The Loss of the S.S. Corregidor

[wwalker]

Hello,

Thanks for the info Fots. It seems that if there were submarines in the Bay that day, the Army mines would have had to have been on safe. But after digging through some submarine logs today, I cannot find anything YET that mentions them being in Manila Bay during that 24 hour time period. The only thing that I found of any interest is this:

USS Canopus War Diary

"16 December 1941

0010 Seadragon stood out for southern waters, emergency repairs completed"

"17 December 1941

1730 Sailfish came alongside for fuel, water, stores, etc. SS Corregidor reported lost with considerable loss of life due to striking mine off Corregidor"

So here we see that there were a couple of submarines, the Seadragon & Sailfish, that were in the bay during that time period. These are the only two that I've found record of so far. I was able to find out that there was quite alot of submarine activity in Manila Bay in the days that followed the sinking of the SS Corregidor. I will do more in-depth on this soon.

I recently received "Fighting for MacArthur" by John Gordon back from a friend that I let borrow. I read his explanation of events again, and his in-depth research produces probably the most truthful, evidence based explanation of what happened. He concludes his 3 page explanation with "Therefore, it appears that a combination of mistakes by the ship's owners, captain, and the US military resulted in the tragedy." Interestingly, he also stated that there were 150 Philippine Army soldiers on the SS Corregidor, and seven Americans. There was also a substantial amount of weaponry on board being sent to the Southern Philippine forces that was lost in the sinking.

Gordon's book appears to have been written from careful studying of these Naval Records, and of course the war diary of the 4th Marines. And also these were certainly not his only sources of information in the book.

Okla, this is a twisty topic. It's one of those topics that requires a lot of research and study before getting to the true facts. I have found that many events written of certain events by veterans during and after the war were based off of what was told to them. This is where the facts get alittle shaky, and sometimes there's truth to these too. However, anytime I have read recollections from those that were in the campaign, that actually witnessed an event (or took part in), those are usually the facts (or very close), almost 100% of the time. So it is one thing to have heard about something happening, and another to have actually watched or took part in these historical happenings. It's all about eye-witness' and participants.

I am going to continue digging and sifting, if I come across anything more that will add to this story I will post it. Thanks for the great discussion. This forum is great, with great people.


WW

PS: I am also very curious as to if any of the estimated 260 survivors of this disaster are still living. Its definitely not impossible (matter of fact I think it could be likely), as many of the people on board were said to have been college students, and would have been 16-22 years old at the time, and there were also children on board.

[EXO]

wwalker,

Your posting is perceptive, and I would like to add a little to it if I may.

I very much enjoy these discussions and the collegiate atmosphere that seems to come with them. What a wonderful "course" we are studying here!

In September of 2010, I had an exchange of e-mails with John Gordon on this topic. I had been invited into discussions with him on the SS Corregidor topic by Richard King, the son of an officer on duty that day. Mr. Gordon was most amenable to discussing things, even though I explained to him that I had only been in the very early days of my research in the matter, and would defer to his scholarship.

He explained that he'd uncovered some very good sources on this incident, in particular a 1950s article in the American Chamber of Commerce magazine published in Manila that described the incident and talks about the accounts of several survivors. (He didn't mention which particular volume it was, I should have asked.) He also mentioned that he'd found a reference in the deck log of the gunboat USS Mindanao (which is in the National Archives in Maryland) that says she tried to get the Corregidor to stop after it departed from Manila, but the ship’s skipper refused to do so.

Mr. Gordon had good reasons to fault Col. Bunker in aspects of his management of the artillery assets on the fortified islands., but that's not what this discussion is about. As a retired Field Artillery Officer, Mr. Gordon's views hold weight. So I do not see Mr. Gordon as, in any way, being an apologist for Col. Bunker's conduct that night.

As our other correspondents have ably commented, there seems to be more than enough reasons to share the blame for the SS Corregidor tragedy, and to his credit Mr. Gordon does just that.

Our site hosts a Review of Mr. Gordon's Book, at:

503prct.org/heritage_battalion/book_review_6.html

[chadhill]

One more comment about Braly's report. Bunker reported directly to General Moore. If there is any substance to Braly's story about the SS Corregidor being delayed by the subs, one of the first questions Moore would have asked Bunker after the disaster was: "When did you return the Monja minefield to contact?". It's then difficult for me to believe that Braly, as the General's operations officer, would not have been aware of any such discussion, and of Bunker's answer. But he is mute on the matter.

EXO, the article Gordon referenced is titled "The Sinking of the SS Corregidor, December 17, 1941" by A.V.H. Hartendorp, and was published in the September 1953 issue of The American Chamber of Commerce Journal (Manila). I think the same article may be found in Volume 29 (1953) of Journal- American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. Several weeks ago I tried to find a copy to purchase but had no success. I remember that a Library in Manila (Rizal?) had a copy for browsing, but being stateside that did me no good.

* * * * *

Gordon's finding (p.74) that the USS Mindanao tried to stop the SS Corregidor could be key in our discussion here. That indicates that the SS Corregidor was not being led by a Navy vessel at this point. It appears from Gordon's account that this interception occurred before the SS Corregidor entered the North Channel minefield.

One would assume that the Mindanao immediately notified the Inshore Patrol of the event, and that word was quickly passed to the Harbor Defense Commander (Moore) and then to the Seaward Defense Commander (Bunker). But maybe a snafu happened somewhere here. The Belotes make note of the friction between the Inshore Patrol and the Army. Gordon notes (p.77) that on 21 December Admiral Rockwell and his staff went to Corregidor, met with General Moore and discussed "better integrating the activities of the Inshore Patrol with the Army. By this time the Inshore Patrol was under the command of recently promoted Captain Kenneth Hoeffel who was onboard the gunboat Mindanao". Hmm... Wwalker, will any of those documents coming to you from NARA have excerpts from the deck log or war diary of the Mindanao? I wonder if they mention signaling or radioing anyone after intercepting the SS Corregidor?

[wwalker]

EXO and Chad, thanks for the tip on the article about the SS Corregidor. If I come across this piece I will post it here. Most of the records I have on order are Army records, but there are also several diaries from various branches. To be honest, I'm not quite 100 percent sure exactly what all I've got coming. The information is also suppose to include award decorations during the Philippine defense. I will let know if there is anything "new" in this pile of papers. Thanks again.

WW

[chadhill]

I've been kicking around some ideas in my head and wanted to see what you guys thought. It's a SWAG based on information we've presented in this thread and some plain old pure speculation by myself. Some of the pieces seemed to fit better than others to me, so I admit I was selective in what I have written below. I'm sure that some of my SWAGs will be thought to be wrong and please don't hesitate to comment so. Hopefully we will someday learn what happened to the SS Corregidor.


This fascinating chart of the minefields was posted by fots2 back in Reply 27. I had to edit out the words "Navy Contact Mines" in the upper left corner in order to make space for the turn buoy. I've added a dark blue arrow for the USS Mindanao, light blue ones for PT-41, and red ones for the SS Corregidor.

Note that near the top of the hand printed legend is the statement "S.S. Corregidor strikes mine and sinks Dec. 17, 1941". Studying the chart, I noticed that in the bottom line of the La Monja minefield, left-of-center, is the letter "C" with an arrow pointing towards the circled mine group 6 (see bottom red arrow). Surely this "C" must represent the SS Corregidor.

Where did this very detailed, professionally drawn chart come from? That's a very good question, and I don't know the answer. But we are left with a few clues. Fots pointed out to me that there is reverse printed bleed-thru from the back side. Above the words "North Channel" are the faint words PRISONER'S IDENTIFICATION CARD in reverse. Scattered throughout the backside are various Japanese characters and English words.


courtesy of fots2 (compliments of Peter Parsons)




Ok, here's the SWAG:


The SS Corregidor is scheduled to leave at midnight on the evening of 16 December with a US Navy vessel leading. Captain Calvo has sailed through the Corregidor minefields a number of times over the past months, but tonight he has even more concerns on his mind. His ship has been flooded with hundreds of extra refugees and he strongly suspects it is overloaded, but it is difficult to turn away those fleeing for their lives. His passengers include many prominent people and he is being pressured to get underway. Calvo also knows that Japanese aircraft have destroyed nearby Cavite Navy Yard and many other targets in the Port of Manila area, so he wants to be as far south as possible by sunrise. At 8:00 p.m. he finally succumbs to these factors and departs, believing that the USN will detect his early departure and assign him an escort anyway.

On the way to the North Channel, the SS Corregidor is intercepted by the USS Mindanao. The gunboat signals the liner to stop, but she continues ahead. The Mindanao notifies Inshore Patrol of the Corregidor's course and continues on with its assigned duties.

Inshore Patrol realizes the SS Corregidor has left Manila far in advance of its scheduled departure time and will be in the North Channel minefield shortly. They contact Lieutenant John Bulkeley, CO of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three based at Sissiman Cove east of Mariveles Bay, and order him to dispatch one of his fast PT boats to find the liner. Bulkeley sends his flagship PT-41, commanded by the wartime experienced Ensign George Cox, who volunteered to go help the French against the Germans in 1940. Inshore Patrol attempts to contact the HQ of Harbor Defense Command on Corregidor.

Captain Calvo sees the lighted buoys outlining the 600 yard wide safety channel as he approaches the North Channel. He still has no escort but knows the way so far. The US Army officers on watch from the minefield casemate at M ' East near Battery James sight the SS Corregidor as it approaches the North Channel minefield. They notify their superior, Colonel Carl Englehart, who in turn calls the C-1 station HQ and requests permission from the Seaward Defense Commander, Colonel Paul Bunker, to switch the minefield to SAFE. The answer comes back, "No. The ship has not been cleared to leave the bay". Because of this order, word is not passed to Searchlight Batteries 3 and 4 on the west coast to prepare to illuminate the unlighted buoys which define the safety channel in the La Monja minefield. These buoys are not lighted so as to prevent arousing the interest of Japanese submarines known to have approached the area from the South China Sea.

Calvo successfully manuevers the Corregidor between the lighted buoys in the thin North Channel minefield and penetrates it without harm. Maintaining a near due west dead-reckoning course, he soon sees the lighted turn buoy ahead. From the turn buoy he knows to head nearly due south, towards the second safety channel where his ship will penetrate the La Monja minefield.

Ensign Cox of PT-41 spots the SS Corregidor as it approaches the lighted turn bouy and signals it to stop. The liner flashes him a friendly recognition reply but ignores his order and turns south at the buoy. Cox radios Bulkeley at Sissiman Cove for orders. Bulkeley says, "Stay with him and keep me advised". Cox pulls PT-41 up alongside SS Corregidor. From the liner's bridge, Calvo looks out and thinks his lead escort has finally arrived. Bulkeley calls Inshore Patrol and tells them, "He's made the turn and is going for it. Better tell Seaward Command to be ready with the lights". Inshore responds that they're working on it.

LT Jonelis and the observers at M ' West, south of Battery Hanna, spot the Corregidor steaming south from the turn buoy. Someone picks up the phone, informs the C-1 station HQ and requests to set the mines on SAFE. The request is agained denied. "Leave them on CONTACT", says Colonel Bunker, "The ship has not been cleared".

PT-41 continues to stay with the SS Corregidor. Cox repeatedly signals for the liner to stop but gets no reponse. Captain Calvo has the torpedo boat in his peripheral vision but is looking for the unlighted buoys somewhere off the bow. He knows the searchlights on Corregidor will illuminate the buoys as he nears the minefield, and they are still off at this point.

Cox radios Bulkeley again. "Do what you can", replies the skipper, "But use your best judgement". There is no moon, all shoreline lights off are in wartime blackout, and Cox cannot even make out the heights of The Rock, somewhere off his port side. Cox realizes PT-41 has such a shallow draft it is almost impossible to strike one of the nearly 500 mines, each submerged 15 feet, outside the 600 yard wide safety channel, but he is worried about what will happen to his own boat if the nearby liner hits a mine and explodes. It is so dark he is not even sure how close the ship is.

Calvo becomes worried because the searchlights have not come on yet. "What do you think?", he queries his First Officer. "Our guide is still with us, sir. We are heading south. I say steady as she goes, sir". Calvo nods. They continue on, straining to see the buoys in the darkness. It seems almost enough time has passed, thinks Calvo. Maybe they are just about to leave the field-

Suddenly a great explosion occurs on the aft starboard side of the SS Corregidor. PT-41 lists from side to side and nearly capsizes. Searchlight 3 from Cheney Ravine illuminates, followed by searchlight 4 at Wheeler Point. The beams rotate until they point at the rapidly sinking liner, now going down almost vertically.

A warning light on the status board illuminates inside the minefield casemate near James Ravine. Colonel Engelhart phones Colonel Bunker. "It a discharge in group six", he tells the Seaward Defense Commander. "Set all mines to SAFE immediately!" barks Bunker.

Back at Sissiman Cove, Lieutenant Bulkeley sees and hears the explosion. He knows exactly what has happened, and immediately sends the PT-32, 34 and 35 boats to the scene. They join PT-41 in rescueing less than 300 survivors of the 1200-1500 people estimated to have been on the ship. Seven die later in hospitals. Captain Calvo is not among the fortunate ones.

* * * * *

On 21 December, Rear Admiral Francis W. Rockwell and his staff depart the Marsman Building in Manila. They board the minesweeper USS Tanager and depart for Corregidor Island. Admiral Hart has directed Rockwell to quickly relocate the 16th Naval District HQ to Tunnel Queen, and that is the official reason for the trip. However, behind closed doors, there is more to that for this visit.

When Admiral Rockwell faces Harbor Defense Commander Major General George F. Moore (two days after his promotion from Brigadier), the two turn to discussing issues involving better integration of the activities of the Inshore Patrol and the Army. There must be no repeating the mistakes that contributed to the disater that occurred only a few nights before. A common enemy is rapidly closing in and the Philippine government must remain a staunch ally. The captain of the fateful ship did not survive and can be presumed to have borne primary responsibility for the disaster. There will be no board of inquiry and all official US records of involvement will be stricken or destroyed. The matter is considered closed.


Remember, this is only a SWAG...

[sherwino]

Good details of your SWAG, Chad. I like it.

[okla]

Hey Chad....Absolutely not SWA, but rather a studied, well thought out G. Plenty of blame to go around, but if only the good Colonel Bunker had said, "OK, put the mines on safe, and we will sort out this deliberate flaunting of operational procedure by the Skipper of the SS Corregidor at a later date". I maintain that the "stiff necked" approach by Colonel Bunker is and will remain the primary reason this disaster took place. This is my SWAG. As Harry Truman once, famously stated, "hindsight is 20 - 20".

[fots2]

Chad,

Details of this disaster will never be known of course but I like your attempt to make some sense of all we have read. I have a comment that may change one detail. I wonder if the SS Corregidor actually struck the mine at the starboard bow and not the starboard aft/stern.

From some reports the ship turned right too early near the end of the outer channel which may have pointed the starboard bow directly into a mine. The stern of the ship would be pushed away a bit as the turn was in progress.

The main reason I was thinking ‘bow’ is info from the eyewitness account of Mr. Balaza at Searchlight #4. He states: “I looked at the vessel, it had struck a mine near a little island called Monja. It was in a vertical position, with its bow looking up to the heavens of the dark sky, as if begging for mercy by some great unknown miracle to be spared from her dreadful fate”.

Does this make any sense? At the moment of the explosion, the ship would still be horizontal. Water would pour in through the hole with great force rushing from bow to stern. The water in the stern would be dead weight and soon cause the ship to start to tilt downward at the rear. The bow would be lighter as there would still be much air being forced out. Once the tilt started, it would only intensify as water filled the stern and then mid compartments. The ship would soon be bow out of the water. As the remaining air was expelled, the ship would start to settle in the ocean stern first.

My nautical experience is limited to a row boat when I was a kid so feel free to shoot holes in my ideas.

[okla]

Hey Fots....As you and everybody else on this Forum knows, I am not a sea faring man, but the RMS Titanic struck that infamous iceberg on her starboard bow and went down bow first. I have viewed, on the History Channel, the debates/discussions on how and why the "great ship went down" till my head begins to spin, but it just seems that any vessel is going to begin her plunge to the ocean depths at the point of impact/collision/explosion,etc. Just my humble, land lubber opinion. Feel free to also knock holes in my unscientific theory. Cheers. Postscript...That is a great map/chart. The CAC Topographical Dept seemed to have the capability to turn out a quality product.

[chadhill]

Fots and okla, I'm typing this post on an airport computer but called home and had the wife check my reference about which side the ship hit the mine on. She managed to find it, on page 74-75 of Gordon's book "Fighting for MacArthur". According to him the ship hit a mine on the starboard stern side. That seems to make it a bit harder to explain the ship in a right turn. But if it did impact on the starboard stern, those compartments would flood first and I tend to think the extra water weight would drag it down stern first...but stranger things have happened.

I'll bet the SS Corregidor blew up with one heckuva bang, too. The wife checked for me, and it was carrying fourteen 3" guns PLUS AMMO and some 2.95" stuff. No wonder it sank so quickly, if all that powder went off, too.

I stuck the bottom red arrow on the chart to show the ship in a right turn when it hit the mine, but forgot to mention it in the text! Must be the over-50 syndrome ;D. In my SWAG, after Bulkeley radioed Cox to "do what you can", Cox realized that the Corregidor was not going to stop, so he pulled PT-41 out infront of her to look for the unlighted buoys as best he could in the dark, "leading" the ship as some accounts say. Moments later, Calvo mistakenly judged he was clear of the field and turned right. Finis-