The Loss of the S.S. Corregidor

[JohnEakin]

Nice catch, Chad.

[okla]

Hey Chad...Great work, as per usual. I still maintain that you have "missed your calling" and should be in charge of research at the National Archives, etc instead of pursuing the art of making "fine Tennessee Moonshine". lol.

[EXO]

The wreck of the S.S. Corregidor, courtesy of Neil "Snake" Krumbeck. 

This image is copyright, used by permission of the owner.

[roland1369]

RE Remarks Apr 11, 2012 at 8:27pm concerning the lack of investigation Postwar on the sinking of SS Corregidor. As with many things were are trying to judge past actions by contemporary standards. The first thing is to acquaint oneself with the the beliefs of the day. The Spanish Civil War had just ended in 1938 and from this war came the birth of the 5th column, those prewar civilian operatives,local sympathizers, and infiltrated military. This growing fear was reinforced by the rapid fall of the European Countries to a real and greatly exaggerated German use of a 5th column. This made the us Army very wary of such a use by the Japanese and as quite a few stories attest a reality in the Philippines campaign. Thus the fear of a boatload of Japanese commandos seizing the SS Corregidor and conducting a surprise attack on Corregidor Island was not a paranoid thought. The reason that there was no investigation of the sinking was that no crime had been committed. The wartime rules in effect called for any vessel crossing the controlled minefield to be stopped at the guardboat, inspected, and escorted through the field by the guard boat. Any vessel not following the rules was to be treated as hostile and sunk by the mines as well as fired on by the alert battery, in this case the 3 inch Battery James. Thus Col Bunker was following regulations and there was nothing to be investigated. In fact if Col Bunker had rendered safe the mines he would have been guilty of dereliction of duty. As it was he would have been justified in opening fire on the potentially hostile vessel.

[Registrar]

So you have made these inferences on what evidence? That the S.S. Corregidor arrived earlier at the rendezvous point (where it was to be guided through the minefield by a PT boat)? The murder of an American civilian occurred that night, the transfer of US munitions and weapons for the purposes of reinforcing the central command was thwarted. Not to mention that a significant group of central island society and their school-children, by best estimates more than a thousand souls, was lost. This was no mere cattle boat. There should have been an investigation, statements taken, and reports prepared. Did Col. Bunker furnish a report on the circumstances to his immediate commander? Or did he order that the matter was not to be further discussed, thereby establishing an official cover-up? There were political implications. Was MacArthur told? If so, what was he told? If he was NOT told, that would be even worse. If Bunker had the personal right to sink this boat, what gave him that right, and why was it not announced afterwards? What occurred was a coverup. Cover-ups occur in war, yes, and crimes too. False reports of a Japanese submarine's involvement were issued, or if not actually issued, no objection was taken when they hit the newspapers, or for some decades afterwards. How do we know this? Because we are left to speculate more than 70 years later, "what WAS the truth?" Sorry, your speculations are wilder even than my own!

This is just another abysmal chapter in the book of maritime disasters covered up. Not to protect the innocent, for the guilty and the innocent on that ship were both drowned equally. Col. Bunker should have made a full report, and a judgment made upon him, fall what way they should. I have my doubts whether his superior officers would have accepted fifth columnist activity.

[cbuehler]

This has been a fascinating thread to say the least. It tendns to reinforce my opinions that far more than this incident was covered over regarding the conduct of USAFFE in the defense of the Philippines.
It would seem that Col. Bunker's relationship to MacArthur surely had something to do with this incident. He was by all accounts a somewhat hard yet highly respected figure within his profession.
We are left to speculate 70 years later about "what WAS the truth" on many more aspects of the defeat in the Philippines that have unfortunately been brought nearly to the level of mythology by contemporary standards. The Japanese were blamed for everything at the time in the tragedy of war and defeat.
In this case, it is clear that mistakes were made that point to the captain of the ship, Col. Bunker and likely some others. The truth will likely never be fully revealed, as with so much of what happened at the time.
That photo posted by Karl courtesy of Neal Krumbeck; has the exact latitude and longitude of wreck been plotted? Can it be translated to GPS or Google maps?
How deep is that?


CB

[Registrar]

Agreed, there is so much happening we don't know about. I just heard from Will Walker, who has been following this thread. He is researching other matters in the National Archives, and he mentions there are references in diaries concerning the S.S. CORREGIDOR. Overall, he gets the feeling that those writing in their diaries were being very circumspect about what they were putting in writing. He is busy with other works at present, but I am looking forward to anything he can add to the picture.

Many may not know that Bunker's career was blotted by a scandal involving carelessness with double-entry bookkeeping, rushing to tie up loose ends so his unit could be sent to fight in France in WW1. There was no finding of personal dishonesty, but it blotted his career afterwards.

I was the one who posted the sidescan radar image, accompanied by Snake, our new forum member. Snake knows exactly where the wreck is, as he has dived on it. I agree entirely with his decision not to disclose the exact location, as scrapping continues to occur in the region, sometimes after dark (as in the case of the USS NEW YORK) and sometimes under the guise of "clearing" a hazard to navigation. Through the years, it has been my habit not to disclose tunnel entrances on the internet, for similar reasons, though it seems to me that Corregidor continues to lose in the fight against scrappers. It is not happening at the same rate and flagrancy as it once did, so it's not all doom and gloom, but it is still occurring. Dynamite fishing has been illegal for years, there is a Coast Guard facility on Corregidor, but the "whumps" still can be heard as you walk Corregidor's trails.

On an aside, I am becoming inclined to the view that rather than global warming, the true problem worldwide is becoming the depletion of the oceans and fish stocks by unrestricted fishing. Over-fishing won't ever rate a mention on an Oscar show, it's not sexy, but the reality is that in the Philippines, its population continues to grow exponentially, and every year there's less fish to find, and further to go to get them. The area around Corregidor is a maritime wasteland.

[snake]

Here are a couple of images that some members may not have seen before.
                 

             

This is a model of the her as the S.S. Engadine which sold at Bonham's Marine Sale Auction in London on March 22, 2011 for 720 pounds. She was a fine looking ship in her time. 
                               

[snake]

I started researching shipwrecks at diveable depths in the Philippines about four years ago and began to research the S.S. Corregidor early last year. While looking for information, I found your thread and was amazed at the amount of information you had all gathered and it really got me going. I had to find out what happened, and therefore, I had to find the wreck.

To start with, I think Chadhill’s SWAG on May 8, 2012 is spot on apart from the involvement of PT-41 and the ship going down “almost vertically”, so not much point in going over that again here.

Here’s the way I see it.


WEATHER AND TIDE.

The usual Northeast Monsoon prevailed at this time, submarines reported rough seas during their patrols. The moon on the 16th was two days from new so there were spring tides with an ebb tide running that night as mentioned in Sailfish's report. Moon set on the 16th was at 1535 and moon rise on the 17th was at 0439.

From the 27 submarines based at Manila (there were 29 but Sealion was bombed at Cavite on the 10th and Seadragon left for Surabaya on the 16th after being damaged in the bombing) the U.S.S. Sailfish was the only submarine to return from her patrol on the night of the 16th.

In her patrol report there is mention that a “considerable westerly set was experienced in the channel of the outer field, it being necessary to finally steer 030 degrees true with increased speed to leave the mid-channel turning buoy on the port hand.”


THE ROUTE SOUTH.

The shipping route from Manila Bay south is down the coast between Fortune Island and Luzon, then Cape Santiago is rounded to port to enter the Verde Island Passage which is the main shipping corridor to southern ports. Once the course change has been made at the turning buoy to around 180 degrees true, there is no need to deviate from this course as it takes the vessel straight down through this shipping lane to Cape Santiago.

After clearing the minefield on the 19th, submarine S-37 takes a course of 177 degrees true to her assigned area in the Verde Island Passage so I don't believe Captain Calvo had any intention to make a turn to starboard after exiting the safety channel as indicated by Ensign Cox. Making this turn, especially so early, makes no sense. This would lengthen the journey and Japanese submarines were known to be in the area, turning out toward the open sea would not be a wise choice.

The position and orientation of the wreck confirms that this was not the case.


THE PT-41 STORY.

From the journal of Commodore Ramon A. Alcaraz:

“ I also talked with Ensign George Cox, CO PT-41 on duty when S.S. Corregidor sunk five days ago. He said PT-41 was leading the ill-fated ship at the channel but suddenly, all at once, the S.S. Corregidor veered off course toward the minefields and his efforts to stop her were to no avail. There was a loud explosion after hitting a mine. The ship sank so fast virtually all aboard went with her including the ships captain. There were very few survivors.”

PT-41 couldn't have been leading the ship through the channel. If it was, it would have been on the scene almost immediately, locating survivors in the water with her searchlight and picking them up, but there is no mention of this anywhere. It would also have had the 196 survivors on board, not PT-32, the survivors had to wait for PT-32, 34 and 35 to arrive on the scene to be rescued. Jack Fee said it was about two hours before he was picked up by PT-32, F. Lambert was three hours in the water and Jose E. Romero says that it was four hours before he was rescued by one of the PT boats. Mr Balaza’s drawing shows the three PT boats coming out from Sisiman Cove, but there’s no sign of PT-41!

There’s another possibility here and that is that PT-41 wasn’t even at the turn buoy and that it never left Sisiman Cove. Surely if Cox had been on his way back and heard the explosion, he would have turned around again.

I recently contacted PT Boats, Inc. in Tennessee which is reportedly the best source of information on PT Boats. I asked them if they had any information on the four PT Boats for December as I had been unable to source the deck logs for any of them from the National Archives in the States.

Their reply was that “It is most likely that there are no deck logs for PT’s 32, 34 and 35. Quartermasters were commonly ordered to destroy logs to prevent them falling into enemy hands.

Three Ron 3 boats took part in the S.S. Corregidor rescue-- PTs 32, 34 and 35.

PT 41 was not part of the operation.”

So we now know for sure that PT-41 wasn’t leading the Corregidor through the channel and I’m almost sure that it was never sent out from Sisiman Cove either. I have asked PT Boats, Inc. if they can find out if this was the case, but have been informed that it will take some time.


COURSE OF EVENTS FROM THE NORTH CHANNEL.

In my opinion, after Captain Calvo failed to stop for the gunboat U.S.S. Mindanao on approach to the inner minefield, he was abandoned by the Army and the Navy and left to his own devices.

On reaching the turn buoy and finding no patrol boat there, he decided to go for it anyway. But what were his options here? Turn back to the Manila Docks with all these passengers on board, who would not be at all happy with this decision, and probably be subjected to an air raid in the morning? Anchor nearby in Mariveles Harbour for the night with the passengers pressuring him to continue and again be in fear of an air raid in the morning?

There were no options, he had to continue south. Even if PT-41 was at the turn buoy, it’s the same.

Once he had made his turn south, he had past the point of no return. He can’t stop with this drift and he can’t turn either way for fear of ending up in the minefield, so he has to keep going.

I’m sure that he would have believed that the mines were set on safe, yes he hasn’t asked for clearance, but why wouldn’t they be with a scheduled passenger vessel passing through, albeit a little early?

We don’t know what was on Col. Bunker’s mind when, two hours early and arriving at the minefield, the senior officer on watch in the mine casement telephoned him to request permission to de-activate the mines to allow S.S. Corregidor to pass. However, we have the statement of Captain George Steiger that the Army and the Filipino skippers had long been butting heads. Unusually, Capt. Steiger desires that we should understand something personal about Col. Bunker at this point, for he writes succinctly, “With a lifetime of experience with the Filipino, going back to the '98 Insurrection, Col. Bunker said "No!"

Calvo knows what the tides and currents are this night, he has his tide tables and he is familiar with the area. He makes his turn south to a course of 180 degrees true but he must compensate for the westerly drift due to the strong wind and current by steering a heading of 165 or 160 degrees, possibly more as Sailfish reported having to steer 030 degrees true to round the turn buoy, but some hours have passed since then so the drift might not be as severe.

Either way the stern of his ship is now marginally further to the west than the bow is, therefore once he enters the safety channel, the stern will be closer to the mines off the starboard side than the bow will be. Overloaded with passengers, army supplies and equipment, the ship will also be drawing considerably more than its usual 16 feet.

The search lights haven’t come on and he doesn’t know exactly where he is in the channel and he also doesn’t know for sure if he has calculated enough for the drift. Unfortunately he hasn’t and the mine makes contact with the ship abaft the starboard beam (towards the stern) which is the closest part of the ship to the mine at this point.


DID IT SINK STERN FIRST OR BOW FIRST?

There were two eyewitness accounts that said the ship went down bow first. Jose Romero stated “there was a second and more terrible explosion” possibly three minutes or more after the first, going by his story of the life belts, stating “it seemed that it was the boiler that exploded and the boat immediately sank headlong into the water.” If one or more boilers had exploded, then this could have caused the ship to go down bow first.

F. Lambert also says it went down bow first saying “The last I saw of the ship was a smoke-stack and then the propellers in the air."

Looking at the side scan image, from amidships to the stern, there appears to be no structural damage indicative of the stern striking the bottom first. However there is considerable damage in the bow area. This could have been caused by the bow striking the seafloor and/or the ammunition in the forward hold going off at some stage as this area is a mess. This couldn’t have happened on impact as it would have killed all the survivors in the water but possibly some time later.

The buckle amidships could also have been caused when the ship struck the bottom and/or from one or more of the six boilers exploding.

At this stage, until more of the wreck is examined, I’m going with Romero and Lambert.


CONCLUSION.

Once Calvo had left the Manila Docks without clearance and made his turn south without waiting for an escort, he became responsible for the accident and as master of his ship, had he survived, Maritime Law would have decreed that he must take full responsibility for the consequences of his actions.

But that cannot be the end of it.

Disasters are rarely the result of a single error. They occur as the result of a chain of events, a chain of error in which, were any one of those errors not to have occurred, then the accident itself would not result. Disasters occur as the sum total of erroneous judgments and actions past the point at which prevention can occur. Calvo made errors, and Col. Bunker, who had duties and obligations beyond his own personal views of establishing his military authority over recalcitrant Filipino skippers. He also had an opportunity to prevent the disaster, and refused to take it.

So why the PT-41 story? The general public and the armed forces seldom see things in the same light, questions will be asked and fingers pointed. Circulating this story, and the one about the ship hitting a Japanese mine, shortly after the sinking ensures no blame will fall on the Army or the Navy. All the blame falls on one man and he can’t speak for himself.

When Ensign Cox told his tale, he was only following orders and had no choice in the matter.

It’s a neat scenario, one in which an inquiry need not be held, and the authority of the Military over a civilian government cannot now be questioned. Besides, there are much more pressing matters at hand. The Japanese are rapidly approaching and the sinking of the S.S. Corregidor is soon swept under the carpet.

What I find deeply disturbing about the story is that not so much that it was contrived, but it must have been contrived at a high level of command. That such a disaster had occurred at the mouth of Manila Bay had clear political implications for the US – Filipino relationship, extending far beyond military considerations. Who could have authorized such a story? Surely only officers of the highest authority.

Lately, as the result of the relationships developing within our collegiate, I’ve had the opportunity to be contacted by a young researcher working his way through boxes of National Archives documents containing POW diaries of Corregidor officers. I don’t want to steal Will Walker’s thunder, but he is discovering there were officers who knew that something was very wrong about what had happened, but felt constrained even to put it in writing. One of them wrote later:

"Have had occasion to speak in conversation lately about the many things which are far better left unmentioned back in the States. The S.S. Corregidor episode and Q.M. and the Tactical Administration and the Fall and the Filipinos etc. It will all come out in parts and pieces and attitudes etc. all our lives—but to stress certain truths publicly is not to be done. That is—providing always that the opportunity to speak publicly comes up sometime in the future. I hope it does. There are some few things it will be a pleasure to get off my chest!"

The writer did not survive the war, but it is clear to Will Walker that the S.S. Corregidor was something to be kept hush hush, the result of an apparent error or wrongdoing being indicated.

I believe that if Col. Bunker had survived the war, he should have been charged with dereliction of duty and possibly murder as an American citizen died in the sinking. I find it hard to accept that the Inshore Patrol wouldn’t have contacted Lt. Bulkeley at MTB RON-3 to notify him that the Corregidor was passing through without clearance. Was the disposition of PT-41 that night a culpable act? Why weren’t orders given to accommodate S.S. Corregidor’s early arrival and Cox ordered to guide the ship through anyway.

Yes the ship left without clearance, and although wartime, both these officers were directly responsible for the safety of passengers and crews passing through the minefields. Had they failed in their duty to protect innocent lives?

This was a large passenger vessel and it should not have been ignored because the Captain alone made a foolish decision.

Combine this information with Chadhill’s SWAG and I think we have a convincing story with added links to the chain of error.

There are still going to be some ifs and buts but this is probably as close as we are going to get with the sinking. Hopefully more information will come to light in relation to the cover up.

I would also like to say that getting this far with the investigation and finding the wreck has been a combined effort between the forum members and the Sea Scan Survey crew as I have obtained a lot of information from the S.S. Corregidor thread.


THE WRECK.

The ship is in a very bad state as seen by the side scan image and buried deep in mud and silt. The bow area is a mass of twisted metal and debris and there are fishing lines and nets snagged everywhere. Visibility is also very poor making it a potentially dangerous wreck.

Dynamite explosions from local fishermen are regularly heard underwater here and this practice has probably contributed to the wrecks poor condition. There may also have been some attempts at salvage in the past.

I was told it has previously been dived on by a group of local divers from Subic Bay several years ago but they say they won't return as they believe it to be haunted.

We have only covered a small area near the bow so far and plan to dive it again this year. It would be nice to get positive identification but this won't be easy. Even using underwater scooters, progress is very slow and we have had to abort two dives so far on reaching the bottom as the visibility was zero.

This wreck is a war grave, and once identified, should be left undisturbed. I doubt very much if any bodies were ever removed from it.

More to follow......

[Registrar]

As I'm not a military lawyer, so you can take this under advisement. It seems to me, now that I've been prompted to find my copy of the Courts-Martial U.S. Army 1928 (Corrected to April 20, 1943) and to blow the dust off it, that "Dereliction of Duty" mightn't have existed at the time of the sinking. That's not to say that there was no offence. Prior to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, offences were pursuant to "The Articles of War", in which dereliction of duty was addressed within the regulations governing the failure to obey an order or regulation.

The Articles of War "shall at all times and in all places govern the Armies of the United States."

As the S.S. Corregidor carried military property belonging to the United States, Article 83 would have applied. Article 92 dealt with Murder. Manslaughter was covered in Article 93. Though not mentioned in the Articles, all"disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service shall be taken cognizance of according to the nature and degree of the offense."