but I am showing you that this is very possible. (The exact route they took is never mentioned). Another question for you. Why are you (and EXO) dismissing the comments of a Company Commander who was in charge of the men on the hill and ridge for some of those days? Cain's document was written by him AND several others who were there at the time. Have you found a more credible source? He is the only guy that is really specific in Goal Post Ridge's location (lower hill 150 yards from Artillery Point). The ridge you believe to be Goal Post Ridge is over 400 yards from Artillery Point. What about the map of the 34th penetration to the north of Malinta Hill by 2400 on February 16th, 1945? What do you think of that? Here is another important point that leads me to believe Goal Post Ridge was not where you think it was. According to text, even after the 34th occupied the top of Malinta Hill, at times Goal Post Ridge was occupied by the Japanese. Being high above and in full view of Bottomside, why are there zero accounts of soldiers down there coming under fire from this specific ridge. Bottomside would be packed with men, vehicles and supplies therefore being an easy target? Now, to clarify my 'opinion', I do not know the exact location of which ridge is Goal Post Ridge. I was not there. Trying to sort that out from written documents has been inconclusive. Nothing has convinced me that it was between the top of the hill down to Malinta Point. It may be the 175ft ridge but I am not 100% convinced of that either. Unfortunately we are not just reading history but also trying to interpret it. The end results are personal opinions and not accurate facts.
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Post by fots2 on Jul 9, 2011 1:04:57 GMT 8
For EXO and Karl etc, One more for you guys. This photo was taken the morning of February 16, 1945 during the 34 Infantry Regiment's assault of Malinta Hill. In the foreground from top to bottom is the ridge down the NW corner of the hill. From the top of Malinta Hill (north end), two metal poles were visible enough down the hill to remind the troops of football goal posts. Goal Post Ridge was named this day. If it was somewhere along this ridge from the top of Malinta Hill down to Malinta Point then the poles should be quite visible in this photo. It is difficult to become a believer when the evidence is missing. Have a look and see what you think. Here is a look at this ridge today.
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Post by Karl Welteke on Jul 9, 2011 12:00:04 GMT 8
Fots2, we interpret the reports 180 degrees differently. You read or interpret that the 3rd Platoon, K Co. or other parts of K Co. and L Co. got past the Malinta Tunnel North Entrance.
I don’t interpret that at all, I read that the majority of K Co. and L Co only faced the 5 Navy tunnels entrances on the west side, that for some reason they referred to them as the Hospital Tunnel. And that was the main mission of the Battalion to get up the hill as fast as possible and that is why they hit the beach first.
Also the 3rd Platoon came by tunnels that faced NW. To me that means that was before they reached Malinta Point. The Cain report even talks about using flamethrowers next day to burn netting away in front of a tunnel facing NW. Again to me that means west or the US side of Malinta Point.
Why don’t we just leave it that, I will recognize that you interpret it your way and I stick with my interpretation and lets continue looking at this battle situation the next time we meet. I promise to buy the 1st beer.
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